• Beyond subjectivity: Spinoza's cognitivism of the emotions
    Gideon Segal
    British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1). 2000.
    In what follows I try to show that Spinoza modelled his project of rational psychology, in some of its major respects, upon Descartes's metaphysics of matter. I argue further that, like Descartes, who paid for the rationalization of the science of matter the price of having to leave out of his description non-quantifiable qualities, so Spinoza left out of his psychology the non-rationalizable aspects of emotions, i.e. whatever in them could not be subsumed under common notions. He therefore was …Read more
  • Belief Contexts and Epistemic Possibility
    Principia 10 (1): 1-20. 2006.
    Although epistemic possibility figures in several debates, those debates have had relatively little contact with one another. G. E. Moore focused squarely upon analyzing epistemic uses of the phrase, ‘It’s possible that p’, and in doing so he made two fundamental assumptions. First, he assumed that epistemic possibility statements always express the epistemic position of a community, as opposed to that of an individual speaker. Second, he assumed that all epistemic uses of ‘It’s possible that p’…Read more
  • Joint Action and Development
    Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246): 23-47. 2012.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible…Read more
  • Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification
    Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2): 179-199. 2013.
    In this paper I offer a distinctive epistemic rationale for the liberal practice of constant and ostentatious reason-giving in the political context. Epistemic trust is essential to democratic governance because as citizens we can only make informed decisions by relying on the claims of moral, scientific, and practical authorities around us. Yet rational epistemic trust is also uniquely fragile in the political context in light of both the radical inclusiveness of the relevant epistemic communit…Read more
  • Is epistemic trust of veritistic value?
    Gregor Betz, Michael Baurmann, and Rainer Cramm
    Ethics and Politics 15 (2): 25-41. 2013.
    Epistemic trust figures prominently in our socio-cognitive practices. By assigning different degrees of competence to agents, we distinguish between experts and novices and determine the trustworthiness of testimony. This paper probes the claim that epistemic trust furthers our epistemic enterprise. More specifically, it assesses the veritistic value of competence attribution in an epistemic community, i.e., in a group of agents that collaboratively seek to track down the truth. The results, obt…Read more
  • Developing Community Epistemic Capacities
    Ian Werkheiser
    Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (2): 97-101. 2016.