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72The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas ReidJournal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (2): 125-137. 2006.Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may be seen as offering us a ‘critical’ and post-Darw…Read more
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50The necessity of pragmatism: Overcoming the stalemate of common senseJournal of Scottish Philosophy 6 (2): 175-187. 2008.The paper argues that the relation between the philosophy of common sense and skepticism ought to be perceived of as the relation between the two horns of a dilemma. Each position, it is therefore said, is able to confront the other with a valid objection, something which implies that neither of the two positions are defensible as such. The dilemma is only resolved, it is argued, by the way in which a pragmatic approach to knowledge enables us to incorporate the insights of both common sense and…Read more
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33Borgmann and the Non-Neutrality of TechnologyTechné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 23 (1): 83-103. 2019.The paper focuses on Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. We argue in support of Borgmann’s “Churchill principle” as presented in Real American Ethics by comparing it to findings within behavioral economics in general and to the “libertarian paternalism” of Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler in particular. According to our interpretation of it, the Churchill principle implies that because our material environment in fact influences our choices, this environment can and should be rearr…Read more
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17“Why Be Moral?” Pragmatism’s Attempt to Dismiss the IssueIn Beatrix Himmelmann (ed.), Why Be Moral? An Argument from the Human Condition in Response to Hobbes and Nietzsche, . pp. 217-234. 2015.
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17Borgmann and the Non-Neutrality of TechnologyTechné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 23 (1): 83-103. 2019.The paper focuses on Albert Borgmann’s philosophy of technology. We argue in support of Borgmann’s “Churchill principle” (“we shape our buildings, and afterwards they shape us”) as presented in Real American Ethics (RAE) (2006) by comparing it to findings within behavioral economics in general and to the “libertarian paternalism” of Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler in particular. According to our interpretation of it, the Churchill principle implies that because our material environment in…Read more
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13The Adam Smith Problem: A ReinterpretationJournal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2): 181-197. 2014.As long as the market is said to be based on the motive of self-interest, any argument in favor of expanding the market will have to be seen as an argument in favor of self-interest. Such an argument, however, clearly conflicts with the notion that this motive, when viewed from a practical-political point of view, must be deemed a vice and thus, at best is something to be tolerated. As long as the market is seen as presupposing the motive of self-interest, as the currently dominating interpretat…Read more
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3«Denne Argumentasjon [...] kan vendes om»: Schweigaard og filosofienNorsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 45 (4): 267-276. 2010.The paper focuses on the philosophy of the young Anton Martin Schweigaard, one of the most influential Norwegian politicians of the nineteenth century. It is argued that the often criticized arguments which Schweigaard presents against German philosophy, i.e. Kant and German idealism, bears close resemblance to arguments which may be found, not only in classical American pragmatism, but also in G.E. Moore. What Schweigaard more precisely is doing, it is argued, is to turn the arguments of the …Read more
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1Pragmatisme vs. Liberalisme: Om Dewey og KantNorsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 47 (2): 75-87. 2012.John Deweys pragmatism is based on the notion that we can do without the kind of a priori conditions which we can find, for instance in Kant. Such conditions, however, do a job. They enable us to distinguish between experience here and now and experience as such. If we are to do without such conditions, Dewey therefore argues, there must be some way of «reconstructing» these distinctions so that they can be upheld within an empirical framework. In this article I discuss whether this kind of reco…Read more
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Økonomi og menneskelig motivasjon: Om det «neo-klassiske» paradigmet og dets kritikereNorsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 49 (2): 105-116. 2014.
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Pragmatismen som filosofisk og politisk prosjekt: Om Rortys lesning av DeweyNorsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 39 (4): 225-234. 2005.
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University of TromsøRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy, Misc |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy, Misc |