•  1042
    Using Small Group Learning in the Philosophy Classroom
    Teaching Philosophy 36 (2): 137-159. 2013.
    I advocate the use of small group learning in the philosophy classroom because it engages a broad cross-section of students and because it proves to be an effective way to teach critical thinking. In this article, I suggest small group activities that are useful for developing philosophical skills, and I propose methods for circumventing common logistical problems that can arise when implementing small group learning in the classroom. Ultimately, I show that small group learning is a pedagogical…Read more
  •  419
    Hippocrates at phaedrus 270c
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3): 409-430. 2020.
    At Plato’s Phaedrus 270c, Socrates asks whether one can know souls without knowing ‘the whole.’ Phaedrus answers that ‘according to Hippocrates’ the same demand on knowing the whole applies to bodies. What parallel is intended between soul-knowledge and body-knowledge and which medical passages illustrate the analogy have been much debated. Three dominant interpretations read ‘the whole’ as respectively (1) environment, (2) kosmos, and (3) individual soul or body; and adduce supporting Hippocrat…Read more
  •  363
    Evil, Demiurgy, and the Taming of Necessity in Plato’s Timaeus
    with Casey Hall
    International Philosophical Quarterly 62 (1): 5-21. 2022.
    Plato’s Timaeus reveals a cosmos governed by Necessity and Intellect; commentators have debated the relationship between them. Non-literalists hold that the demiurge, having carte blanche in taming Necessity, is omnipotent. But this omnipotence, alongside the attributes of benevolence and omniscience, creates problems when non-literalists address the problem of evil. We take the demiurge rather as limited by Necessity. This position is supported by episodes within the text, and by its larger con…Read more
  •  284
    Pre-Cosmic Necessity in Plato's Timaeus
    Apeiron 44 (3): 287-305. 2011.
    One aim of this paper is to bring to the surface the problems with the traditional, non-literal interpretation of the pre-cosmos in the Timaeus. Contrary to this traditional interpretation, I show that Necessity is an ateleological cause capable of bringing about the events in the pre-cosmos, and that Intelligence is a teleological cause that produces effects only for the sake of maximizing the good. I conclude that there are no grounds for supposing that Intelligence is a causal force operatin…Read more
  •  281
    Is the Form of the Good a Final Cause for Plato?
    History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2): 99-116. 2016.
    Many assume that Plato's Form of the Good is a final cause. This might be true if one assumes an Aristotelian definition of final cause; however, I argue that if one adopts Plato's conception of final causation as evidenced in the Phaedo and Timaeus, the claim that the Form of the Good is a final cause for Plato is untenable.
  •  124
    An Examination of Plato’s Chora
    Environment, Space, Place 7 (1): 7-27. 2015.
    In the Timaeus, Plato’s creation story, Plato describes an entity he refers to as the chora. The Greek word chora is translated as place, room, or space, but Plato’s descriptions of the chora are so notoriously enigmatic that there is disagreement about what, exactly, he intends to indicate by it. In this paper, I address an interpretation of the chora according to which the chora is a kind of cosmic mirror. I argue that this interpretation results in an uncharitable reading of Plato’s explanati…Read more
  •  121
    The Philosopher-Ruler
    Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1): 225-232. 2010.
    I argue for a view that departs radically from the long-held assumption that "to know the good is to do the good". On the view I shall defend, the role of the Form of the Good in the 'Republic' is greatly demoted; I argue that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Form of the Good is in fact 'insufficient' for the philosopher-king to rule. Instead, I argue that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Forms must be complemented with a type of "practical wisdom". I define "practical wisdom" as the ability…Read more
  •  50
    Evaluating the Goodness of Actions on Plato's Ethical Theory
    Philosophical Inquiry 39 (3-4): 56-72. 2015.
    Can Plato’s ethical theory account for the goodness of actions? Plato’s Form of the Good is regarded as the ultimate explanatory principle of all good things, which presumably includes good actions. And this is indeed a standard view. However, in this paper I argue that the theory of the Form of the Good cannot explain the goodness of actions. This is a highly contested claim because, if it is accurate, it suggests that there is a significant deficit in Plato’s theory of the Form of the Good - t…Read more
  •  32
    What is Plato’s Epistemic Worry About Phantasia?
    Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2): 61-67. 2016.
    Liu argues that Plato’s account of phantasia in the Sophist reveals Plato’s “deep epistemic worry about perceptual experience” (Liu, 2016, p. 175). The purpose of this paper is to identify more precisely the nature and extent of Plato’s epistemic worry. Liu claims that Plato is worried about phantasiai because, “one’s perception-based belief reflects a distorted picture of things,” but by not fully explaining the nature of this worry, Liu leaves the reader with the impression that Plato regard…Read more
  •  22
    At Phaedo 105c, Socrates introduces a type of explanation (αἰτία) he describes as “clever.” Rather than explaining a body’s hotness in terms of the body’s participation in the Form Hot, for example, the clever αἰτία attributes a body’s hotness to the presence of fire in the body. Traditional interpretations argue that the clever αἰτία accounts for the interaction between fire and the body in terms of logical entailment relationships among the Forms. On this view, fire makes bodies hot because fi…Read more
  •  19
    A Commentary On “Socrates and His Daimonion: A Paragon of Rationality?”
    Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2): 1-5. 2015.
    Brandt addresses what has been called an “embarrassment” in Socratic studies: in the Crito, Socrates claims that he is only persuaded to act on the basis of propositions that appear to him to be best upon rational examination (45b). However, in several other dialogues, Socrates appears to contradict himself: He obeys the commands of his supernatural daimonion, thereby suggesting that divine command - something that is not the product of human reasoning - can also persuade Socrates to act. Herein…Read more