•  22
    Terrorism: A Philosophical Investigation, written by Igor Primoratz
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (3): 357-360. 2017.
  •  19
    Nature, Place, and Space: Albert the Great and the Origins of Modern Science
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1): 83-101. 1996.
  • _Is God a Delusion?_ addresses the philosophical underpinnings of the recent proliferation of popular books attacking religious beliefs. Winner of CHOICE 2009 Outstanding Academic Title Award Focuses primarily on charges leveled by recent critics that belief in God is irrational and that its nature ferments violence Balances philosophical rigor and scholarly care with an engaging, accessible style Offers a direct response to the crop of recent anti-religion bestsellers currently generating consi…Read more
  • The Moral Status of Violence Within the Framework of a Christian Love Ethic
    Dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo. 1993.
    Two interrelated questions drive this work. First, what moral status does violence have within the framework of the Christian tradition which gives the command to love one's "neighbor" the status of fundamental moral principle? Second, can an ethics of the sort articulated in this tradition stand on its own as a coherent and complete moral system? ;In exploring these questions, I focus attention on the following forseeable situation, which provides a special problem for the sort of Christian eth…Read more
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  •  19
    Substance and Modern Science. By Richard J. Connell
    Modern Schoolman 69 (1): 64-66. 1991.
  •  36
    A guarantee of universal salvation?
    Faith and Philosophy 24 (4): 413-432. 2007.
    Recent defenders of the Christian doctrine of eternal damnation have appealed to what I call the “No Guarantee Doctrine” (NG)—the doctrine that not evenGod can ensure both (a) that every person who is saved freely chooses to be saved and (b) that all are saved. Thomas Talbott challenges NG on the groundsthat anyone who is truly free will have no motive to reject God and will infallibly choose salvation. In response to critics of Talbott , I argue that in order toavoid Talbott ’s critique of NG, …Read more
  • On William A. Wallace, O.P., The Modeling of Nature
    with Benedict Ashley
    The Thomist 61 625-640. 1997.
  • Review (review)
    The Thomist 57 690-694. 1993.
  •  11
    When philosophers contribute to public debates as polarized as contemporary ones about theistic belief, it is common to encounter responses that, philosophically, are woefully misguided. While it is tempting to simply dismiss them, a closer examination of recurring responses can offer insight of philosophical significance. In this paper I exemplify the value of engaging with recurring but misguided popular objections by looking carefully at one such objection to my recent book, Is God a Delusion…Read more
  •  5
    Christianity and Partisan Politics
    Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 2 (4): 82-96. 1999.
  •  87
    Talbott's universalism, divine justice, and the Atonement
    Religious Studies 40 (3): 249-268. 2004.
    Thomas Talbott has argued that the following propositions are inconsistent: (1) it is God's redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore His will) to reconcile all sinners to Himself; (2) it is within God's power to achieve His redemptive purpose for the world; (3) some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will therefore either consign them to a place of eternal punishment, from which there will be no hope of escape, or put them out of existence altogether. In this paper we explor…Read more
  •  31
    Universalism and autonomy: Towards a comparative defense of universalism
    Faith and Philosophy 18 (2): 222-240. 2001.
    In arecent article, Michael Murray critiques several versions of universalism-that is, the doctrine that in the end all persons are saved. Of particular interest to Murray is Thomas Talbott’s version of universalism (called SU1 by Murray), which puts forward a strategy for ensuring universal salvation that purports to preserve the autonomy of the creatures saved. Murray argues that, on the contrary, the approach put forward in SU1 is not autonomy-preserving at all. I argue that this approach pre…Read more
  •  18
    Efforts to protect endangered species by regulating the use of privately owned lands are routinely resisted by appeal to the private property rights of landowners. Recently, the 'wise-use' movement has emerged as a primary representative of these landowners' claims. In addressing the issues raised by the wise-use movement and others like them, legal scholars and philosophers have typically examined the scope of private property rights and the extent to which these rights should influence public …Read more
  •  52
    Does the Argument from Evil Assume a Consequentialist Morality?
    Faith and Philosophy 17 (3): 306-319. 2000.
    In this paper, I argue that the some of the most popular and influential formulations of the Argument from Evil (AE) assume a moral perspective that is essentially consequentialist, and would therefore be unacceptable to deontologists. Specifically, I examine formulations of the argument offered by William Rowe and Bruce Russell, both of whom explicitly assert that their formulation of AE is theoretically neutral with respect to consequentialism, and can be read in a way that is unobjectionable …Read more
  •  109
    One reason for the persistent appeal of Don Marquis' ‘future like ours’ argument is that it seems to offer a way to approach the debate about the morality of abortion while sidestepping the difficult task of establishing whether the fetus is a person. This essay argues that in order to satisfactorily address both of the chief objections to FLO – the ‘identity objection’ and the ‘contraception objection’ – Marquis must take a controversial stand on what is most essential to being the kind of enti…Read more
  •  3
    11. Responses
    with Gregory J. Coulter, Laura L. Garcia, and Peter Shea
    Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 6 (1): 165-187. 2003.
  •  109
    Rape as an essentially contested concept
    Hypatia 16 (2): 43-66. 2001.
    : Because "rape" has such a powerful appraisive meaning, how one defines the term has normative significance. Those who define rape rigidly so as to exclude contemporary feminist understandings are therefore seeking to silence some moral perspectives "by definition." I argue that understanding rape as an essentially contested concept allows the concept sufficient flexibility to permit open moral discourse, while at the same time preserving a core meaning that can frame the discourse
  •  9
    No Title available: Book reviews (review)
    Religious Studies 46 (1): 130-135. 2010.
  •  31
    Deep ecology and the irrelevance of morality
    Environmental Ethics 18 (4): 411-424. 1996.
    Both Arne Naess and Warwick Fox have argued that deep ecology, in terms of “Selfrealization,” is essentially nonmoral. I argue that the attainment of the ecological Self does not render morality in the richest sense “superfluous,” as Fox suggests. To the contrary, the achievement of the ecological Self is a precondition for being a truly moral person, both from the perspective of a robust Kantian moral frameworkand from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. The opposition between selfre…Read more
  •  56
    Richard Swinburne’s formulation of the argument from evil is representative of a pervasive way of understanding the challenge evil poses for theistic belief. But there is an error in Swinburne’s formulation : he fails to consider possible deontological constraints on God’s legitimate responses to evil. To demonstrate the error’s significance, I show that some important objections to Swinburne’s theodicy admit of a novel answer once we correct for Swinburne’s Lapse. While more is needed to show t…Read more
  •  102
    Defining Terrorism for Public Policy Purposes: The Group-Target Definition
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2): 253-278. 2010.
    For the sake of developing and evaluating public policy decisions aimed at combating terrorism, we need a precise public definition of terrorism that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence. Ordinary usage does not provide a basis for such a definition, and so it must be stipulative. I propose essentially pragmatic criteria for developing such a stipulative public definition. After noting that definitions previously proposed in the philosophical literature are inadequate based on th…Read more
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