Eric Sotnak

Part of the kalam cosmological argument draws upon the claim that an actual infinite cannot exist. Classical theists also maintain both that some individuals will earn eternal life and that God infallibly foreknows the future. The claim that these latter two theses do not require that an actual infinite exists because God possesses an intuitive, rather than propositional intellect, is examined and rejected. Although the future is potential, rather than actual, classical theism requires that the future be, in a sense, actually infinite.

The statement “Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” seems true in Jane Austin’s Pride and Prejudice (even though it may not actually appear in the text) while the statement “Mr. Darcy is a detective” seems false. One explanation for this intuition is that when we read or talk about fictional stories, we implicitly employ the fictional operator “It is fictional that” or “It is part of the story that.” “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy proposes to Elizabeth” expresses a true proposition while “It is fictional that Mr. Darcy is a detective” does not. Fictive statements can be abbreviated as “In F, P”. Determining what statements are fictionally true in a story requires providing truth conditions for statements of the form “In F, P.” This paper proposes an analysis of truth in fiction and examines the notion of make-believe

This book contains translations of four of Leibniz’s writings on China: Preface to the Novissima Sinica, On the Civil Cult of Confucius, Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, and Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. Cook and Rosemont have included a splendid introduction to the collection, which describes the historical and theological background of Leibniz’s China writings, placing them in a context of debate over whether or not existing philosophical and cultural traditions could be reconciled with Christian theology. In the main, this is the topic addressed by all the essays translated here. Leibniz takes the position that there is something of the truth in Chinese intellectual traditions, and thus it should not be too difficult for missionaries from the West to instruct Chinese literati, and help them to see that, with the exception of the special revelation found only in Christianity, their own traditions have always contained the seeds of theism within them. At times Leibniz is even charitable enough to suggest that certain concepts found in Chinese philosophy are similar in spirit to concepts found in his own philosophy. Leibniz professes great admiration for Chinese culture and philosophy, even going so far as to claim that in many respects, the Chinese had the upper hand over the West.

Many people find the notion of blending humans and nonhumans together to create animals whose brains are composed entirely of human brain cells disturbing. I argue that these moral qualms lack adequate justification. I consider a number of reasons for objecting to the creation of such chimeras and argue that none of these reasons withstand scrutiny. I argue that the only plausible objections to these chimeras would require that they possess morally significant properties that would be lacked by similar, non-chimeric animals, but that there is no good reason to think this would be the case

This book contains translations of four of Leibniz’s writings on China: Preface to the Novissima Sinica, On the Civil Cult of Confucius, Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, and Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. Cook and Rosemont have included a splendid introduction to the collection, which describes the historical and theological background of Leibniz’s China writings, placing them in a context of debate over whether or not existing philosophical and cultural traditions could be reconciled with Christian theology. In the main, this is the topic addressed by all the essays translated here. Leibniz takes the position that there is something of the truth in Chinese intellectual traditions, and thus it should not be too difficult for missionaries from the West to instruct Chinese literati, and help them to see that, with the exception of the special revelation found only in Christianity, their own traditions have always contained the seeds of theism within them. At times Leibniz is even charitable enough to suggest that certain concepts found in Chinese philosophy are similar in spirit to concepts found in his own philosophy. Leibniz professes great admiration for Chinese culture and philosophy, even going so far as to claim that in many respects, the Chinese had the upper hand over the West.

This book contains translations of four of Leibniz’s writings on China: Preface to the Novissima Sinica, On the Civil Cult of Confucius, Remarks on Chinese Rites and Religion, and Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese. Cook and Rosemont have included a splendid introduction to the collection, which describes the historical and theological background of Leibniz’s China writings, placing them in a context of debate over whether or not existing philosophical and cultural traditions could be reconciled with Christian theology. In the main, this is the topic addressed by all the essays translated here. Leibniz takes the position that there is something of the truth in Chinese intellectual traditions, and thus it should not be too difficult for missionaries from the West to instruct Chinese literati, and help them to see that, with the exception of the special revelation found only in Christianity, their own traditions have always contained the seeds of theism within them. At times Leibniz is even charitable enough to suggest that certain concepts found in Chinese philosophy are similar in spirit to concepts found in his own philosophy. Leibniz professes great admiration for Chinese culture and philosophy, even going so far as to claim that in many respects, the Chinese had the upper hand over the West.

My dissertation is a study of Leibniz' theory of individual substances and several concomitant problems. These are the problems of substantial identity , contingency with respect to the existence and properties of individual substances, and how those individual substances which are also persons can be said to be free. ;In the first chapter, I begin with an overview of Leibniz' life, and of the historical and philosophical climate within which Leibniz thought and wrote. I then set the stage for subsequent chapters by discussing how Leibniz approaches his investigation of the nature of individual substances through a family of closely interconnected sub-theories; especially the containment theory of truth, and the theory of complete concepts. ;In the second chapter, I consider the case for reading Leibniz as committed to the doctrine known as "super-essentialism," according to which every property of an individual substance is essential to it. I defend the superessentialist reading against some recent criticisms; the first by Jan Cover and John Hawthorne, and the second by Robert Sleigh, Jr. In the process, I distinguish between several varieties of essentialism, and identify the sense in which Leibniz may properly be said to be a superessentialist. ;In the third chapter, I take up the problem of how propositions about individual substances can be contingent if Leibniz is, as is argued in the previous chapter, a superessentialist. Leibniz has several different, and apparently conflicting, theories of contingency, but saw these theories as grounded in a common base, viz., divine freedom. I argue that this grounding leads Leibniz' account of contingency into an apparently vicious circularity. ;In the fourth chapter, I continue to pursue the topic of freedom, now with respect to both divine and human actions. An asymmetry emerges in Leibniz' accounts of divine and human freedom. Leibniz attempts to provide an ultimate ground for freedom in reason. I argue that the attempt cannot succeed unless the asymmetry between human and divine freedom can be eradicated. I conclude that Leibniz' account of freedom cannot be reconciled with his commitment to superessentialism

Eines der wichtigsten Probleme in der Leibniz-Arnauld-Korrespondenz betrifft Gottes Freiheit, individuelle Substanzen nach seinem Willen zu erschaffen. Arnauld äußert sich besorgt darüber, daß Leibniz 'Theorie der vollständigen Begriffe in dieser Hinsicht keinen Raum für Gottes Freiheit zu lassen scheint. Ich behaupte, daß Leibniz Arnauld eine zweigeteilte Antwort anbietet, deren zweiter Zweig bislang unterschätzt worden ist. Ich werde zeigen, daß Leibniz' Unterscheidung zwischen primären und sekundären Entscheidungen Gottes von wesentlicher Bedeutung ist für den zweiten Zweig seiner Antwort an Arnauld. Außerdem kann diese Unterscheidung helfen, Leibniz' Lehre von der unendlichen Analyse zu verstehen und zudem verdeutlichen, inwiefern nach Leibniz' Ansicht Gott nun in der Lage ist, individuelle Substanzen begrifflich getrennt voneinander zu betrachten - was eine Schwierigkeit zu sein scheint, wenn von der Theorie vollständiger Begriffe ausgegangen wird