My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Lean toward: no
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Reject both
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Lean toward: subjective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: no
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Reject both
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Reject all
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Reject all
God: theism and atheism Agnostic/undecided
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Reject both
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Reject all
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Reject both
Logic: classical and non-classical Lean toward: non-classical
Mental content: internalism and externalism Reject both
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Reject both
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Reject both
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Reject both
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Reject both
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Reject both
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Reject all
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Reject all I tend towards an account drawn from the early Heidegger, which isn't reflected in any of these approaches. The lines of division between them are very frustrating to the continental tradition.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Reject all
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Reject all There are many other positions outside of these; I would lean towards an "ethics of care" approach.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Reject both
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Reject both Again, I'd look to Foucault, Canguilhem and Bachelard.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept both
Time: A-theory and B-theory Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Reject all Again, I feel very unhelpful in answering this question as it is alien to the continental tradition - although I am sufficiently aware of the positions above. I draw heavily on accounts of truth forward in Foucault's work; which is substantially different to those above
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: inconceivable