My philosophical views

Question Answer Comments
A priori knowledge: yes and no Accept: yes but not of anything substantive.
Abstract objects: Platonism and nominalism Accept: nominalism
Aesthetic value: objective and subjective Accept an intermediate view I accept roughly a secondary-quality view -- is that subjective or objective?
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes and no Accept: yes but vague.
Epistemic justification: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view There is an internal and an external face to epistemic justification.
External world: idealism, skepticism or non-skeptical realism Accept: non-skeptical realism However, I can't entirely rule out the possibility that there are sufficient limitations on our (or my) capacities or sufficient dissimilarity between our (or my) conception of the world and the real features of the world to justify skepticism or something like transcendental idealism.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism or no free will Accept: compatibilism
God: theism and atheism Accept: atheism
Knowledge: empiricism and rationalism Accept: empiricism
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism or invariantism Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean and non-Humean Agnostic/undecided I'm not sure how we could know.
Logic: classical and non-classical Accept both Let a thousand logics bloom.
Mental content: internalism and externalism Accept: externalism though I'm nervous about the metaphorical word "content".
Meta-ethics: moral realism and moral anti-realism Accept an intermediate view I lean toward something in the ballpark of a secondary-quality view, which seems to be to be realism in a way, anti-realism in a way.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism and non-naturalism Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism and non-physicalism Lean toward: physicalism not as a metaphysical position of the sort that can be addressed a priori with thought experiments and conceptual analysis but rather as an empirical claim that could be shown false with enough weird psi phenomena or physics.
Moral judgment: cognitivism and non-cognitivism Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism and externalism Accept an intermediate view It's a pragmatic issue about what sorts of psychological states we want to attach what labels to -- about what we should think of as sufficient to qualify as making a moral judgment, and for different purposes we might cut the psychological pie differently.
Newcomb's problem: one box and two boxes Accept: two boxes
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism or virtue ethics Lean toward: virtue ethics I doubt there's a clean fact of the matter on this issue.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism or sense-datum theory Lean toward: qualia theory
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view or further-fact view Accept: psychological view But not as a deep metaphysical matter, rather as a matter of what we care about and how it makes the most sense, given our values, to classify hard cases.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism or libertarianism Reject all I don't like the choice categories.
Proper names: Fregean and Millian Accept an intermediate view It's an empirical issue about language use and psychology, and our language use and psychology do not break cleanly in favor of one or the other but are a muddy mess.
Science: scientific realism and scientific anti-realism Accept: scientific realism Mostly.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival and death Accept: survival But this is not a metaphysically deep fact, it's more a matter of how it's most practically useful to think about people.
Time: A-theory and B-theory Accept both
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch and don't switch Lean toward: switch
Truth: correspondence, deflationary or epistemic Accept: correspondence
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible or metaphysically possible Accept: metaphysically possible but metaphysical possibility is a lot less important than it's ordinarily cooked up to be, and the falsity of materialism does not follow from the metaphysical possibility of zombies.