Dwight Lewis

Anton Wilhelm Amo (c. 1700 – c. 1750) – born in West Africa, enslaved, and then gifted to the Duke of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel – became the first African to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy at a European university. He went on to teach philosophy at the Universities of Halle and Jena. On the 16th of April, 1734, at the University of Wittenberg, he defended his dissertation, De Humanae Mentis Apatheia (On the Impassivity of the Human Mind), in which Amo investigates the logical inconsistencies in René Descartes’ (1596 – 1650) res cogitans (mind) and res extensa (body) distinction and interaction by maintaining that (1) the mind does not sense material things nor does it (2) contain the faculty of sensing.

The ethos of Justin Smith’s Nature, Human Nature, & Human Difference is expressed in the narrative of Anton Wilhelm Amo (~1703-53), an African-born​ slave who earned his doctoral degree in Philosophy at a European university and went on to teach at the Universities of Jena and Halle. Smith identifies Amo as a time-marker for diverging interpretations of race: race as inherently tethered to physical difference and race as inherited essential difference. Further, these interpretations of race are fastened to the discourse of science and human diversity within modern Europe. Smith’s thesis maintains that the rise of the concept of race in philosophy begins with a divorcing of the soul from human nature and a movement to a naturalistic classification of human beings through taxonomies (e.g. botany, mineralogy and zoology), which dissolved into this dichotomy: an essential difference between people of reason and people of nature.

Diversity and the concept of race are, or should be, central concerns both for the history of philosophy and for our current political reality. Within academic philosophy, these concerns are expressed in the growing demand for minority representation within the canon, which is overwhelmingly white and male, especially in early modern philosophy. Furthermore, until now, historians of philosophy have not spent the time necessary to uncover various designations such as “Negro”, “Moor”, “Ethiopian”, etc., in early modern Europe, and from there to understand how these shaped philosophical reflections on human diversity. In my research, I relate Anton Wilhelm Amo, Europe’s first African Ph.D. in philosophy, to philosophy and religion together with the treatment of human difference in the work of Robert Boyle and his contemporaries. My project aids in addressing the lack of diversity in the philosophical canon and the insufficient historical analysis of various designations of human difference. Human difference, i.e., the early modern interpretation of race, and Amo scholarship are interrelated subjects, as Amo is both a philosopher in Europe and an African native. The one cannot be researched without the other. Thus, my research attempts to elucidate Amo’s philosophical significance and its relation to race and human difference. I begin by give a biographical sketch of Amo, which addresses goals and, where I discuss Amo in relation to religious ideologies, philosophical positions, and the surrounding early modern context. In the following chapter, which also address goals and, I untangle Amo’s critique of Descartes. For Amo, there is an impasse between the mind and sensation because the mind is immaterial, and sensations necessarily need to occur upon something passive and material, which means sensations could only ever be cognized by the mind and through the body. The final chapter, which addresses goal, investigates how the Royal Society, driven by financial incentives and England’s economy, as well as the burgeoning slave trade, played a large role in advancing “scientific” theories of human difference, especially in relation to Africa. That is, the Royal Society essentially propelled natural philosophy into the proto-racist landscape experienced in the early 18th Century, culminating in the application of the ad hoc and non sequitur racist claims given by 18th Century philosophers, e.g., Immanuel Kant and David Hume, and the ousting of Anton Wilhelm Amo. My project contributes to philosophy and the academic community in three ways: philosophical inclusion and diversity, Black history, and the historical ontology of race. It is this intersectional approach to philosophy that, I believe, allows me to contribute to my field in new and interesting ways. Many people believe that philosophy is dying. I believe diverse individuals, like Amo, and diverse ideologies offer breath and life to philosophy. This is because, as Michel de Montaigne explains in the Essays, we learn from the unfamiliar.

As a Catholic nun, to suggest Jacqueline Pascal as autonomous might at first glance seem contradictory. We show that her moral deference to the divine is not at all forfeiting her autonomy, but that aligning her own law with God's law is to align her own law with rationality itself, that is, the laws of nature. Her theoretical structure begins with a theory of virtue—viz., how and to whom we have an obligation to be moral. For her, acting in accordance with cultural restrictions or following church orders against her own conscience would be living by the laws of another and so not acting autonomously. Pascal would not live by other's laws, regardless of whether her actions conform to the categories by which society expected her to act. The framework for her laws laid in Pascal's understanding of self-governance: if she wants to act virtuously then she must autonomously follow God's law by making it her own through the sentiments of her heart. Thus, she cannot live by the laws of men, but by the laws of her human nature and in alignment with a rightly ordered universe, that is, God's law, which we show parallels with a Stoic framework of autonomy.