Elaine P. Miller

I examine the relation between logic and nature in terms of ‘reflection’, the word that Hegel uses at the end of theEncyclopaedia Logicto describe the self-sundering or externalization of the idea into nature. Although nominally the term ‘reflection’ seems to denote a uniquely mental process and is often used so by Hegel in his early critique ofReflexionsphilosophie, in his later writings it also has an irreducibly ontological significance. Hegel describes logic's opening-out to nature as a movement of ‘reflection’ [Widerschein] and he follows Kant in describing the shift from the finite to the infinite in the relation between nature and thought as one of reflective judgement. Although Hegel generally considers reflection to be uniquely concerned with finite cognition and the constitution of finite things, I argue that in his embrace of reflective judgement he sees a key role for reflection in the relation of logic, nature and spirit.

Kristeva's Teresa My Love concerns the life and thought of a 16th century Spanish mystic, written in the form of a novel. Yet the theme of another kind of foreigner, equally exotic but this time threatening, pops up unexpectedly and disappears several times during the course of the novel. At the very beginning of the story, the 21st century narrator, psychoanalyst Sylvia Leclerque, encounters a young woman in a headscarf, whom Kristeva describes as an IT engineer, who speaks out, explaining that "she and her God were one and that the veil was the immovable sign of this 'union,' which she wished to publicize in order to definitively 'fix it' in herself and in the eyes of others." In this paper I ask what difference Kristeva discerns between these two women, a distinction that apparently makes Teresa's immanence simultaneously a transcendence, but transforms a Muslim woman in a headscarf immediately into an imagined suicide bomber. Despite the problematic aspects of this comparison, we can learn something from them about Kristeva's ideas on mysticism and on art. Both mysticism and art are products of the death drive, but whereas the suicide bomber and the animal directly and purely pursue death Teresa and Adel remain on its outer edge and merely play with mortality.

I argue that in Julia Kristeva’s concept of negativity, conceived of as the recuperation, through transformation, of a traumatic remnant of the past, we can find a parallel to what Theodor Adorno, following Walter Benjamin, calls a mimesis that in its emphasis on non-identity is able to remain faithful to the ban on graven images interpreted materialistically rather than theologically. A connection between negativity and the theological ban on images is suggested in Adorno’s claim that a ban on positive representations of utopia leads to a practice of negating the negative, that is, of exposing the injustices of modern life. Both Adorno and Kristeva discern in contemporary art a capacity to critique modernity and envision a better world, but insist that this art must not represent what it indicates. I also examine Benjamin’s writings on photography in order to argue that a mimesis that respects the ban on graven images moves us beyond the systematic optimism of the Hegelian dialectic, and extends the philosophy of history into the unknown of the unconscious.

The dissertation analyzes interpretations of the construction of nature and culture in the philosophies of nature of Immanuel Kant, Johann Wilhelm von Goethe, Friedrich Holderlin, Georg W. F. Hegel, and Friedrich Nietzsche. It traces the trajectory of the claim that the human mind can function only by projecting nature to be a series of unities, by making fictions about nature. Both Kant and Nietzsche make this claim, but the implications they draw from it are strikingly divergent. While Kant believed that human thinking would simply have nowhere to go if it did not project form onto nature, and thus advocated a limited teleology of nature in analogy with human art, Nietzsche attempted to expose the falsity of projections of unity and to analyze nature from a radically non-purposive standpoint. ;Nietzsche questioned the specific form that the "fictionizing" Kant describes always takes. Why must "form" imply "unity" or "totality"? Nietzsche speculated that human beings create fictions like final causes, atoms, ideal forms, rather than imagining a chaotic universe of continually metamorphosing constellations of forces with no stable building blocks, by basing scientific theories on the "crude perspective" of our own animal bodies. As creatures that are capable of carrying our bodies around as self-enclosed and self-motivated separable entities, we tend to forget that most of nature is much less conducive to being separated into distinct entities. ;Following Goethe, who specified in his Metamorphosis of Plants that no plant can be called an individual, and Holderlin, who describes his most beloved characters as plants within the realm of nature, Nietzsche uses plant figuration to describe the human being's situation in the world. Thus we will oppose what we call a plant reading of human being--found in Goethe, Holderlin, and Nietzsche--to an animal understanding of individuation that privileges form, unity, self-reflection, and purposiveness, exemplified by Kant and by Hegel's philosophy of nature

Introduction: Losing our heads -- Kristeva and Benjamin: melancholy and the allegorical imagination -- Kenotic art: negativity, iconoclasm, inscription -- To be and remain foreign: tarrying with l'inquietante etrangete alongside Arendt -- And Kafka -- Sublimating maman: experience, time, and the re-erotization of existence in -- Kristeva's reading of Marcel Proust -- The "Orestes Complex": thinking hatred, forgiveness, Greek tragedy, and the -- Cinema of the "thought specular" with Hegel, Freud, and Klein -- Conclusion: forging a/head.

There is a special poignancy to the fact that Pleshette DeArmitt's essay "Sarah Kofman's Art of Affirmation" foregrounds Freud's essay "On Transience," in which he muses on the fact that beauty seems to be inextricably linked to a fleeting existence. As DeArmitt writes, "beauty, even in full flowering, foreshadows its own demise, causing what Freud describes as 'a foretaste of mourning.'" Such a transience, in Freud's mind, increases rather than decreases the worth of all that is beautiful. In her essay, DeArmitt argues that Kofman's 1985 text Mélancolie de l'Art reinscribes Freud's text, but brings it into the present by pointing to contemporary art as the occasion for the opening up of a new space, one capable of "dislocat[ing] the space of representation and meaning" and "invent[ing] a space of indetermination and play.” Through dislocation of a fixed reference or meaning and opening up a place for indeterminacy and play, contemporary art acknowledges and celebrates, rather than regrets, the transience of beauty.