•  5
    Cavell and Philosophical Vertigo
    Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (9). 2021.
    My interest is the kind of philosophical vertigo that is a theme of Cavell’s work on scepticism. This describes the anxiety that is elicited via philosophical engagement with certain kinds of sceptical questions. There is a standing puzzle about this notion of vertigo, however, forcefully pressed, for example, by McDowell. Why should a resolution of the sceptical problem, one that putatively completely undercuts the motivation for scepticism in that domain, nonetheless generate vertigo in this s…Read more
  •  4
    Omniscience and ignorance
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1). 2021.
    God’s omniscience generates certain puzzles, not least regarding how such omniscience is compatible with human free will. One option in this regard is to impose limitations on the scope of God’s knowledge, but that then poses the further question of how such limitations can be compatible with God’s nature as a perfect being. I offer a novel way of approaching these questions, which appeals to what I claim is an independently motivated distinction between lacking knowledge and being ignorant. In …Read more
  •  9
    Socrates as Intellectual Character Builder
    Ancient Philosophy Today 3 (2): 133-147. 2021.
    Our aim in this paper is to argue that Socrates is an intellectual character builder. We show that the Socratic Method, properly understood, is a tool for developing the intellectual character of students. It motivates agents towards the truth and helps them to develop the cognitive skills to gain knowledge of the truth. We further elucidate this proposal by comparing the Socratic Method, so understood, with the widely held contemporary view that the epistemic aim of education is the development…Read more
  •  20
    Varieties of Epistemic Risk
    Acta Analytica 1-15. forthcoming.
    My interest is in how shifting from an anti-luck epistemology to an anti-risk epistemology can enable us to make sense of some important epistemic phenomena. After rehearsing the more general arguments for preferring anti-risk epistemology over its anti-luck cousin, I argue that a further advantage of this transition lies in how it puts us in a better position to understand certain trade-offs with regard to epistemic risk. In particular, there can be ways of forming beliefs that are epistemicall…Read more
  •  7
    Veritic Desire
    Humana Mente 14 (39). 2021.
    The intellectual virtues are defined, in part, in terms of a love for the truth: veritic desire. Unpacking this idea is complicated, however, not least because of the difficulty of understanding the truth goal that is associated with veritic desire. In particular, it is argued that this cannot be formulated in terms of the maximization of one’s true beliefs. What is required, it is claimed, is a conception of veritic desire as aiming at understanding the fundamental nature of reality, where this…Read more
  •  10
    Veritism and the Goal of Inquiry
    Philosophia 49 (4): 1347-1359. 2021.
    Elgin has offered us a powerful articulation of an epistemology that does not, contra veritism, have a concern for truth at its core. I contend that the case for Elgin’s alternative epistemological picture trades upon a faulty conception of what a veritistic epistemological outlook involves. In particular, I argue that the right conception of veritism—one that is fundamentally informed by the intellectual virtues—has none of the problematic consequences that Elgin claims. Relatedly, I maintain t…Read more
  •  45
    Assurance and Disjunctivism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3): 715-720. 2021.
  •  8
    Extended cognition, assistive technology and education
    with Andrea R. English and John Ravenscroft
    Synthese 1-23. forthcoming.
    Assistive technology is widely used in contemporary special needs education. Our interest is in the extent to which we can conceive of certain uses of AT in this educational context as a form of extended cognition. It is argued that what is critical to answering this question is that the relationship between the student and the AT is more than just that of subject-and-instrument, but instead incorporates a fluidity and spontaneity that puts it on a functional par with their use of the student’s …Read more
  •  12
    Intellectual humility and the epistemology of disagreement
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 7): 1711-1723. 2018.
    It is widely accepted that one strong motivation for adopting a conciliatory stance with regard to the epistemology of peer disagreement is that the non-conciliatory alternatives are incompatible with the demands of intellectual character, and incompatible with the virtue of intellectual humility in particular. It is argued that this is a mistake, at least once we properly understand what intellectual humility involves. Given some of the inherent problems facing conciliatory proposals, it is mai…Read more
  • Wittgenstein and the Epistemology of Religion (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
  •  34
    Editors’ Note
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4): 185-186. 2020.
  •  14
    The sources of scepticism
    Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60. 2019.
    It is claimed that the radical sceptical problem that is the focus of much of contemporary epistemological discussion in fact divides into two logically distinct subproblems --a formulation that turns on the closure principle, and a second formulation which turns on the underdetermination principle. The Wittgensteinian account of the structure of rational evaluation is set out, and it is shown how this proposal --at least when properly formulated--can deal with closure-based radical scepticism. …Read more
  • The value of knowledge
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2018.
    The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than knowledge, such as justification or under…Read more
  • Epistemic Axiology
    In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 407-422. 2016.
  •  9
    Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as Pyrrhonism in Action
    In A. C. Grayling, Shyam Wuppuluri, Christopher Norris, Nikolay Milkov, Oskari Kuusela, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Beth Savickey, Jonathan Beale, Duncan Pritchard, Annalisa Coliva, Jakub Mácha, David R. Cerbone, Paul Horwich, Michael Nedo, Gregory Landini, Pascal Zambito, Yoshihiro Maruyama, Chon Tejedor, Susan G. Sterrett, Carlo Penco, Susan Edwards-Mckie, Lars Hertzberg, Edward Witherspoon, Michel ter Hark, Paul F. Snowdon, Rupert Read, Nana Last, Ilse Somavilla & Freeman Dyson (eds.), Wittgensteinian : Looking at the World From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Springer Verlag. pp. 91-106. 2020.
    I want to suggest a way of approaching On Certainty that treats what Wittgenstein is doing in the notebooks that make up this work as manifesting a kind philosophical practice that is broadly Pyrrhonian, at least on one reading of what this involves. Such a reading fits with the general philosophical quietism found in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in his later writings, and is also supported by independent textual evidence that he was profoundly influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Crucially…Read more
  •  6
    I want to suggest a way of approaching On Certainty that treats what Wittgenstein is doing in the notebooks that make up this work as manifesting a kind philosophical practice that is broadly Pyrrhonian, at least on one reading of what this involves. Such a reading fits with the general philosophical quietism found in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in his later writings, and is also supported by independent textual evidence that he was profoundly influenced by Pyrrhonian scepticism. Crucially…Read more
  •  23
    Anti-luck epistemology and pragmatic encroachment
    Synthese 199 (1-2): 715-729. 2020.
    A distinctive approach to the theory of knowledge is described, known as anti-luck epistemology. The goal of the paper is to consider whether there are specific features of this proposal that entails that it is committed to pragmatic encroachment, such that whether one counts as having knowledge significantly depends on non-epistemic factors. In particular, the plausibility of the following idea is explored: that since pragmatic factors play an essential role when it comes to the notion of luck,…Read more
  •  3
    Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 41 175-181. 2016.
  •  9
    Epistemological Disjunctivism
    Journal of Philosophical Research 41 221-238. 2012.
  •  23
    Educating for Intellectual Humility and Conviction
    Journal of Philosophy of Education 54 (2): 398-409. 2020.
  • Some Recent Work in Epistemology
    Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217): 604-613. 2004.
  •  2
    Sceptical Intuitions
    In Booth Anthony Robert & P. Rowbottom Darrell (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    The chapter begins by exploring a philosophical case study of the use of intuitions — viz., the debate regarding the problem of radical scepticism, paying particular attention to key figures within this debate such as Barry Stroud, John Austin, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It contends that this debate demonstrates something interesting about the nature of intuitions and the role that they can play in philosophical inquiry. In particular, the chapter argues that we need to think of the philosophical …Read more
  •  3
    Introduction
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.
  •  13
    Epistemic Angst offers a completely new solution to the ancient philosophical problem of radical skepticism—the challenge of explaining how it is possible to have knowledge of a world external to us. Duncan Pritchard argues that the key to resolving this puzzle is to realize that it is composed of two logically distinct problems, each requiring its own solution. He then puts forward solutions to both problems. To that end, he offers a new reading of Wittgenstein's account of the structure of rat…Read more
  •  19
    Educating for ignorance
    with Rik Peels
    Synthese 198 (8): 7949-7963. 2020.
    It is widely thought that education should aim at positive epistemic standings, like knowledge, insight, and understanding. In this paper, we argue that, surprisingly, in pursuit of this aim, it is sometimes necessary to also cultivate ignorance. We examine several types of case. First, in various circumstances educators should present students with defeaters for their knowledge, so that they come to lack knowledge, at least temporarily. Second, there is the phenomenon of ‘scaffolding’ in educat…Read more
  •  11
    Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo
    Philosophia 48 (5): 1699-1704. 2020.
    This paper critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s discussion of the Wittgensteinian notion of epistemic vertigo in the context of the radical sceptical problematic, at least as that notion has been recently articulated by Duncan Pritchard.
  •  9
    Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 15): 3635-3664. 2019.
    Part one offers a précis of my book, Epistemic Angst, with particular focus on the themes discussed by the participants in this symposium. Part two then examines a number of topics raised in this symposium in light of this précis. These include how best to understand the ‘non-belief’ account of hinge epistemology, whether we should think of our hinge commitments as being a kind of procedural knowledge, whether hinge epistemology can be used to deal with underdetermination-based scepticism, what …Read more
  •  16
    Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 15): 3635-3664. 2019.
    Part one offers a précis of my book, Epistemic Angst, with particular focus on the themes discussed by the participants in this symposium. Part two then examines a number of topics raised in this symposium in light of this précis. These include how best to understand the ‘non-belief’ account of hinge epistemology, whether we should think of our hinge commitments as being a kind of procedural knowledge, whether hinge epistemology can be used to deal with underdetermination-based scepticism, what …Read more