• Volition. Time to act : the dynamics of agentive experiences
    In Patrick Haggard & Baruch Eitam (eds.), The Sense of Agency, Oxford University Press Usa. 2015.
  •  17
    The purpose of this article is to explore the role commitments may play in shaping our sense of joint agency. First, we propose that commitments may contribute to the generation of the sense of joint agency by stabilizing expectations and improving predictability. Second, we argue that commitments have a normative element that may bolster an agent's sense of control over the joint action and help counterbalance the potentially disruptive effects of asymmetries among agents. Finally, we discuss h…Read more
  • Addressing joint action challenges in HRI: Insights from psychology and philosophy
    with Victor Fernandez Castro, Kathleen Belhassein, Amandine Mayima, Aurélie Clodic, Michèle Guidetti, Rachid Alami, and Hélène Cochet
    Acta Psychologica 222 (103476). 2022.
    The vast expansion of research in human-robot interactions (HRI) these last decades has been accompanied by the design of increasingly skilled robots for engaging in joint actions with humans. However, these advances have encountered significant challenges to ensure fluent interactions and sustain human motivation through the different steps of joint action. After exploring current literature on joint action in HRI, leading to a more precise definition of these challenges, the present article pr…Read more
  •  170
    Intentions: The Dynamic Hierarchical Model Revisited
    WIREs Cognitive Science 10 (2). 2019.
    Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and glob…Read more
  •  121
    Self-control as hybrid skill
    In Surrounding self-control, Oxford University Press. pp. 81-100. 2020.
    One of the main obstacles to the realization of intentions for future actions and to the successful pursuit of long-term goals is lack of self-control. But, what does it mean to engage in self-controlled behaviour? On a motivational construal of self-control, self-control involves resisting our competing temptations, impulses, and urges in order to do what we deem to be best. The conflict we face is between our better judgments or intentions and “hot” motivational forces that drive or compel us …Read more
  •  109
    Editorial: “Skilled Action Control”
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3): 469-480. 2021.
  •  323
    The objective of this paper is to characterize the rich interplay between automatic and cognitive control processes that we propose is the hallmark of skill, in contrast to habit, and what accounts for its flexibility. We argue that this interplay isn't entirely hierarchical and static, but rather heterarchical and dynamic. We further argue that it crucially depends on the acquisition of detailed and well-structured action representations and internal models, as well as the concomitant developme…Read more
  •  4
    Commitments in Human-Robot Interaction
    with Víctor Fernandez Castro, Aurélie Clodic, and Rachid Alami
    AI-HRI 2019 Proceedings. 2019.
    An important tradition in philosophy holds that in order to successfully perform a joint action, the participants must be capable of establishing commitments on joint goals and shared plans. This suggests that social robotics should endow robots with similar competences for commitment management in order to achieve the objective of performing joint tasks in human-robot interactions. In this paper, we examine two philosophical approaches to commitments. These approaches, we argue, emphasize diffe…Read more
  • Key Elements for Human-Robot Joint Action
    with Raja Chatila, Rachid Alami, and Aurélie Clodic
    In Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, Springer. 2017.
  •  63
    This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this …Read more
  •  14
    Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action
    with Solène Le Bars, Alexandre Devaux, Tena Nevidal, and Valérian Chambon
    Cognition 195 (C): 104117. 2020.
  •  23
    The sense of agency in human-human vs human-robot joint action
    with Ouriel Grynszpan, Aïsha Sahaï, Nasmeh Hamidi, Bruno Berberian, Lucas Roche, and Ludovic Saint-Bauzel
    Consciousness and Cognition 75 102820. 2019.
  •  40
    Alterations of agency in hypnosis: A new predictive coding model
    with Jean-Rémy Martin
    Psychological Review 126 (1): 133-152. 2019.
  •  28
    Action co-representation and the sense of agency during a joint Simon task: Comparing human and machine co-agents
    with Aïsha Sahaï, Andrea Desantis, Ouriel Grynszpan, and Bruno Berberian
    Consciousness and Cognition 67 44-55. 2019.
  •  31
    Solution Thinking and Team Reasoning: How Different Are They?
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (6): 585-593. 2018.
    In his book, Understanding Institutions, Francesco Guala discusses two solutions to the problem of mindreading for coordination, the solution thinking approach proposed by Adam Morton and the team reasoning approach developed by Michael Bacharach, Robert Sugden, and Natalie Gold. I argue that the family resemblance between the two approaches is even stronger than Guala thinks.
  •  359
    Bottom-Up or Top-Down: Campbell's Rationalist Account of Monothematic Delusions
    with Tim Bayne
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1): 1-11. 2004.
    A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. In place of empiricism Campbell offers a rationalist account of monothematic delusions, according to which delusional beliefs are understood as Wittgensteinian framew…Read more
  •  7
    Reply to John Campbell
    In Jérôme Dokic & Joëlle Proust (eds.), Simulation and Knowledge of Action, John Benjamins. pp. 45--255. 2002.
  •  247
    Agency, simulation and self-identification
    with Marc Jeannerod
    Mind and Language 19 (2): 113-146. 2004.
    This paper is concerned with the problem of selfidentification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in selfidentification and in agencyascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centr…Read more
  •  77
    Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3): 299-317. 2002.
    The main aim of this paper is to investigate what becomes of normativity in naturalistic epistemologies. What particular stand a given naturalistic epistemology takes on normativity will depend both on what it thinks is wrong with traditional epistemology and on what level of normativity is at stake. I propose a tentative typology of possible attitudes towards normativity from within naturalistic epistemology. In section I, I give a brief presentation of traditional epistemology, stressing the d…Read more
  •  284
    Looking for the agent: An investigation into consciousness of action and self-consciousness in schizophrenic patients
    with E. Daprati, N. Franck, N. Georgieff, Joëlle Proust, J. Dalery, and Marc Jeannerod
    Cognition 65 (1): 71-86. 1997.
    The abilities to attribute an action to its proper agent and to understand its meaning when it is produced by someone else are basic aspects of human social communication. Several psychiatric syndromes, such as schizophrenia, seem to lead to a dysfunction of the awareness of one’s own action as well as of recognition of actions performed by other. Such syndromes offer a framework for studying the determinants of agency, the ability to correctly attribute actions to their veridical source. Thirty…Read more
  •  4
    Iesap and institutional members I
    Dialectica 53 (2). 1999.
  •  64
    Conscious experience and concept-forming abilities
    Acta Analytica 16 (26): 45-52. 2001.
    Pierre Jacob's book, What Minds Can Do , is mainly concerned with intentionality. Jacob's primary goal is to explain both how it is possible for a physical system to have intentional mental states and how the intentional content of such mental states can play a role in the causal explanation of behaviour. Yet, he also tackles the issue of the nature of conscious experience. I shall focus here on a claim he makes in connection with this latter topic. The claim (made at the very end of Chapter 2, …Read more
  •  346
    After a long period of neglect, the phenomenology of action has recently regained its place in the agenda of philosophers and scientists alike. The recent explosion of interest in the topic highlights its complexity. The purpose of this paper is to propose a conceptual framework allowing for a more precise characterization of the many facets of the phenomenology of agency, of how they are related and of their possible sources. The key assumption guiding this attempt is that the processes through…Read more
  •  36
    In this paper, we evaluate the proposal that a central function of commitments within joint action is to reduce various kinds of uncertainty, and that this accounts for the prevalence of commitments in joint action. While this idea is prima facie attractive, we argue that it faces two serious problems. First, commitments can only reduce uncertainty if they are credible, and accounting for the credibility of commitments proves not to be straightforward. Second, there are many other ways in which …Read more
  •  20
    The paper discusses the role affective factors may play in explaining why, in Capgras'delusion, the delusional belief once formed is maintained and argues that there is an important link between the modularity of the relevant emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.
  •  107
    Too much ado about belief
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 185-200. 2007.
    Three commitments guide Dennett’s approach to the study of consciousness. First, an ontological commitment to materialist monism. Second, a methodological commitment to what he calls ‘heterophenomenology.’ Third, a ‘doxological’ commitment that can be expressed as the view that there is no room for a distinction between a subject’s beliefs about how things seem to her and what things actually seem to her, or, to put it otherwise, as the view that there is no room for a reality/appearance distinc…Read more
  •  187
    Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite
    Synthese 190 (10): 1817-1839. 2013.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s …Read more
  •  322
    In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions
    with Timothy J. Bayne
    Mind and Language 20 (2): 163-88. 2005.
    In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that th…Read more