•  1168
    Evidentialism
    Philosophical Studies 48 (1). 1985.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic ju…Read more
  •  973
    Phenomenal knowledge
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 136-150. 1994.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  814
    Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent pe…Read more
  •  712
    Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This book is a collection of essays, mostly jointly authored, that support and apply evidentialism.
  •  590
    The generality problem for reliabilism
    with E. Conee and R. Feldman
    Philosophical Studies 89 (1): 1-29. 1998.
  •  554
    Heeding misleading evidence
    Philosophical Studies 103 (2): 99-120. 2001.
  •  474
    This is an introduction to metaphysics for students and non-philosophers. (Philosophers: it's supposed to be the kind of book you can give to your friends and family, when they ask what you do for a living.) Contents: personal identity, fatalism, time, God, why not nothing?, free will, constitution, universals, necessity and possibility, what is metaphysics? (There is a second edition, which adds chapters on meta-metaphysics and the metaphysics of ethics.)
  •  376
    Metaphysics and the morality of abortion
    Mind 108 (432): 619-646. 1999.
    Conclusions about the morality of abortion have been thought to receive some support from metaphysical doctrines about persons. The paper studies four instances in which philosophers have sought to draw such morals from metaphysics. It argues that in each instance the metaphysics makes no moral difference, and the manner of failure seems indicative of a general epistemic irrelevance of metaphysics to the moral issue.
  •  324
    Internalism Defended
    American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1). 2001.
  •  270
  •  193
    The specificity of the generality problem
    Philosophical Studies 163 (3): 751-762. 2013.
    In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will argue…Read more
  •  180
    Peerage
    Episteme 6 (3): 313-323. 2009.
    Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
  •  173
    Evidentialism: essays in epistemology
    Oxford University Press. 2004.
    Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition. Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic j…Read more
  •  172
    Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question
  •  163
    Against moral dilemmas
    Philosophical Review 91 (1): 87-97. 1982.
    E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible
  •  144
    Typing problems
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 98-105. 2002.
    Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved
  •  144
    Utilitarianism And Rationality
    Analysis 42 (January): 55-59. 1982.
  •  142
    The possibility of absent qualia
    Philosophical Review 94 (July): 345-66. 1985.
  •  142
    The possibility of power beyond possibility
    Philosophical Perspectives 5 447-473. 1991.
  •  141
    The comforts of home
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2). 2005.
    The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
  •  140
    Physicalism and phenomenal properties
    Philosophical Quarterly 35 (July): 296-302. 1985.
  •  140
    The truth connection
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3): 657-669. 1992.
  •  139
    Seeing the truth
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.
    Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied
  •  117
    Friendship and consequentialism
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  116
    Good to know
    Philosophical Studies 174 (2): 311-331. 2017.
    Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. Th…Read more