•  688
    What makes a belief delusional?
    with Lisa Bortolotti and Rachel Gunn
    In I. McCarthy, K. Sellevold & O. Smith (eds.), Cognitive Confusions, Legenda. pp. 37-51. 2016.
    In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence). Other defining features of delusions are psychological and they focus on whether delusions are harmful, as in the definition of …Read more
  •  6
    Unbiased Awarding of Art Prizes? It’s Hard to Judge
    with Michael Rush
    British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2): 157-179. 2023.
    We have higher-order evidence that aesthetic judgements in the context of awarding art prizes may be affected by implicit bias, to the detriment of artists from marginalized groups. Epistemologists have suggested how to respond to higher-order evidence by appeal to bracketing or suspending judgement. We explain why these approaches do not help in this context. We turn to three ways of addressing the operation of implicit bias: (i) anonymization, (ii) the production of objective criteria, (iii) d…Read more
  •  1
  •  76
    How can false or irrational beliefs be useful?
    Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1): 1-3. 2017.
    Introduction to a special issue on False Beliefs that are Useful
  •  43
    Aims and Exclusivity
    European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 721-731. 2017.
    If belief has an aim by being a intentional activity, then it ought to be the case that the aim of belief can be weighed against other aims one might have. However, this is not so with the putative truth aim of belief: from the first-person perspective, one can only be motivated by truth considerations in deliberation over what to believe. From this perspective then, the aim cannot be weighed. This problem is captured by David Owens's Exclusivity Objection to belief having an aim. Conor McHugh h…Read more
  • The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Delusion (edited book)
    Routledge. forthcoming.
  •  18
    Virtually imagining our biases
    Philosophical Psychology 36 (4): 860-893. 2023.
    A number of studies have investigated how immersion in a virtual reality environment can affect participants’ implicit biases. These studies presume associationism about implicit bias. Recently philosophers have argued that associationism is inadequate and have made a case for understanding implicit biases propositionally. However, no propositionalist has considered the empirical work on virtual reality and how to integrate it into their theories. I examine this work against a propositionalist b…Read more
  •  631
    Better no longer to be
    South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1): 55-68. 2012.
    David Benatar argues that coming into existence is always a harm, and that – for all of us unfortunate enough to have come into existence – it would be better had we never come to be. We contend that if one accepts Benatar’s arguments for the asymmetry between the presence and absence of pleasure and pain, and the poor quality of life, one must also accept that suicide is preferable to continued existence, and that his view therefore implies both anti-natalism and pro-mortalism . This conclusio…Read more
  •  11
    What Makes a Belief Delusional?
    with Lisa Bortolotti and Rachel Gunn
    In I. McCarthy, K. Sellevold & O. Smith (eds.), Cognitive Confusions, Legenda. 2016.
    In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions, since there is no consensus yet on what causes delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence. Other defining features of delusions are psychological and focus on whe…Read more
  •  11
    Belief, Imagination, and Delusion (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2022.
    This volume brings together recent work on the nature of belief, imagination, and delusion. Whilst philosophers of mind and epistemology employ notions of belief and imagination in their theorizing, parallel work seeking to make these notions more precise continues. Delusions are standardly taken to be bizarre beliefs occurring in the clinical population, which do not respond to evidence. The purpose of this collection of essays is to get clearer on the nature of belief and imagination, the ways…Read more
  •  5
    Correction to: Against a second factor
    Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2): 1-1. 2022.
  •  6
    Against a second factor
    Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1): 1-10. 2022.
    In his recent book Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono offers a thoroughgoing defence of delusions as biologically malfunctioning beliefs, greatly elaborating on his earlier defence of this view. Miyazono has it that delusions have biological doxastic functions, and that delusions involve direct or indirect malfunctions of this kind. In this short piece, I focus on Miyazono’s defence of a two-factor approach to delusion formation as it appears in Chapter Four. Miyazono approaches his discussio…Read more
  •  32
    Believing badly ain’t so bad
    Philosophical Psychology 36 (6): 1208-1216. 2023.
    The Covid-19 pandemic provides the newest example of staunch polarization in the epistemic community, providing ample opportunity for profound disagreements on its origin and the international resp...
  •  7
    Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs
    In Geert Keil, Lara Keuck & Rico Hauswald (eds.), Vagueness in Psychiatry, Oxford University Press. pp. 191-210. 2016.
  •  25
    Better to Return Whence We Came
    Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (1): 85-100. 2022.
  •  38
    Debunking Doxastic Transparency
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1). 2022.
    In this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transparency involves casting our mechanisms for belief formation as solely concerned with truth. I argue that this is explanatorily inadequate when we take a wider view of our belief formation practices. I sh…Read more
  •  23
    Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance?
    Synthese 198 (6): 5437-5454. 2019.
    When subject to the choice-blindness effect, an agent gives reasons for making choice B, moments after making the alternative choice A. Choice blindness has been studied in a variety of contexts, from consumer choice and aesthetic judgement to moral and political attitudes. The pervasiveness and robustness of the effect is regarded as powerful evidence of self-ignorance. Here we compare two interpretations of choice blindness. On the choice error interpretation, when the agent gives reasons she …Read more
  •  61
    Monothematic delusions involve a single theme, and often occur in the absence of a more general delusional belief system. They are cognitively atypical insofar as they are said to be held in the absence of evidence, are resistant to correction, and have bizarre contents. Empiricism about delusions has it that anomalous experience is causally implicated in their formation, whilst rationalism has it that delusions result from top down malfunctions from which anomalous experiences can follow. Withi…Read more
  •  31
    Unimpaired abduction to alien abduction: Lessons on delusion formation
    Philosophical Psychology 33 (5): 679-704. 2020.
    An examination of alien abduction belief can inform how we ought to approach constructing explanations of monothematic delusion formation. I argue that the formation and maintenance of alien abduction beliefs can be explained by a one-factor account, and that this explanatory power generalizes to (other) cases of monothematic delusions. There are no differences between alien abduction beliefs and monothematic delusions which indicate the need for additional explanatory factors in cases of the la…Read more
  •  50
    The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief
    Philosophical Studies 177 (5): 1213-1227. 2020.
    We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look elsewhere.
  •  56
    Biased by our imaginings
    Mind and Language 34 (5): 627-647. 2018.
    I propose a new model of implicit bias, according to which implicit biases are constituted by unconscious imaginings. I begin by endorsing a principle of parsimony when confronted with unfamiliar phenomena. I introduce implicit bias in terms congenial to what most philosophers and psychologists have said about their nature in the literature so far, before moving to a discussion of the doxastic model of implicit bias and objections to it. I then introduce unconscious imagination and argue that ap…Read more
  •  73
    Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?
    Synthese 195 (8): 3453-3476. 2018.
    I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of our mechanisms for belief production. I begin by characterizing the phenomenon, and then move to the teleological and normative accounts of belief, advertised by their proponents as able to give an explanation of it. I argue that, at the very least, both accounts face serious difficulties in this endeavour. Thes…Read more
  •  63
    Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience
    Philosophical Psychology 31 (6): 920-947. 2018.
    ABSTRACTEmpiricists about monothematic delusion formation agree that anomalous experience is a factor in the formation of these attitudes, but disagree markedly on which further factors need to be specified. I argue that epistemic innocence may be a unifying feature of monothematic delusions, insofar as a judgment of epistemic innocence to this class of attitudes is one that opposing empiricist accounts can make. The notion of epistemic innocence allows us to tell a richer story when investigati…Read more
  •  447
    Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief
    In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief, Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73. 2017.
    In this chapter we argue that some beliefs present a problem for the truth-aim teleological account of belief, according to which it is constitutive of belief that it is aimed at truth. We draw on empirical literature which shows that subjects form beliefs about the real world when they read fictional narratives, even when those narratives are presented as fiction, and subjects are warned that the narratives may contain falsehoods. We consider Nishi Shah’s teleologist’s dilemma and a response to…Read more
  •  76
    The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
    Mind and Language 33 (3): 263-279. 2018.
    In some neuropsychological disorders memory distortions seemingly fill gaps in people’s knowledge about their past, where people’s self-image, history, and prospects are often enhanced. False beliefs about the past compromise both people’s capacity to construct a reliable autobiography and their trustworthiness as communicators. However, such beliefs contribute to people’s sense of competence and self-confidence, increasing psychological wellbeing. Here we consider both psychological benefits an…Read more
  •  715
    David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-P…Read more