Elvio Baccarini

Ovaj je zbornik nastao kao rezultat istraživanja provedenog unutar istoimenoga znanstveno-istraživačkoga projekta na kojemu su urednici istovremeno bili i glavni istraživači, a ostali autori članovi istraživačke skupine. Kao svjedoci različitih vrsta otklona od prevladavajućeg, uobičajenoga, normalnoga, pozitivnog ili ponašanja koje se karakterizira kao asocijalno, zapitali smo se – što postojeće čini normom, treba li odstupanje od norme nužno smatrati devijacijom i kakvi su poželjni društveni odgovori na odstupanja od normi. Često se smatra ispravnim upravo ono što je prevladavajuće, a ono što predstavlja otklon označava se kao devijacija u negativnome značenju onoga što nije ispravno, nije posve ispravno, ili čak onoga što treba sankcionirati. Naš je početni stav bio da ono što prevladava ne smije biti neupitna norma, kao što ni ono što je otklon nije po automatizmu devijacija. Međutim, ne smatramo ni da prevladavajuću normu, samom tom činjenicom što je prevladavajuća, nužno treba kritizirati te da je svaki otklon po sebi poželjan. Cilj našeg istraživanja bio je istražiti različite oblike deficita i devijacijau u domeni formiranja vjerovanja individualnih, grupnih, kolektivnih i institucijskih epistemičkih aktera (socijalna epistemologija) i u domeni društvenog i institucijskoga djelovanja (filozofija politike i filozofija psihijatrije). Nastavno na to, pokušali smo identificirati vrijednosti postojećih normi, koliko odgovaraju poželjnim vrijednostima te koji su poželjni društveni odgovori na otklone od normi.

In the first part of the paper, Gaus’ ground for the ideal of persons as free and equal is described. Doubts are raised about the appropriateness of the use of his account of this ideal as endogenous to our moral practice. Th e worries are related to the use of the concept of having a reason that Gaus makes in his book, as well as to the aptness of his account of our moral practice from the viewpoint of our moral phenomenology. Some doubts are raised in relation to the pertinence of Gaus’ concept of having a reason from the perspective of the motivation of the public reason project. In the second part of the paper, a summary is off ered of Gaus’ model of public justification and some of its consequences are discussed. Th e primary intention here is to show that, contrary to Gaus’ view, egalitarian liberalism, and not classical liberalism, is the most appropriate result of such a model of justification.

We argue that the mandatory moral bioenhancement of psychopaths is justified as a prescription of social morality. Moral bioenhancement is legitimate when it is justified on the basis of the reasons of the recipients. Psychopaths expect and prefer that the agents with whom they interact do not have certain psychopathic traits. Particularly, they have reasons to require the moral bioenhancement of psychopaths with whom they must cooperate. By adopting a public reason and a Kantian argument, we conclude that we can justify to a psychopath being the recipient of mandatory moral bioenhancement because he has a reason to require the application of this prescription to other psychopaths.

The method of reflective equilibrium implies that moral principles received from philosophical reasoning and considered moral judgments received intuitively are finally justified if they cohere with each other. This idea is combined with the proposal of rational consensus (Lehrer), which shows the way in which divergences of judgements could be made to converge. This second method is used to the end of rendering more plausible the intuitions used in reflective equilibrium, and, so, to show the appropriateness of the coherentist method in ethics.

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument against suicide based on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment.

The research started with a definition of the general ethical background to be applied in bioethical discussions, particularly regarding aspects of morality that have to be enforced by the community. Only those moral beliefs that can be accepted by consensus in a free discussion can be enforced. It follows that the basic principle of a well ordered society is the equality (and possible upwards extension) of the basic liberties. Therefore, whenever it is possible to respect the principle of autonomy in matters of bioethics (here including questions of abortion, assisted procreation, genetics, organ transplantation and euthanasia) this must be done. On the other hand, there are some common values that can be defended in a free dialogue, values that are needed in order to guarantee stable cooperation in a political society. These values include the respect for human life, which implies the respect for human life in all its forms. This leads to the conclusion that people who are able to be part of the system of cooperation in a political society have rights which are dominant in moral considerations. In all cases where there is no conflict between these rights and the value of life as manifested in human individuals who are not able participate in social cooperation, considerations of the value of the life of the latter must be an important moral consideration. This implies that embryo experimentation should be permitted in order to develop scientific advances needed to save human life, but embryos must not be used for trivial reasons or for the cosmetic industry.

Empirical methods interact with moral philosophy in several ways. In this paper I remark the role of experience, as well as formative experience, in moral epistemology. I defend the thesis that abstract reasoning is not sufficient in morality. Experiences are needed for refined moral judgments. In particular, I focus on experience and formative experience through engagement with artworks. I endorse a form of art cognitivism, the thesis that we can learn through experiences of artworks, but here I remain neutral toward whether the cognitive value of artworks contributes to their artistic value. In my view, learning from artworks is not detached from abstract reasoning, but complementary to it. This is needed in order to reply to an objection directed at art cognitivism, one which appeals to the fact that the properties of artworks can improve our moral cognitive capacities, as well as reduce them. I reply to this objection by saying that although art is one resource of moral learning, it is not the only resource. This is why we must not passively endorse insights that are derived from experiences of artworks. We must critically analyse these by comparing them with other beliefs and experiences. Experiences of artworks are a source of moral learning, but insights that are derived from them must be reflective and critically examined. The model is a kind of reflective equilibrium, where various sources of learning interact and support, as well as check, each other for moral learning.

Abstract In The Rational and the Social James Brown argues against the use of the method of reflective equilibrium in attempting to justify methodological norms. For, according to Brown, this would involve a circularity for that method presupposes an account of good scientific practice. In this paper it is argued that the method can be sustained without such a presupposition using either conherentism, reliabilism or defeasible foundationalism. That being so there is no circularity in applying it within normative methodology of science

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument against suicide based on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment.

It is from the mere announcement of the possibility of human cloning that moralists have formulated critical arguments against the permissibility of introducing this practice. A critical survey of these arguments, however, shows that they are not well founded, i.e. that frequently they are not such that they can be used as legitimate arguments in the debate about what is publicly permissible in a state, that they rely on mistaken premises, or that they are non coherent with permissions in relation to other forms of human reproduction. Each argument in favor of the banning of human cloning is analyzed by at least one of these means: whether it is coherent with the fundamental principles of contemporary democracies , whether it relies on well-founded and widely accepted results of scientific researches, and whether it is coherent with the usual and widely shared moral attitudes related to other forms of human reproduction. The most important argument that is taken as a good foundation for the prohibition of human cloning is the moral duty not to harm future persons. The result of the rejection of traditional moral arguments against human cloning does not represent an overall justification of human cloning, it only shows that new, or more sophisticated, arguments must be found if human cloning is to be banned

Dès la simple annonce de la possibilité de cloner des humains, les moralistes ont formulé des argyuments contre l’introduction d’une telle pratique, la jugeant inadmissible. Or, un examen critique de ces arguments montre qu’il ne sont pas bien fondés, c’est-à-dire que, souvent, ils ne sont pas propres à être mis en avant en tant qu’arguments légitimes dans les débats sur ce qui est publiquement admissible, qu’ils reposent sur des prémisses erronées, ou qu’ils ne sont pas cohérents avec l’admissibilité d’autres formes de reproduction humaine. Chacun des arguments en faveur de la proscription du clonage humain est analysé ici sous au moins l’un des aspects suivants : est-il en conformité avec les principes fondamentaux des démocraties modernes , est-il fondé sur les résultats incontestés et communément admis des recherches scientifiques, enfin, est-il cohérent avec l’attitude générale à l’égard d’autres formes de reproduction humaine. L’argument massue en faveur de la proscription du clonage humain est celui qui met en avant le devoir moral qui consiste à ne pas faire de tort à la future personne. Le résultat de cette réfutation des arguments éthiques traditionnels contre le clonage humain ne représentent pour autant pas une justification complète de ce dernier : elle montre tout simplement qu’il faudra trouver des arguments plus concluants si l’on veut faire interdire le clonage humain

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob die Verlängerung der L ebenszeit zu den in der Verfassung einer gut eingerichteten Gesellschaft verankerten Grundfragen gehört, sei es als schutzwürdiges Recht oder aber als Verbot. Der letztere Fall bezieht sich auf die Frage, ob es Umstände gebe, die von gesetzgebenden gesellschaftlichen Grundeinrichtungen ins Feld geführt werden könnten, um ein Verbot von Forschungen oder bestimmten technologischen Praktiken, die das Ziel einer wesentlichen L ebenszeitverlängerung verfolgen, durchzusetzen. Es mag als offenkundig erscheinen, dass entsprechende Verbote auf unmittelbarem Wege bewirkt werden, wenn eine positive Antwort auf die gestellte Frage ausbleibt. Dies ist jedoch nicht der Fall. Selbst wenn auf verfassungsrechtlicher Ebene kein Verbot erreicht werden kann, ist es immer noch möglich, entsprechende gesetzliche Regelungen auf tieferer Ebene festzulegen. In der Folge ergibt sich ein neues Problem: Ist es möglich, unter anderen in der Verfassung zu verankernden Grundfragen, ein Recht auf die Entwicklung wissenschaftlicher Forschung zu bestimmen , ferner ein Recht auf die Nutzung technologischer Ressourcen mit dem Ziel, die L ebensdauer des Menschen wesentlich zu verlängern? Es werden zwei Arten von Argumenten analysiert. Die erste Argumentationsweise besagt, dass die Verlängerung der L ebenszeit schädlich sei, da sie die Natur des Menschen gefährde. L aut zweiter Argumentationsweise ist eine Verlängerung der menschlichen L ebenszeit nutzlos, da sie in Sinnlosigkeit und Langweile führe

Rawls’s theory of justice is capable of providing an important contribution to the question of physician-assisted suicide (PAS). PAS should be guaranteed as a right to make decisions in accordance with the conception of the good the individual formulates as a rational being. This defense is supported, therefore, by a Kantian premise. But it is also possible to oppose this kind of proposal by relying on differentaspects of Kant’s theory, i.e. on some variant of the famous argument against suicide based on the means/end formulation of the categorical imperative. In this paper, I try to show that these attempts are not well founded, and that the Rawlsian appeal to the Kantian tradition divulges better perspectives. I also try to add considerations inspired by contextualist epistemology to the Rawlsian appeal to the burdens ofjudgment.

The paper is mainly concerned with the problem of whether the question of extension of lifespan may be included in the constitutional essentials of a well ordered society; either as a right that must be protected, or as a prohibition. More precisely, when put in the terms of a possible prohibition, the question is about whether there are reasons that may be endorsed in the basic legislative institutions of a society, as a matter of the constitutional essentials of a state, as a ground for the prohibition of research or technological practice, with the aim of sensibly extending human lifespan. It may appear as obvious that, if the answer to this question is not positive, freedom to engage in these activities immediately follows. However, this is not true. Even if there is no possibility to establish a prohibition at the level of constitutional essentials, it may still be possible to legislate at lower levels for a prohibition. As a consequence, there is another problem, i.e. the question of whether we may establish, as a matter of constitutional essentials, the right to develop research , and make use of technological resources, with the aim of sensibly extending human lifespan. Two kinds of arguments are analysed. The one saying that extension of lifespan is damaging, because it threats human nature; and the one saying that extension of lifespan is not helpful, because it leads to a life of boredom and tediousness

Auf die bloße Ankündigung der Möglichkeit menschlichen Klonens formulierten die Moralisten kritische Argumente gegen die Zulässigkeit der Einführung dieser Praxis. Ein kritischer Blick auf diese Argumente zeigt jedoch, dass sie nicht wohl fundiert sind, d.h. dass sie nicht als legitime Argumente in der Debatte um das in einem Staat öffentlich zulässige zu verwenden sind, denn sie stützen sich auf falsche Prämissen oder sie sind unvereinbar mit Erlaubnissen im Hinblick auf andere Formen der menschlichen Reproduktion. Jedes Argument zugunsten des Verbotes menschlichen Klonens wird mindestens anhand eines der folgenden Mittel analysiert: Steht es im Einklang mit den Grundprinzipien zeitgenössischer Demokratien ; stützt es sich auf wohl fundierte und weitgehend akzeptierte Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Forschungen; ist es kohärent mit den üblichen und allgemein anerkannten moralischen Vorstellungen, die mit anderen Formen menschlicher Reproduktion verbunden sind. Das Hauptargument, das als gute Grundlage zum Verbot menschlichen Klonens angesehen wird, ist die moralische Pflicht, künftigen Personen keinen Schaden zuzufügen. Das Ergebnis des Verwerfens traditioneller moralischer Argumente gegen das menschliche Klonen bedeutet keine allgemeine Rechtfertigung menschlichen Klonens, es zeigt nur, dass neue oder präziser ausgeklügelte Argumente zu erbringen sind, wenn menschliches Klonen verboten werden soll

Tekst se bavi problemom može li produžetak trajanja ljudskog života biti uključen u ustavna temeljna pitanja dobro uređenog društva, bilo kao pravo koje treba biti zaštićeno, ili kao zabrana. Kada govorimo o mogućoj zabrani, pitanje je postoje li razlozi na koje je moguće pozvati se u temeljnim zakonodavnim ustanovama društva, kao osnovu za zabranu istraživanja, ili tehnološke prakse, u cilju značajnog produžetka trajanja ljudskog života. Može se činiti očitim da, ako ne postoji pozitivan odgovor na to pitanje, zabrana ovih aktivnosti slijedi neposredno. Međutim, to nije ispravno. Čak i ako nije moguće uspostaviti zabranu na razini ustavnih temeljnih pitanja, može biti još uvijek moguće odrediti zakone na nižim razinama zakonodavstva. Kao posljedica, pojavljuje se novi problem – možemo li odrediti, među temeljnim ustavnim pitanjima, pravo na razvijanje istraživanja i na korištenje tehnoloških resursa, u cilju značajnog produžetka trajanja ljudskog života. Analiziraju se dvije vrste argumenta. Jedan od njih kaže da je produžetak trajanja ljudskog života štetan, budući da ugrožava ljudsku prirodu, a drugi kaže da produžetak trajanja ljudskog života nije koristan, s obzirom da vodi do besmislenosti i dosade

L’article se penche sur la question de savoir si l’allongement de l’espérance de vie peut faire partie des principes de base de la constitution d’une société bien ordonnée, que ce soit en tant que droit à protéger ou en tant qu’interdit. Plus précisément, si on décide de l’interdire, la question est de savoir s’il existe des fondements sur lesquels puisse s’appuyer une interdiction de recherches scientifiques ou technologiques qui visent à allonger sensiblement l’espérance de vie, dans les institutions législatives fondamentales d’une société, et avec l’idée d’en faire un principe constitutionnel de l’Etat. Il pourrait sembler évident que, si la réponse à cette question n’est pas positive, la liberté de s’engager dans de telles activités en découle. Néanmoins, cela n’est pas vrai. Même s’il n’y a pas de possibilité d’établir une telle interdiction au niveau constitutionnel, il est toujours possible de légiférer à un niveau inférieur. En conséquence se pose un autre problème, celui de savoir si l’on peut inscrire, dans les fondements de la constitution, le droit de développer la recherche, financée par exemple par des fonds privés, et utiliser les ressources technologiques dans le dessein d’allonger sensiblement l’espérance de la vie humaine. Deux types d’arguments sont analysés. L ’un avance que l’allongement de l’espérance de vie est dangereux car il compromet l’essence même de l’humanité. L ’autre estime que l’allongement de l’espérance de vie n’est pas utile car il aurait pour résultat une vie ennuyeuse et monotone

Must liberalism, in dealing with issues of basic rights and primary goods, take into account national belonging as a particularly important form of cultural belonging? The paper first discusses liberalism which is frequently defined as difference-blind and which considers citizens solely on the basis of some of their abstract and common features. The alternative position is liberal nationalism, according to which individuals and their primary goods stand at the center of considerations of justice, but which also finds it impossible to ignore cultural belonging when discussing primary goods and basic rights of individuals. In discussing the strategy which affirms national cultural belonging as a precondition for autonomy, an attempt is made to show that this is not a sufficient basis for the role of a special national cultural belonging in the definition of primary goods, because even if a national cultural belonging is needed for practicing autonomy, specific national cultural belonging isn’t.

Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express demands. I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.

This paper extends Alan John Simmons?s conceptual distinction between Lockean and Kantian conceptions of legitimacy that he applied to the question of the legitimacy of states, to the issue of legitimacy of public decisions. I criticise the consent conception of legitimacy defended by Simmons, and I defend the Rawlsian version of the justificatory conception of legitimacy from his objection. The approach of this paper is distinctive because the two conceptions are assessed by investigating, using the method of reflective equilibrium, their respective prescriptions concerning the treatment of antisocial personality disorder and epidemiologic measures. I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium does not support the consent conception. Considering the issues of treatment of APD and of epidemiologic measures, I argue that the consent conception of legitimacy is not well-equipped for the evaluation of norms that are not strictly self-regarding. This causes a deficit of prescriptions for relevant social responses. Further, by considering the case of responses to epidemics, I argue that such a conception can avoid harmful consequences only by recurring to additional, and independent, premises. This does not cause incoherence but reduces the coherence of a normative system. Finally, the consent conception is not equipped to support social cooperation in an optimal way, which has proved to be necessary in critical conditions, like a pandemic. On the other hand, I argue that the method of reflective equilibrium supports the Rawlsian version of justificatory conception of legitimacy, because of its advantages in handling the indicated issues. In addition, I maintain that this justificatory conception is respectful of freedom and equality of agents as moral self-legislators, and, thus, it is not vulnerable to Simmons?s main criticism.