•  11
    Subjective Rationality and the Reasoning Argument
    Logos and Episteme 14 (3): 299-321. 2023.
    My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argu…Read more
  •  11
    Zihin: Descartes'tan Yapay Zekaya (edited book)
    FOL Kitap. 2023.
  •  8
  •  151
    Conditional Uniqueness
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 29 (2): 268-274. 2022.
    In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to clar…Read more
  •  304
    On the Very Idea of Undercutting Defeat
    Logos and Episteme 12 (4): 403-412. 2021.
    My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.
  •  44
    Reasons, Rationalization, and Rationality
    Philosophia 51 (1): 113-137. 2021.
    In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In or…Read more
  •  25
    A Dilemma for Epistemic Infinitism
    Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 10 (10:1): 13-23. 2020.
  •  18
    Epistemic Infinitism, the Reason-Giving Game, and the Regress Skeptic
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1): 81-102. 2020.
    Epistemic infinitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justification of a given proposition requires an infinite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infinitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justification on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infinitism appear as well-equipped to si…Read more
  •  245
    The Priority of Propositional Justification
    Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 59 167-182. 2019.
    Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of having reason(s) R and S believes p on the basis of R. According to Turri, (Basis) is false and hence the orthodox view is wrong. Turri offers “an alternative proposal,” the definitive thesis of which is that the subject’s inte…Read more
  •  295
    Harman on Mental Paint and the Transparency of Experience
    Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 27 (1): 56-81. 2020.
    Harman famously argues that a particular class of antifunctionalist arguments from the intrinsic properties of mental states or events (in particular, visual experiences) can be defused by distinguishing “properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object” and by realizing that the latter are not introspectively accessible (or are transparent). More specifically, Harman argues that we are or can be introspectively aware only of the properties of the object of a…Read more
  •  99
    In “A well-founded solution to the generality problem,” Comesaña argues, inter alia, for three main claims. One is what I call the unavoidability claim: Any adequate epistemological theory needs to appeal, either implicitly or explicitly, to the notion of a belief’s being based on certain evidence. Another is what I call the legitimacy claim: It is perfectly legitimate to appeal to the basing relation in solving a problem for an epistemological theory. According to Comesaña, the legitimacy claim…Read more
  •  11
    On Understanding a Theory on Conscious Experiences
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 75-86. 2018.
    McGinn claims, among other things, that we cannot understand the theory that explains how echolocationary experiences arise from the bat’s brain. One of McGinn’s arguments for this claim appeals to the fact that we cannot know in principle what it is like to have echolocationary experiences. According to Kirk, McGinn’s argument fails because it rests on an illegitimate assumption concerning what explanatory theories are supposed to accomplish. However, I will argue that Kirk’s objection misfires…Read more
  •  18
    On the Differentia of Epistemic Justification
    Kilikya Felsefe Dergisi / Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 4 (1): 1-10. 2017.
    How are we to distinguish epistemic justification for believing a proposition from other sorts of justification one might have for believing it? According to what I call the received view about the differentia of epistemic justification, epistemic justification is intimately connected to “the cognitive goal of arriving at truth” in a specific way no other sorts of justification can possibly be. However, I will argue that the received view is mistaken by showing that there are cases in which prag…Read more
  •  108
    In this paper, I will present and defend an argument from the conditional character of inferential justification against the version of epistemic infinitism Klein advances. More specifically, after proposing a distinction between propositional and doxastic infinitism, which is based on a standard distinction between propositional and doxastic justification, I will describe in considerable detail the argument from conditionality, which is mainly an argument against propositional infinitism, and c…Read more
  •  73
    Dretske on Non‐Epistemic Seeing
    Theoria 83 (4): 364-393. 2017.
    In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibi…Read more
  •  158
    In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
  • Contingent A Priori and Two Kinds of Necessity
    Felsefe Tartismalari 32 47-64. 2004.
    Kripke argues that the existence of a priori contingent truths shows the falsity of the traditional idea that the notions of necessity and a priority are coextensional. In this paper, I maintain that the traditional coexistensionality thesis is defendable. I contend that the propositions that are alleged to be a priori contingent truths by Kripke are propositions that express contingent facts and, at the same time, are necessarily true. That they are necessarily true is not because of their meta…Read more
  •  223
    Human Cognitive Closure and Mysterianism: Reply to Kriegel
    Acta Analytica 32 (1): 125-132. 2017.
    In this paper, I respond to Kriegel’s criticism of McGinn’s mysterianism. Kriegel objects to a particular argument for the possibility of human cognitive closure and also gives a direct argument against mysterianism. I intend to show that neither the objection nor the argument is convincing.
  •  558
    Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3): 325-340. 2015.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge about experiences is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. Some physicalists (e.g., John Perry) have countered by arguing that what Jackson’s Mary, the perfect scientist who acquires all physical knowledge about experiencing red while being locked in a monochromatic room, lacks before experiencing red is merely a piece of recognitional knowledge of an identity, and …Read more
  •  82
    Christopher Hill: Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9373-8 Authors Erhan Demircioglu, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106
  •  39
    Inan on Objectual and Propositional Ignorance
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3): 305-311. 2016.
    In this note, I would like to focus on the two central distinctions Inan draws between varieties of ignorance. One is the distinction between “objectual” and “propositional” ignorance, and the other is the distinction between “truth-ignorance” and “fact-ignorance,” which is a distinction between two types of propositional ignorance. According to Inan, appreciating these distinctions allow us to see what is wrong with the “received view,” according to which ignorance (or awareness of it) is “alwa…Read more
  •  163
    The Given in Perceptual Experience
    Synthese 192 (8). 2015.
    How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one wants to insist that …Read more
  •  1017
    Against McGinn's Mysterianism
    Cilicia Journal of Philosophy 3 (1): 1-10. 2016.
    There are two claims that are central to McGinn’s mysterianism: (1) there is a naturalist and constructive solution of the mind-body problem, and (2) we human beings are incapable in principle of solving the mind-body problem. I believe (1) and (2) are compatible: the truth of one does not entail the falsity of the other. However, I will argue that the reasons McGinn presents for thinking that (2) is true are incompatible with the truth of (1), at least on a fairly standard conception of the ter…Read more
  •  367
    Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts
    Philosophical Studies 165 (1): 257-277. 2013.
    Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large num…Read more
  •  131
    Naïve realism and phenomenological directness: reply to Millar
    Philosophical Studies 173 (7): 1897-1910. 2016.
    In this paper, I respond to Millar’s recent criticism of naïve realism. Millar provides several arguments for the thesis that there are powerful phenomenological grounds for preferring the content view to naïve realism. I intend to show that Millar’s arguments are not convincing.
  •  1
    Gareth Evans on Proper Names
    Felsefe Tartismalari 50 1-9. 2014.
    The central aim of this paper is to argue against Evans’ hybrid theory of reference. I will show that Evans’ theory makes false predictions in the case of some thought-experiments. The paper has two sections. After providing a short presentation of Evans’ theory in the first section, I will move on to criticize it in the second section.
  •  159
    Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism
    European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1): 25-35. 2011.
    Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction bet…Read more