•  325
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the th…Read more
  •  59
    Fregean propositions and their graspability
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1): 73-94. 2006.
    According to Frege a proposition—or, in his terms, a thought—is an abstract structured entity constituted by senses which satisfies, at least, the three following properties: it can be semantically assessed as true or as false, it is the object of so called propositional attitudes and it can be grasped. What Frege meant by 'grasping' is the peculiar way in which we can have epistemic access to propositions. The possibility for propositions to be grasped is put by Frege as a warrant for their exi…Read more
  •  34
    Propositions. An introduction
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1): 1-27. 2006.
  •  31
    Against phenomenal externalism
    Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (145): 25-48. 2017.
    We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal external- ism is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see no reason to relinquish an idea…Read more
  •  25
    In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object occurs in the in…Read more
  •  22
    Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2): 256-263. 2016.
    __: In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his own ar…Read more
  •  5
    Against Phenomenal Externalism
    Critica 49 (145): 25-48. 2017.
    Queremos mostrar que ninguno de los argumentos conocidos a favor del externismo fenoménico es convincente. PE es la tesis de que las propiedades fenoménicas de nuestras experiencias se tienen que individuar en modo amplio en la medida en la que están constituidas por propiedades del mundo. Examinamos los que nos parecen los cinco mejores argumentos a favor de PE. Intentamos mostrar que ninguno de ellos puede establecer el resultado deseado. Mientras no aparezcan argumentos mejores en el debate, …Read more
  •  2
    Fregean Presentationalism
    In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History, Palgrave. pp. 241-261. 2018.
    The paper focuses on two claims widely held in the philosophy of mind, namely, content externalism and phenomenological internalism. The question it addresses is which picture, if any, of the relationship between representational and phenomenal properties makes the conjunction between the two claims tenable. The main thesis of the paper is that the conjunction is tenable only within an account which treats the two kinds of properties as distinct, irreducible and yet related to each other. The re…Read more
  •  1
    Can Phenomenology be Narrow if Content is Wide and Phenomenology is Claimed to Depend on Intentionality?
    Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57 117-122. 2018.
    There are two main ideas that inform the current reflection in the philosophy of mind, namely that the content of mental states is constitutively dependent on worldly, environmental facts and that phenomenology depends only on the intrinsic features of a subject. The question I shall address is whether it is possible to preserve both ideas within a strong intentionalist account. In other words, as the title goes: Can phenomenology be narrow if content is wide and phenomenology is claimed to depe…Read more
  • I pensieri e il regno di mezzo
    Rivista di Estetica 44 (26): 239-255. 2004.