•  782
    Why is it that some instances of disagreement appear to be so intractable? And what is the appropriate way to handle such disagreements, especially concerning matters about which there are important practical and political needs for us to come to a consensus? In this paper, I consider an explanation of the apparent intractability of deep disagreement offered by hinge epistemology. According to this explanation, at least some deep disagreements are rationally unresolvable because they concern ‘hi…Read more
  •  686
    Hinge Epistemology, Radical Skepticism, and Domain Specific Skepticism
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (2): 116-133. 2019.
    This paper explores how hinge epistemology might fruitfully be applied not only to the problem of radical skepticism, but also to certain domain specific skepticisms, and in particular, moral skepticism. The paper explains the idea of a domain specific skepticism, and how domain specific skepticisms contrast with radical skepticism. I argue that a domain specific skeptical problem can be resolved in just the same way as radical skepticism, if there are hinge commitments within that domain. I the…Read more
  •  460
    A Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse
    Dissertation, University of Connecticut. 2022.
    What is it that we are doing when we make ethical claims and judgments, such as the claim that we morally ought to assist refugees? This dissertation introduces and defends a novel theory of ethical thought and discourse. I begin by identifying the surface features of ethical thought and discourse to be explained, including the realist and cognitivist (i.e. belief-like) appearance of ethical judgments, and the apparent close connection between making a sincere ethical judgment and being motivat…Read more
  •  215
    Disjunctive luminosity
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (2): 118-126. 2021.
    Williamson's influential anti-luminosity argument aims to show that our own mental states are not “luminous,” and that we are thus “cognitively homeless.” Among other things, this argument represents a significant challenge to the idea that we enjoy basic self-knowledge of our own occurrent mental states. In this paper, I summarize Williamson's anti-luminosity argument, and discuss the role that the notion of “epistemic basis” plays in it. I argue that the anti-luminosity argument relies upon a …Read more
  •  47
    Luca Moretti and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology (review)
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1): 79-87. 2022.
  •  26
    This paper employs Ruth Millikan’s biosemantic theory of representation to develop a proposal about the function of ethical claims and judgments. I propose that ethical claims and judgments (or ethical ‘affirmations’) have the function of simultaneously tracking the morally salient features of social situations and directing behavior that coordinates in a collectively beneficial way around those features. Thus, ethical affirmations count as a species of what Millikan labels ‘Pushmi-Pullyu’ repre…Read more
  •  2
    Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge
    In Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, Routledge. pp. 317-344. 2019.
    So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one's present states of mind) can be seen as both 'baseless' and privileged. The spontaneous self-beliefs we have when we avow our states of mind do not appear to be formed on any particular epistemic basis (whether intro-or extro-spective). Nonetheless, on some views, these self-beliefs constitute instances of (privileged) knowledge. We are here interested in views on which true mental self-beliefs have internalist epistemic warrant that fal…Read more
  • This chapter reflects on some of the major themes of this volume, as it takes up the question: is truth a value in political discourse? As a preliminary step, we evaluate a view of political discourse that answers this question negatively: the identity-expression view. According to this view, political claims function to express commitments central to an individual’s political self-conceptions, rather than to state truths in the political domain. While we often assess political claims as true or…Read more
  • Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge
    In Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, Routledge. pp. 317-344. 2019.
    So-called basic self-knowledge (ordinary knowledge of one's present states of mind) can be seen as both 'baseless' and privileged. The spontaneous self-beliefs we have when we avow our states of mind do not appear to be formed on any particular epistemic basis (whether intro-or extro-spective). Nonetheless, on some views, these self-beliefs constitute instances of (privileged) knowledge. We are here interested in views on which true mental self-beliefs have internalist epistemic warrant that fal…Read more
  • From the back cover: This book offers a collection of papers on focal themes in truth research, including minimalism, pragmatism and pluralism, and philosophical logic. It further provides valuable hindsight with contemporary perspectives on the works of Frege, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, Strawson, and Evans on truth, and it features recent discussions on the role and value of truth in politics and political discourse. The collection is based on groundbreaking presentations hosted by the Virtual Inter…Read more