Eric-John Russell

Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes und seine Wissenschaft der Logik sowie Marx Kapital sind, so wird im ersten Teil gezeigt, jeweils Ausdruck einer Verlegenheit. Alle drei stehen nämlich vor der Herausforderung, in Geist, Logik und Kapital letztlich eine Methode darstellen zu müssen, und sie müssen darüber auch noch die Möglichkeit der Darstellung ebendieser Methode einholen und begründen. Diese Übereinkunft zwischen der Methode der Darstellung mit dem Methodischen aufseiten des dargestellten Geistes, der Logik und des Kapitals gelingt, so die These des zweiten Teils, durch die Technik des Maßes. Maß und Messung konstituieren bereits in der Naturwissenschaft Objektivität im neuzeitlichen Sinne: Gehalten an und gebrochen durch ihre eigenen Maß, werden die Verhältnisse der Natur durch die ermittelten Werte wie ein selbständiger Gegenstand objektiv bestimmbar und im Wissen subjektiv aufgehoben. Dagegen zeigen Geist, Logik und Kapital jeweils, dass die Technik des Maßes nicht nur Objektivität im neuzeitlichen Sinne konstituiert, sondern die gesamte neuzeitliche Form der Gegenständlichkeit von Objektivität und Subjektivität, Bewusstsein und Gegenstand. In Hegels Phänomenologie und seiner Logik sowie in Marx Kapital eröffnet das Maß diese Gegenständlichkeit, indem jeweils eine Objektivität konstituiert wird, die einem Subjekt buchstäblich zu denken gegeben wird. Es ist allerdings unmittelbar die Objektivität der Subjektivität selbst, die jeweils gegeben wird: phänomenologisch wird durch das Maß die Objektivität der Subjektivität des Geistes gegeben, rein logisch wird die Objektivität des Seins durch die Subjektivität des Begriffs gegeben, und der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft ist durch quantitative Werte die eigene Objektivität gegeben, und zwar gegeben durch ein Geld, das dadurch zu einer überindividuellen, automatischen Subjektivität wird. Für das Maß steht in der Phänomenologie das Selbstbewusstsein, in der Logik der Begriff des Seins und im Kapital das Geld. Die Technik dieses Maßes erschließt sich jeweils bereits durch die Art und Weise, wie überhaupt ein Maß gegeben wird im starken Sinne einer ursprünglichen, anonymen und einseitigen Gabe, und diese geben eines Maßes in allen drei Werken der Einstieg in die Entwicklung des Geistes, der Logik und des Kapitals.

We naturally tend to think of our own opinions as akin to the coins we carry around in our pockets, transferable and yet inalienable. We may share or alter them, yet in form they remain fundamentally our own, sacrosanct as registers of our very sense of self. Hegel was aware of this relationship between opinion and subjectivity, and regarded such a bond as one of the great accomplishments of modernity itself. Yet for Hegel, excessive estimation of inwardness comes at a dangerous price. Truth reducible to subjective and arbitrary will, to caprice and without philosophical reflection, sets, in his view, a corrosive standard for ethics, politics and thinking itself. This essay will excavate from Hegel's corpus the conceptual groundwork for a critical theory of opinion relevant for the twenty-first century. The overall aim is to offer a holistic reading of Hegel's critique of opinion by drawing on both his early and late writings, tracking its appearance as an initial critique of subjectivism but subsequently developed in his political philosophy. We begin with Hegel's polemics during the Jena years and unearth opinion as an index for self-certitude. Second, we proceed to a focused analysis of Elements of the Philosophy of Right, paying particular attention to what Hegel describes as the contradiction of public opinion. Thirdly, Hegel's epistemological critique of opinion will be synthesized with his political critique of public opinion by returning to the category of certainty, not as a certainty found in an individual opinion, but a certainty in one's own subjective standpoint, while employing elements from Adorno's critique of epistemology. We will conclude by examining the contradiction of public opinion specifically in accordance with the historical conditions of civil society and therewith begin to situate the socio-epistemological problem of opinion as historically specific to capitalist society.

This essay excavates the pre-capitalist influences of the thought of Guy Debord, French postwar critical theorist and founding member of the Situationist International. Tracing a lineage of what can be described as Debord’s aristocratic sensibility, we discover not simply an aesthetic approach to navigating social life, or guidelines for outmanoeuvring an adversary, but also contempt for honest labour, monetary transactions in cultural affairs, and conventional political gestures. Together these themes remain part of a legacy of an aristocratic past, one that, as will be examined here, informed Debord’s acrimony towards his own mid-20th-century moment. The following discussion will advance a genealogy of Debord’s thinking with these themes from late antiquity to the Italian Renaissance, and finally with an extended examination of the baroque, a concept that helps advance Debord’s diagnostic concept of the society of the spectacle.

This descriptive scientific-phenomenological study set forth to discover what is like to survive a building collapse as a firefighter. The participants of the study were 3 uniformed and sworn professional firefighters performing interior operations at a commercial building structure fire. The 3 participants all become trapped and had to self-rescue as a result of a structural collapse. The data collected from the participant interviews was analyzed and transformed so as to form the structure of the study.

Não existe uma resolução sobre como exatamente a Ciência da Lógica de Hegel informou Marx enquanto ele escrevia o volume I de O Capital. Tentativas de estabelecimento de uma homologia categorial estrita entre os dois trabalhos hesitam nas dissemelhanças de suas respectivas estruturas analíticas enquanto exorcizam o papel substantivo da liberdade humana da filosofia de Hegel. Como alternativa, proponho a diretriz de uma afinidade eletiva quando se considera as dialéticas de Hegel e Marx. O presente trabalho aplica tal princípio à categoria da subsunção. Irei demonstrar que a subsunção da externalidade entre sujeito e predicado dentro da forma do juízo da lógica hegeliana do conceito compartilha uma afinidade conceitual com a teoria marxiana da subsunção formal e real do trabalho sob o capital. Ao caracterizar minha abordagem como afinidade eletiva, o presente trabalho procura fundamentar a proximidade entre esses dois pensadores menos com a intenção de construir um alinhamento rígido entre as sequências categoriais que em estabelecer comparações racionais com as quais delinear o elemento decisivo da crítica da economia política: como o trabalho pode ser logicamente tanto o resultado quanto a pressuposição do capital.