Elina Pechlivanidi

In this paper we examine the status of relations in two prominent views in metaphysics of science, i.e. dispositionalism and structuralism, and argue that the current consensus about the metaphysics of relations, according to which relations are to be viewed as internal and as constituting no addition of being over and above their relata, needs to be re-examined. After discussing what we call internalism and externalism about relations, we show that dispositionalism and structuralism lead to opposite but equally controversial accounts of the metaphysics of relations. While we criticise some widespread versions of those views, we identify versions of dispositionalism and structuralism that we deem more promising. A core feature of both of these more promising variants is an externalist view about relations. Against the current internalist consensus, we claim that a version of externalism about relations is the view that best combines metaphysical rigour with a naturalistic stance.

It is essential for an introductory book, addressed to the reader who is new to the philosophical discourse, not only to give a representative picture of the main issues of the philosophical area which it studies, but also to be clear about its aims and its methodological approach. Furthermore, ideally it would not only refer to the literature for further independent investigation, but it would inspire the reader to pursue such an investigation too. Effingham’s Introduction to Ontology meets all the aforementioned aims. Its light, yet careful and systematic, way of introducing the field of ontology and also presenting some background metaphysical concepts certainly does not scare off the uninitiated reader. In what follows I will present Effingham’s approach, focusing especially on some of the features of the book that reveal its contribution to the ontology educational literature.The book is comprised of ten chapters, which can be categorised into three parts: an introductory part (Ch ..