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41Avowing the Avowal ViewAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3): 623-640. 2024.This paper defends the avowal view of self-deception, according to which the self-deceived agent has been led by the evidence to believe that ¬p and yet is sincere in asserting that p. I argue that the agent qualifies as sincere in asserting the contrary of what they in the most basic sense believe in virtue of asserting what they are committed to believing. It is only by recognizing such commitments and distinguishing them from the more basic beliefs whose rational regulation is automatic that …Read more
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21Killing with KindnessIn Fritz Allhoff & S. Waller (eds.), Serial Killers ‐ Philosophy for Everyone, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Nature, Nurture, and the Female Serial Killer Introduction Female Nurture and Human Nature: Some Philosophical Background Female Serial Killers: A Typology Of Poets and Monsters: Our Common Nature.
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48Précis of Self-Consciousness and 'Split' Brains: The Minds' IJournal of Consciousness Studies 29 (1-2): 142-152. 2022.
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1478Self-Consciousness and Split Brains: The Minds' IOxford University Press. 2018.Elizabeth Schechter explores the implications of the experience of people who have had the pathway between the two hemispheres of their brain severed, and argues that there are in fact two minds, subjects of experience, and intentional agents inside each split-brain human being: right and left. But each split-brain subject is still one of us.
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142Can Panpsychism Bridge the Explanatory Gap?Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 32-39. 2006.
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224The switch model of split-brain consciousnessPhilosophical Psychology 25 (2). 2012.The attempt to model the structure of consciousness in split-brain subjects is ongoing. This paper concerns the recently proposed ?switch model? of split-brain consciousness, according to which a split-brain subject possesses only a single stream of consciousness, unified at and across time, that shifts from one hemisphere to the other from moment to moment. The paper argues that while the central explanatory element of the switch model may account for some aspects of split-brain consciousness, …Read more
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188Individuating mental tokens: The split-brain casePhilosophia 38 (1): 195-216. 2010.Some philosophers have argued that so long as two neural events, within a subject, are both of the same type and both carry the same content, then these events may jointly constitute a single mental token, regardless of the sort of causal relation to each other that they bear. These philosophers have used this claim—which I call the “singularity-through-redundancy” position—in order to argue that a split-brain subject normally has a single stream of consciousness, disjunctively realized across t…Read more
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233Two Unities of ConsciousnessEuropean Journal of Philosophy 21 (2): 197-218. 2010.: This paper argues for a distinction between possession of a unified consciousness and possession of a single stream of consciousness. Although the distinction has widespread applicability in discussions of the structure of consciousness and of pathologies of conscious experience, I will illustrate its importance primarily using the debate about consciousness in split-brain subjects, suggesting that those who have argued that split-brain subjects have two streams of consciousness apiece and tho…Read more
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1Persons and psychological frameworks: A critique of TyeJournal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3): 141-163. 2009.This paper concerns the relationships between persons, brains, behaviour, and psychological explanation. Tye defines a ‘psychological framework’ (PF) as a set of token beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, streams of consciousness, higher-order mental states, etc., that ‘form a coherent whole’ and against which a creature’s ‘behavior can be explained’ (p. 141). A person is the subject of such a psychological framework. Each person has one PF, and with each new PF there is a new person. Meanwhi…Read more
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235The unity of consciousness: subjects and objectivityPhilosophical Studies 165 (2): 671-692. 2013.This paper concerns the role that reference to subjects of experience can play in individuating streams of consciousness, and the relationship between the subjective and the objective structure of consciousness. A critique of Tim Bayne’s recent book indicates certain crucial choices that works on the unity of consciousness must make. If one identifies the subject of experience with something whose consciousness is necessarily unified, then one cannot offer an account of the objective structure o…Read more
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154The Subject in Neuropsychology: Individuating Minds in the Split‐Brain CaseMind and Language 30 (5): 501-525. 2015.Many experimental findings with split-brain subjects intuitively suggest that each such subject has two minds. The conceptual and empirical basis of this duality intuition has never been fully articulated. This article fills that gap, by offering a reconstruction of early neuropsychological literature on the split-brain phenomenon. According to that work, the hemispheres operate independently of each other insofar as they interact via the mediation of effection and transduction—via behavior and …Read more
Bloomington, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |