•  86
    Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions?
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1): 124-142. 2006.
    Most people (and philosophers) distinguish between performing a morally wrong action and being blameworthy for having performed that action, and believe that an individual can be fully excused for having performed a wrong action. My purpose is to reject this claim. More precisely, I defend what I call the "Dependence Claim": A's doing X is wrong only if A is blameworthy for having done X. I consider three cases in which, according to the traditional view, a wrong action could be excused: duress,…Read more
  •  75
    Probabilities in tragic choices
    Utilitas 20 (3): 323-333. 2008.
    In this article I explore a kind of tragic choice that has not received due attention, one in which you have to save only one of two persons but the probability of saving is not equal (and all other things are equal). Different proposals are assessed, taking as models proposals for a much more discussed tragic choice situation: saving different numbers of persons. I hold that cases in which (only) numbers are different are structurally similar to cases in which (only) probabilities are different…Read more
  •  73
    Individual procreative responsibility and the non-identity problem
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3): 336-363. 2009.
    The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the so-called 'Non-Identity Proble…Read more
  •  44
    Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 32 (2): 177-189. 2015.
    The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so-called principle of ‘adversarial’ litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of potenti…Read more
  •  39
    How to Reject Resultant Moral Luck Alone
    Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2): 415-423. 2016.
  •  38
  •  26
    Kommunitaristische Paradoxe
    Analyse & Kritik 17 (2): 149-166. 1995.
    Two basic kinds of communitarians are discriminated. Weak communitarians reject only the liberal metaethical theses that I call universalism and neutralism, but endorse liberal norms and institutions at the normative level. Strong communitarians condemn liberalism at both levels: they reject not only universalism and neutralism, but also substantive liberal norms defending communitarian values. This article intends to show certain internal paradoxes of these two versions of communitarianism
  •  23
    Puzzles on defending others from aggression
    Law and Philosophy 25 (3): 377-386. 2005.
    We all agree on the justification of defending ourselves or others in some situations, but we do not often agree on why. Two main views compete: subjectivism and objectivism. The discussion has mainly been held in normative terms. But every theory must pass a previous test: logical consistency. It has recently been held that, at least in the case of defending others from aggression, objective theories lead, in some situations, to normative contradiction. My aim is to challenge the idea that only…Read more
  •  22
    The Fragility of our Moral Standing to Blame
    Ethical Perspectives 24 (3): 333-361. 2017.
  •  20
  •  17
    Controversies in Latin American Bioethics (edited book)
    with Martin Hevia
    Springer Verlag. 2019.
    This book offers a first rate selection of academic articles on Latin American bioethics. It covers different issues, such as vulnerability, abortion, biomedical research with human subjects, environment, exploitation, commodification, reproductive medicine, among others. Latin American bioethics has been, to an important extent, parochial and unable to meet stringent international standards of rational philosophical discussion. The new generations of bioethicists are changing this situation, an…Read more
  •  11
    Castigo penal, injusticia social y autoridad moral
    Análisis Filosófico 35 (2): 167-185. 2015.
    La pregunta que exploro en este trabajo es si la injusticia social puede socavar la autoridad moral de la sociedad para castigar al que delinque. La respuesta a esta pregunta depende esencialmente de cuál sea la teoría justificatoria del castigo penal de la que se parte. Analizo diversas teorías de la pena, entre ellas la teoría consensual de Carlos Nino. Mi objetivo es explorar de qué modo las diferentes teorías de la pena enfrentan el desafío que plantea la pregunta y extraer algunas conclusio…Read more
  •  10
    What Does Nozick’s Experience Machine Argument Really Prove?
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 40 100-105. 1998.
    Nozick's well-known Experience Machine argument can be considered a typically successful argument: as far as I know, it has not been discussed much and has been widely seen as conclusive, or at least convincing enough to refute the mental-state versions of utilitarianism. I believe that if his argument were conclusive, its destructive effect would be even stronger. It would not only refute mental-state utilitarianism, but all theories considering a certain subjective mental state as the only val…Read more
  •  6
    Is medically assisted death a special obligation?
    Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (6): 401-406. 2017.
  •  5
    Consent and Exploitation in Bioethics: Individual Ethics and Legal Regulation
    In Eduardo Rivera-López & Martin Hevia (eds.), Controversies in Latin American Bioethics, Springer Verlag. pp. 83-95. 2019.
    In this paper, I discuss exploitative transactions in bioethics. Examples of this kind of transactions allegedly include, among others, commercial surrogacy, organ selling, and research with human subjects in developing countries. The most problematic kind of exploitation is what Allan Wertheimer calls “mutually advantageous exploitation:” the weak party’s consent for the transaction is an effective and rational consent. Moreover, W does not suffer any harm by the transaction; on the contrary, t…Read more
  •  2
    Introduction: Why (and How) Bioethics Matters in Latin America
    In Eduardo Rivera-López & Martin Hevia (eds.), Controversies in Latin American Bioethics, Springer Verlag. pp. 1-8. 2019.
    Bioethics embraces a number of ethical problems connected to medicine, biomedical research, and health law. Most of these have both a universal dimension and a more particular one. Reproductive rights, exploitation, commodification, biomedical research, and the protection of the environment, among others, are issues that can be discussed from a universal perspective.
  • “Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But circumstance…Read more
  • “ Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But circumstanc…Read more
  • Los drones, la moralidad profunda Y las convenciones de la Guerra
    Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 46 11-28. 2017.
    El trabajo discute la justificación moral del uso de drones en conflictos armados, tanto desde el punto de vista de la moralidad profunda de la guerra como desde el punto de vista de cuál es la regulación jurídica moralmente justificable. Desde la óptica de la moralidad profunda, argumento que no es posible dar un veredicto general acerca de la permisión o prohibición moral del uso de drones. Desde la óptica de las convenciones jurídicas para regular los conflictos armados, sostengo que la posic…Read more
  • ¿es El “trilema De Fishkin” Un Verdadero Trilema?
    Análisis Filosófico 16 (1): 27-42. 1996.
    Fishkin claims that the three liberals principles concerning assignment of social positions constitute a “trilemma”: the realization of any two of these principles precludes the realization of the third. In this paper, I try to prove that this is the case, only if these principles are interpreted in an extreme way. Liberalism, however, has strong reasons to reject such interpretation of each of these principles. Moreover, these reasons are independent from the question of whether their conjuncti…Read more
  • Deberes negativos y positivos: ¿Hace el resultado la diferencia?
    Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 27 (1): 161-170. 2001.
  • Eutanasia y autonomía
    Humanitas 1 (1): 79-86. 2003.
  • I try to show that Steiner's theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone's rights
  • Aspectos éticos de la eutanasia
    Análisis Filosófico 17 (2): 189-208. 1997.
    I analyze some traditional distinctions around euthanasia. In contrast to those who most discuss the justification of active versus passive, or direct versus indirect euthanasia. I claim, following and expanding a Holly Smith´s argument, that the possibility of active and/or direct euthanasia cannot be morally excluded, once we have accepted passive and/or indirect euthanasia, even though we assume the asymmetry between killing and letting die, or between killing someone intentionally as a means…Read more