•  443
    The Virtue of Authenticity
    In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 5, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 272-295. 2015.
    This paper explores the idea of authenticity, both what it is and why it’s valuable. First, I identify and criticize three popular approaches to authenticity: Individual Authenticity, Natural Authenticity, and Truthful Authenticity. Second, I defend a fourth approach to authenticity – what I call Existential Authenticity (EA) – which is comprised of three basic elements: (a) self- understanding, (b) self-expression, and (c) self-concern – in particular, concern about what kind of person one is a…Read more
  •  406
    **Runner-up for the 2021 Royal Institute for Philosophy Essay Prize: What should we think about ‘acts of conscience’, viz., cases where our personal judgments and public authority come into conflict such that principled resistance to the latter seems necessary? Philosophers mainly debate two issues: the Accommodation Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, should public authority accommodate claims of conscience?’ and the Justification Question, i.e., ‘When, if ever, are we justified in engaging in acts…Read more
  •  371
    Intuitions in 21st-Century Ethics: Why Ethical Intuitionism and Reflective Equilibrium Need Each Other
    In Discipline filosofiche XXXI 2 2021 ( L’intuizione e le sue forme. Prospettive e problemi dell’intuizionismo), . pp. 275-296. 2021.
    In this paper, I attempt to synthesize the two most influential contemporary ethical approaches that appeal to moral intuitions, viz., Rawlsian reflective equilibrium and Audi’s moderate intuitionism. This paper has two parts. First, building upon the work of Audi and Gaut, I provide a more detailed and nuanced account of how these two approaches are compatible. Second, I show how this novel synthesis can both (1) fully address the main objections to reflective equilibrium, viz., that it provide…Read more
  •  327
    Bishop Butler on Forgiveness and Resentment
    Philosophers' Imprint 11. 2011.
    On the traditional view, Butler maintains that forgiveness involves a kind of “conversion experience” in which we must forswear or let go of our resentment against wrongdoers. Against this reading, I argue that Butler never demands that we forswear resentment but only that we be resentful in the right kind of way. That is, he insists that we should be virtuously resentful, avoiding both too much resentment exhibited by the vices of malice and revenge and too little resentment where we merely con…Read more
  •  247
    Three Rival Versions of Kantian Constructivism
    Kant Yearbook 14 (1): 23-43. 2022.
    In order to make some headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism…Read more
  •  232
    Bringing Public Reason into the Philosophy Classroom
    Teaching Ethics 22 (2): 173-191. 2022.
    In recent years, ‘philosophy as a way of life’ [PWOL] courses have emerged as an exciting new pedagogical approach. I explain what a PWOL-course is. Next, I argue that the standard method for teaching such courses—what I call the ‘Smorgasbord Model’—presents us with a basic problem: viz., the challenge of how to enable students in the context of the modern university to truly experience what a PWOL even is. I propose a solution to this problem by exploring a PWOL that most teachers and students …Read more
  •  226
    Pure and Impure Philosophy in Kant's Metaphilosophy
    Kantian Journal 42 (3): 17-48. 2023.
    Kant’s metaphilosophy has three main parts: (1) an essentialist project (“What is philosophy?”); (2) a methodological project (“How do we do philosophy?”); and (3) a taxonomic project (“What are the different parts of philosophy, and how are they related?”). This paper focuses on the third project. In particular, it explores one of the most intriguing yet puzzling aspects of Kant’s philosophy, viz. the relationship between what Kant calls ‘pure’ philosophy vs. ‘applied’, ‘empirical’ or what we c…Read more
  •  217
    Value Realism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate
    Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2): 231-258. 2004.
    In this paper, I propose a new framework for the general internalism/externalism debate about reasons. My aim is to defend a novel account of internalism that at least allows for the possibility of a more "realist" conception of reasons- thus avoiding simply begging the question (as Williams himself seems to do) against many recent externalist thinkers like Hampton, Scanlon, McDowell, and Parfit - while still somehow retaining a deep connection between reasons to act and an agent's motivations. …Read more
  •  208
    A Kantian Theory of Evil
    The Monist 85 (2): 194-209. 2002.
    Is there any interesting sense in which we can speak of an act as 'evil', in contrast to simply "morally bad' or "immoral"? In ordinary language, we typically judge actions as evil that somehow differ significantly, in terms of degree or intensity, from commonplace wrongdoing. If taken to an extreme, however, this view simply reduces the difference between evil and immoral acts to a mere quantitative analysis. At worst, it leads to a wholly trivial account of evil as just those actions we tend t…Read more
  •  184
    The Social Nature of Kantian Dignity
    Social Philosophy Today 16 127-139. 2000.
    Most scholars describe Kant’s idea of dignity as what I term his “vertical” account—that is, our human dignity insofar as we rise above heteronomous natural inclinations and realize human freedom by obeying the moral law. In this paper, I attempt to supplement this traditional view by exploring Kant’s neglected “horizontal” account of dignity—that is, our human dignity insofar as we exist in relationship with others. First, I examine the negative aspect of this horizontal account of dignity, fou…Read more
  •  177
    Book Review: Essays on Kant's Anthropology (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2): 240-244. 2006.
  •  73
    Making Room for Love in Kantian Ethics
    In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 25-37. 2021.
    What place, if any, does love have in Kantian ethics? This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I discuss Kant’s own account of moral versus non-moral love as found throughout his various writings and show how this closely parallels his account of moral versus non-moral friendship. Second, I discuss contemporary Kantian accounts of both friendship and love, highlighting how they go beyond, and in some ways seem to significantly improve upon, Kant’s own views via their appeal to Kant’s For…Read more
  •  59
    Ethical Naturalism: Problems and Prospects
    In Paul Bloomfield & David Copp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 193-219. 2023.
    This chapter discusses fundamental problems and prospects for ethical naturalism. Section 1 explains what is meant by “ethical naturalism” and surveys different versions of the view. Section 2 discusses the central philosophical challenge to ethical naturalism, viz., the “Normativity Objection.” Section 3 offers a battery of responses to it on behalf of the ethical naturalist. Section 4 explores a promising and novel approach to ethical naturalism, viz., a moral nativist theory that that combine…Read more
  •  44
  •  22
    Book Review: Essays on Kant’s Anthropology (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2): 240-244. 2006.
  •  20
    The Social Nature of Kantian Dignity
    Social Philosophy Today 16 127-139. 2000.
    Most scholars describe Kant’s idea of dignity as what I term his “vertical” account—that is, our human dignity insofar as we rise above heteronomous natural inclinations and realize human freedom by obeying the moral law. In this paper, I attempt to supplement this traditional view by exploring Kant’s neglected “horizontal” account of dignity—that is, our human dignity insofar as we exist in relationship with others. First, I examine the negative aspect of this horizontal account of dignity, fou…Read more
  •  17
    Book Review: Essays on Kant’s Anthropology (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2): 240-244. 2006.