University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2008
Springfield, Missouri, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics
Applied Ethics
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics
Applied Ethics
  •  108
    Good Eats
    Between the Species 17 (1): 53-73. 2014.
    If one believes that vegetarianism is morally obligatory, there are numerous ways to argue for that conclusion. In this paper, classic utilitarian and rights-based attempts to ground this obligation are considered, as well as Cora Diamond’s reframing of the debate in terms of the proper way to view other animals. After discussion of these three ways to ground the obligation and their problems, an attitude-based approach inspired by Diamond’s view is advanced. It is argued that such a view, by fo…Read more
  •  79
    Given the existence of “marginal human cases”, it is often argued that we must either acknowledge that some human beings have less moral status than some non-human animals, or commit to the idea that moral status is held by humans qua human. In this paper, the moves available on both sides are shown to be unsatisfactory, and an argument for moral status that avoids both of the standard positions is suggested. Ultimately, it is argued that the discussion of moral status is confused when marginal…Read more
  •  67
  •  56
    The Objects of Respect
    Environmental Ethics 37 (1): 57-73. 2015.
    Although it is widely held that we do not owe basic respect to nonhuman animals, a close examination of why we owe this respect to human beings leads to the conclusion that we owe it to nonhuman animals as well. While Kant’s basic notion of respect for persons is intuitively plausible, Kant’s two arguments for why respect is owed to human beings ultimately fail, and a reconsideration of which feature of human beings actually grounds the respect that humans are owed is called for. Ultimately, it …Read more
  •  46
    An Agent-Centered Account of Rightness: The Importance of a Good Attitude
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (5): 941-954. 2014.
    This paper provides a sketch of an agent-centered way of understanding and answering the question, “What’s wrong with that?” On this view, what lies at the bottom of judgments of wrongness is a bad attitude; when someone does something wrong, she does something that expresses a bad, or inappropriate, attitude . In order to motivate this account, a general Kantian agent-centered ethics is discussed, as well as Michael Slote’s agent-based ethics, in light of analysis of the grounding role of attit…Read more
  •  31
    Review of Patricia Marino’s Moral Reasoning in a Pluralistic World (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2016. 2016.
  •  22
    Focusing Respect on Creatures
    Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3): 593-609. 2017.
    Obligations of respect tend to be grounded in the moral relevance of features of creatures rather than in the creatures themselves. This is troubling for two reasons: (1) There is a difference between what we take the attitude of respect to be, and the way in which our theories structure our obligations, and (2) If the presence of a feature is what generates our obligations, then the creatures to whom we are obligated lose their claim on us if they lose that feature. In light of these problems…Read more
  •  11
    Dogs and tigers and fish, oh my! Sporting captivity
    Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 17 (4): 477-487. 2023.
    In contemporary society, humans interact with nonhuman animals in a number of ways, many of which involve the captivity of the nonhuman animals involved. Nonhuman animals trained for sport (sled dogs, horses trained for dressage, etc.), nonhuman animals confined for human entertainment (zoos, aquariums, circuses, etc.), and companion animals are all held captive by the human beings who interact with them. However, the moral acceptability of these forms of captivity seems to vary widely; this var…Read more