We frame the question of what kind of subjective experience
a brain simulation would have in contrast to a biological brain. We
discuss the brain prosthesis thought experiment. Then, we
identify finer questions relating to the original inquiry, and set out
to answer them moving forward from both a general physicalist
perspective, and pan-experientialism. We propose that the brain
simulation is likely to have subjective experience, however, it may differ
significantly from human experience. Addi…
Read moreWe frame the question of what kind of subjective experience
a brain simulation would have in contrast to a biological brain. We
discuss the brain prosthesis thought experiment. Then, we
identify finer questions relating to the original inquiry, and set out
to answer them moving forward from both a general physicalist
perspective, and pan-experientialism. We propose that the brain
simulation is likely to have subjective experience, however, it may differ
significantly from human experience. Additionally, we discuss the
relevance of quantum properties, digital physics, theory of
relativity, and information theory to the question.