•  26
    Kritik über Jedan (2000): Willensfreiheit bei Aristoteles?
    Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Fur Antike Und Mittelalter 7 (1): 243-249. 2002.
  •  5
    Aristotle's Political Virtues
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3 154-161. 1998.
    This paper argues that Aristotle conceives happiness not primarily as an exercise of virtue in private or with friends, but as the exercise of virtue in governing an ideal state. The best states are knit together so tightly that the interests of one person are the same as the interests of all. Hence, a person who acts for his or her own good must also act for the good of all fellow citizens. It follows that discussions of Aristotle’s altruism and egoism are misconceived.
  •  1
    Poetry, History, and Dialectic
    The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 3 146-153. 1998.
    Twice in the Poetics, Aristotle contrasts poetry with history. Whatever its didactic value, the contrast has not seemed to readers of special philosophical interest. The aim of this paper is to show that this contrast is philosophically significant not just for our understanding of tragedy but also for the light it sheds on Aristotle’s overall methodology. I shall show how he uses the method sketched in the Topics to define tragedy and explain why the same method will not define history. In part…Read more
  • Uses the problem of the one and the many as a lens through which to examine the Central Books of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
  •  2
    Aristotle's Physics: A Guided Study (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 50 (3): 687-688. 1997.
    Joe Sachs has a refreshing and unusual view of Aristotle's Physics: he thinks that it is a physics. In contrast, most recent writers have seen the work as an exposition of the way nature is spoken and thought about, as metaphysics, or as an anticipation of modern physics. The reason the work is often misunderstood, Sachs maintains, is that translators render it into meaningless terms rooted in medieval Latin translations. Aristotle's own "philosophic vocabulary is... incapable of dogmatic use" b…Read more
  •  27
    Colloquium 2 The Metaphysics of the Syllogism
    Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 33 (1): 31-60. 2018.
    This paper addresses a central metaphysical issue that has not been recognized: what kind of entity is a syllogism? I argue that the syllogism cannot be merely a mental entity. Some counterpart must exist in nature. A careful examination of the Posterior Analytics’s distinction between the syllogism of the fact and the syllogism of the reasoned fact shows that we must set aside contemporary logic to appreciate Aristotle’s logic, enables us to understand the validity of the scientific syllogism t…Read more
  •  14
    Heraclitus and the Possibility of Metaphysics
    Review of Metaphysics 70 (3). 2017.
    Heraclitus is famous for affirming contradictions, though most readers do not regard the content of his fragments as contradictory. Examining fragments 1 and 50, this article argues that Heraclitus aims to assert a special class of contradictions, the intrinsic conflict between the content of any universal metaphysical claim and the assertion or reception of that claim. Such contradictions undermine the possibility of metaphysics as a science that knows all things. Second, the article argues tha…Read more
  •  8
    A Tale of Two Metaphysics: Alison Stone's Environmental Hegel
    Hegel Bulletin 26 (1-2): 1-12. 2005.
  •  9
    Hegel and the Problem of the Differentia
    Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America 10 191-202. 1990.
  • Unity in Aristotle's "Metaphysics"
    Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada). 1980.
    Since unity is always explained through something else, it is not primary; it is not the highest cause. Further, secondary unities are not understood through a primary "one"; rather, all ones are understood through being, actuality, etc. Hence, unlike being, unity is not a . In order that "one" function as it does in the Metaphysics it cannot be a . In the second part of the fourth chapter, I discuss Aristotle's definition of "one", and I argue that "one" is analogically defined. ;The final thre…Read more
  • Telos
    In Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1999.
  •  29
    Is creativity good?
    British Journal of Aesthetics 29 (1): 47-56. 1989.
  • A Tale Of Two Metaphysics: Alison Stone's Environmental Hegel
    Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 51 1-12. 2005.
  •  66
    Aristotle on Knowledge of Nature
    Review of Metaphysics 37 (4). 1984.
    IT IS well-known that Plato and Aristotle disagree on the possibility of knowledge of nature. Plato maintains that knowledge, in contrast with belief, is never mistaken, that the objects of knowledge are always the same and never becoming, and that what we sense is always becoming. He concludes that knowledge is possible only of objects that are unchanging and separate from sensibles, i.e., the forms. Aristotle rejects this conclusion and recognizes knowledge of sensibles. Surprisingly, though, …Read more
  •  43
    Metaphysics Z 4-5: An Argument from Addition
    Ancient Philosophy 6 (n/a): 91-122. 1986.
  •  20
    Letter to the Editor
    Phronesis 40 (1): 116-117. 1995.
  •  9
    The Logic of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature
    Proceedings of the Hegel Society of America 13 29-49. 1998.
  •  1
    Sheldon M. Cohen, Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance (review)
    Philosophy in Review 17 314-316. 1997.
  •  13
    Aristotle on the Convertibility of One and Being
    Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 3 259-264. 1988.
  •  21
    Context -- Overview of themes -- Reading the text -- Reception and influence.
  •  26
    Maimonides’ claim, in Guide of the Perplexed I.68, that our intellect, like God’s, becomes one with the object it knows would seem to be at odds with his injunction to his readers to set their “thought to work on the first intelligible” and to “rejoice in what [it] apprehends”. The former passage supposes that we grasp individual essences by themselves, whereas the latter supposes that such essences are known only through their first cause. Since we cannot grasp the first cause, God, we cannot, …Read more
  •  13
    Klein and Cassirer
    Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (2): 194-217. 2015.