•  4
    How do scientific conjectures become laws? Why does proof mean different things in different sciences? Do numbers exist, or were they invented? Why do some laws turn out to be wrong? Experience shows that disentangling scientific knowledge from opinion is harder than one might expect. Full of illuminating examples and quotations, and with a scope ranging from psychology and evolution to quantum theory and mathematics, this book brings alive issues at the heart of all science.
  •  90
    Some remarks on the foundations of quantum theory
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3): 521-539. 2005.
    Although many physicists have little interest in philosophical arguments about their subject, an analysis of debates about the paradoxes of quantum mechanics shows that their disagreements often depend upon assumptions about the relationship between theories and the real world. Some consider that physics is about building mathematical models which necessarily have limited domains of applicability, while others are searching for a final theory of everything, to which their favourite theory is sup…Read more
  •  105
    Quantum mechanics does not require the continuity of space
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (2): 319-328. 2003.
  •  20
    Some reflections on Newton's Principia
    British Journal for the History of Science 42 (2): 211-224. 2009.
    This article examines the text of Principia Mathematica to discover the extent to which Newton's claims about his own contribution to it were justified. It is argued that for polemical reasons the General Scholium, written twenty-six years after the first edition, substantially misrepresented the methodology of the main body of the text. The article discusses papers of Wallis, Wren and Huygens that use the third law of motion as set out by Newton in Book 1. It also argues that Newton's use of in…Read more
  •  121
    We approach the philosophy of mathematics via a discussion of the differences between classical mathematics and constructive mathematics, arguing that each is a valid activity within its own context.
  •  5
    How do scientific conjectures become laws? Why does proof mean different things in different sciences? Do numbers exist, or were they invented? Why do some laws turn out to be wrong? In this wide-ranging book, Brian Davies discusses the basis for scientists' claims to knowledge about the world. He looks at science historically, emphasizing not only the achievements of scientists from Galileo onwards, but also their mistakes. He rejects the claim that all scientific knowledge is provisional, by c…Read more
  •  8
    Quantum mechanics does not require the continuity of space
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 34 (2): 319-328. 2003.
  •  57
    The Newtonian Myth
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 34 (4): 763-780. 2003.
    I examine Popper’s claims about Newton’s use of induction in Principia with the actual contents of Principia and draw two conclusions. Firstly, in common with most other philosophers of his generation, it appears that Popper had very little acquaintance with the contents and methodological complexities of Principia beyond what was in the famous General Scholium. Secondly Popper’s ideas about induction were less sophisticated than those of Newton, who recognised that it did not provide logical pr…Read more
  •  24
    We discuss the extent to which the visibility of the heavens was a necessary condition for the development of science, with particular reference to the measurement of time. Our conclusion is that while astronomy had significant importance, the growth of most areas of science was more heavily influenced by the accuracy of scientific instruments, and hence by current technology.
  •  71
    Empiricism in arithmetic and analysis
    Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1): 53-66. 2003.
    We discuss the philosophical status of the statement that (9n – 1) is divisible by 8 for various sizes of the number n. We argue that even this simple problem reveals deep tensions between truth and verification. Using Gillies's empiricist classification of theories into levels, we propose that statements in arithmetic should be classified into three different levels depending on the sizes of the numbers involved. We conclude by discussing the relationship between the real number system and the …Read more