•  713
    Degrees of Virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics
    Ancient Philosophy 37 (1): 91-112. 2017.
    I argue that Aristotle believes that virtue comes in degrees. After dispatching with initial concerns for the view, I argue that we should accept it because Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue as the highest degree of virtue. I support this interpretation of heroic virtue by considering and rejecting alternative readings, then showing that heroic virtue characterized as the highest degree of virtue is consistent with the doctrine of the mean.
  •  560
    Deficient virtue in the Phaedo
    Classical Quarterly 70 (1): 119-130. 2020.
    Plato seems to have been pessimistic about how most people stand with regard to virtue. However, unlike the Stoics, he did not conclude that most people are vicious. Rather, as we know from discussions across several dialogues, he countenanced decent ethical conditions that fall short of genuine virtue, which he limited to the philosopher. Despite Plato's obvious interest in this issue, commentators rarely follow his lead by investigating in detail such conditions in the dialogues. When scholars…Read more
  •  432
    Platonic Personal Immortality
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3): 812-836. 2019.
    I argue that Plato distinguishes between personal immortality and immortality of the soul. I begin by criticizing the consensus view that Plato identifies the person and the soul. I then turn to the issue of immortality. By considering passages from 'Symposium' and 'Timaeus', I make the case that Plato thinks that while the soul is immortal by nature, if a person is going to be immortal, they must become so. Finally, I argue that Plato has a psychological continuity approach to personal identity…Read more
  •  282
    The Objects of Stoic Eupatheiai
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (3): 195-212. 2017.
    The Stoics claim that the sage is free from emotions, experiencing instead εὐπάθειαι (‘good feelings’). It is, however, unclear whether the sage experiences εὐπάθειαι about virtue/vice only, indifferents only, or both. Here, I argue that εὐπάθειαι are exclusively about virtue/vice by showing that this reading alone accommodates the Stoic claim that there is not a εὐπάθειαι corresponding to emotional pain. I close by considering the consequences of this view for the coherence and viability of Sto…Read more
  •  48
    Overstraining Human Nature in the Nicomachean Ethics
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (1): 45-67. 2021.
    In this paper, I investigate Aristotle’s claim in 'Nicomachean Ethics' III.1 about situations that “overstrain human nature.” By setting out and answering several interpretative questions about such situations, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of this passage. I argue that in (at least some of) these cases, the agent voluntarily does something wrong, even though there is a right action available. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle would think it is possible for a rare agent to perform the…Read more
  •  10
    Aristotle on Thought and Feeling. By Paula Gottlieb (review)
    Ancient Philosophy 43 (1): 293-297. 2023.
  •  3
    Bodily Desires and Afterlife Punishment in the 'Phaedo'
    Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 59 45-78. 2021.
    In this paper I investigate whether in the 'Phaedo' the body or the soul is the subject of bodily desires. By analyzing Plato’s portrayal of the disembodied soul in the dialogue, I argue that because many souls are shown possessing bodily desires after death, the soul can possess bodily desires. Part of my analysis is built on my argument that the best way to understand afterlife punishment in the dialogue is as the necessary frustration of persistent bodily desires. Finally, I end the paper by …Read more
  •  1
    Socrates, Philosophy, and Friendship in the 'Phaedo'
    In Wisdom, Love, and Friendship in Ancient Greek Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Daniel Devereux, De Gruyter. 2020.
    In this paper I investigate Socrates as a friend in Plato's 'Phaedo'. I begin by setting out his friends' request for reassurance of how they will fare after Socrates dies. I argue that by structuring the discussion as he does, Socrates provides one final opportunity for his friends to prepare themselves for life without him, thus offering them the best kind of reassurance they could ask for.