Eduarda Calado Barbosa

In this paper, we defend that demonstratives are expressions of joint attention. Though this idea is not exactly new in the philosophical or linguistic literature, we argue here that their proponents have not yet shown how to incorporate these observations into more traditional theories of demonstratives. Our purpose is then to attempt to fill this gap. We argue that coordinated attentional activities are better integrated into a full account of demonstratives as meta-pragmatic information. Our claim is twofold. First, we claim that pragmatically presupposing salience is a fundamental aspect of using demonstratives. Secondly, we hold that the pragmatics of demonstrating can only be properly understood in relation to meta-pragmatic conditions that have to do with joint attention. We use tests of truth-value gap as evidence for our claim. Our proposal provides us with a complete view of what speakers do and presuppose when engaging in acts of demonstrative reference through language.

When and why do we need the indexical ‘I’? Perry (1979) thinks that ‘I’ is an essential ingredient to the explanation and prediction of action. We need ‘I’ to classify the kind of belief that causes an agent to produce a new action. In his view, classifying the agent’s belief in terms of ‘I’ makes sense because, when asked to explain her behavior, the agent will be disposed to say ‘I’. Here, we argue that this dispositional assumption is problematic. The disposition to act according to an essential indexical and the disposition to make a speech act that contains ‘I’ are two very different things that are not always related. The most common circumstances in which we need to say ‘I’ to explain ourselves involve other agents: when we coordinate in joint actions or when we engage in self-talk to save face before the eyes of potential witnesses. Finally, we revisit Perry’s famous messy shopper anecdote to offer a better story about why its main character is disposed to say ‘I’.

One of the characteristics of what has been called “dogwhistle politics” is the presence of a rhetoric that targets minority groups implicitly. For example, terms like ‘illegals’ and ‘illegal immigrants’, used to target Latin-Americans, have come to permeate the American political discourse as well as everyday conversations. Here I focus on how such expressions, which I call illegality frame code words (IFCW, for short), can be countered by recalcitrant hearers. I begin with the assumption that IFCWs are racial code words, conversational devices that convey implicit racial appeals while allowing for deniability. I then discuss how the existence of an Illegality Frame in the American Immigration debate supports their deniability. Lastly, I discuss how recalcitrant hearers can counter utterances that contain them. In particular, I propose reframing as an adequate strategy. In reframing, agents take control of the goals or the QUD (question under discussion) of the conversation to exclude certain topics from the common ground and include others. The idea is to “change the conversation” to neutralize problematic moves. This maneuver is advantageous not only because it helps to hinder veiled discriminatory practices, but also because it affords control over “the terms of the conversation”.

Bozickovic’s The Indexical Point of View is a richly informative and solid philosophical work about the problem of cognitive significance involving indexical thoughts and expressions. Although I tend to agree with most of what is said in the book, here I will make some comments on two minor correlated points regarding Bozickovic’s Fregean account of indirect speech reports (or ISRs). After presenting some of the author's ideas about reports, I will claim that the tracking and updating involved in ISRs is of a complex kind that requires attention to the role played by speech reporters and their audiences. Following that, I will hold that a general theory of correct ISR strictly in Fregean terms (as Bozickovic’s) fails to account for that - at least directly.

O paradigma informacional da comunicação estipula que agentes usam a fala para transmitir informação não-redundante a outros agentes. Se olharmos para a fala auto-direcionada e, em particular, para a fala privada, no entanto, nos deparamos com um claro contraexemplo: nela, os papéis de falante e ouvinte coincidem no mesmo agente. Meu objetivo aqui será, então, somar-me aos esforços de buscar um paradigma alternativo que explique a fala privada, em seus vários usos, intrapessoais e intersubjetivos. Para isso, considero dois candidatos: o paradigma disposicional e o deôntico, segundo os quais a fala serve, respectivamente, para gerar disposições e para negociar compromissos em ações coordenadas. Ao comparar os méritos de ambos, mostro que o segundo é preferível por conseguir explicar usos da fala privada com função fática mais facilmente que o primeiro. Tais usos evidenciam que a comunicação também pode voltar-se para aspectos de sua própria infraestrutura e da ação-entre-participantes. Lamentavelmente, eles vêm sendo negligenciados na literatura filosófica, embora pareçam ser peça-chave de qualquer resposta completa à pergunta “Por que falamos?”.

Counterspeech is a kind of communicative resistance that tries to oppose, neutralize or remedy harmful speech. It can be defined as a form of non-coercive intervention that is, in some cases, available for any competent speaker. In recent years, some philosophers of language have focused on analyzing and proposing different varieties of in situ counterspeech in the hopes that their insights about communicative mechanisms can contribute to the identification of efficient strategies. This investigation is however still new and in programmatic expansion. Our first goal then is to suggest a separation between two categories of counterspeech, confrontational and redirecting, adopting the impact of the intervention on the cooperation between participants as an organizational criterion. Secondly, we propose a type of confrontational counterspeech, which we call elucidation, and a type of redirecting counterspeech, namely, reframing. In cases of elucidation, the recalcitrant hearer makes a problematic aspect of what was said salient. This is a way of calling the bigot out for the commitments that he/she undertakes in virtue of choosing to use certain words. In reframing, the recalcitrant hearer tries to neutralize the effects of code words by replacing them for semantically equivalent alternatives that have different social meanings and connotations. For example, replacing ‘ideologia de gênero’ (‘gender ideology’) by ‘diversidade de gênero’ (‘gender diversity’), when accommodated, gives the hearer additional control over the discursive topics (the QUD) and the “terms of the conversation”.

Counterspeech is a kind of communicative resistance that tries to oppose, neutralize or remedy harmful speech. It can be defined as a form of non-coercive intervention that is, in some cases, available for just any competent speaker. In recent years, some philosophers of language have focused on analyzing and proposing different varieties of counterspeech in the hopes that their insights about communicative mechanisms can contribute to the development of efficient strategies of contention. This investigation is however still new and in programmatic expansion. Our first goal then is to suggest a separation between two larger categories of counterspeech, confrontational and redirecting, adopting as an organizational criterion the impact of the interventions on the cooperativity between participants. Secondly, we propose a type of confrontational counterspeech, which we call elucidation, and a type of redirecting counterspeech, namely, reframing. In cases of elucidation, the recalcitrant hearer makes a problematic aspect of what was said especially salient. This is a way of calling the bigot out for the commitments that he/she undertakes in virtue of choosing to use certain words. In reframing, the recalcitrant hearer tries to neutralize the effects of code words by replacing them for semantically equivalent alternatives that have different social meanings and connotations. For example, replacing ‘ideologia de gênero’ (‘gender ideology’) by ‘diversidade de gênero’ (‘gender diversity’), when accommodated, gives the hearer additional control over the discursive topics (the QUD) and the “terms of the conversation”.

Determining what content is expressed by a demonstrative when its reference cannot be determined is a problem for those who assume that demonstrative reference is cognized by interpreters and demonstrative meaning has a mere indicative role. Here, I explore a concept of content that gives meaning a cognitively relevant role, namely, John Perry’s classificatory concept of content. With that purpose, I compare the interpretation of a deictic demonstrative in two cases: for an eavesdropper and a conversational participant, aiming to show that meaning, in the form of reflexive rules, can be recruited to play the role of content when information is scarce.