•  710
    Names, identity, and predication
    Philosophical Studies 175 (10): 2631-2647. 2018.
    It is commonly accepted, after Frege, that identity statements like “Tully is Cicero” differ from statements like “Tully is Tully”. For the former, unlike the latter, are informative. One way to deal with the information problem is to postulate that the terms ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ come equipped with different informative values. Another approach is to claim that statements like these are of the subject/predicate form. As such, they should be analyzed along the way we treat “Tully walks”. Since pr…Read more
  •  263
    Who Is I?
    with William Fish and Jonathan Gorvett
    Philosophical Studies 107 (1): 1-21. 2002.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom “I” refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of “I” arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 “Demonstratives” before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threate…Read more
  •  237
    Contextualism, minimalism, and situationalism
    Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (1): 115-137. 2007.
    After discussing some difficulties that contextualism and minimalism face, this paper presents a new account of the linguistic exploitation of context, situationalism. Unlike the former accounts, situationalism captures the idea that the main intuitions underlying the debate concern not the identity of propositions expressed but rather how truth-values are situation-dependent. The truth-value of an utterance depends on the situation in which the proposition expressed is evaluated. Hence, like in…Read more
  •  193
    Temporal Indexicals And Temporal Terms
    Synthese 130 (3): 441-460. 2002.
    Indexical reference is personal, ephemeral, confrontational, and executive. Hence it is not reducible to nonindexical reference to what is not confronted. Conversely, nonindexical reference is not reducible to indexical reference. (Castañeda 1989, p. 70).
  •  165
    Indexicals, fictions, and ficta
    Dialectica 57 (2). 2003.
    We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as ‘Hamlet’ and ‘Ophelia’ are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti-realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals (and fictional names) as they appear within a fiction is …Read more
  •  149
    It is argued that, in order to account for examples where the indexicals `now' and `here' do not refer to the time and location of the utterance, we do not have to assume (pace Quentin Smith) that they have different characters (reference-fixing rules), governed by a single metarule or metacharacter. The traditional, the fixed character view is defended: `now' and `here' always refer to the time and location of the utterance. It is shown that when their referent does not correspond to the time a…Read more
  •  148
    Situated minimalism versus free enrichment
    Synthese 184 (2): 179-198. 2012.
    In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thoug…Read more
  •  144
    'She' and 'he': Politically correct pronouns
    Philosophical Studies 111 (2). 2002.
    It is argued that the pronouns `she' and `he' are disguised complexdemonstratives of the form `that female/male'. Three theories ofcomplex demonstratives are examined and shown to be committed to theview that `s/he' turns out to be an empty term when used to refer toa hermaphrodite. A fourth theory of complex demonstratives, one thatis hermaphrodite friendly, is proposed. It maintains that complexdemonstratives such as `that female/male' and the pronoun `s/he' can succeed in referring to someone…Read more
  •  141
    Frege on subject matter and identity statements
    with Kepa Korta
    Analysis 75 (4): 562-565. 2015.
    In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented
  •  139
    Sense and insensibility: Or where minimalism meets contextualism
    with Jérôme Dokic
    In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 169--193. 2007.
    In this paper we present some benefits of semantic minimalism. In particular, we stress how minimalism allows us to avoid cognitive overloading, in that it does not posit hidden indexicals or variables at the LF or representational level and it does not posit the operation of free enrichment processes when we produce or hear a sentence. We nonetheless argue that a fully adequate semantic minimalism should embrace a form of relativism—that is, the view that semantic content must be evaluated, pac…Read more
  •  112
    In focusing on indexicals and proper names and on the different ways in which their references are fixed, I illustrate how our linguistic practice rests on context, broadly construed. The following theses are discussed and defended: • There are two main kinds of information: (i) anchored information, i.e. the information one gathers in using and entertaining indexical expressions and (ii) unanchored information, i.e. the information one may gain in hearing a proper name. • Indexical expressions …Read more
  •  106
    Description-names
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (4): 313-325. 2002.
    It is argued that, contrary to appearances, description-names (e.g.: "The Roman Empire", "The Beatles", "The Holy Virgin",...) do conform to Millianism, i.e. the view that proper names are directly referential expressions, referring regardless of whether the relevant individual satisfies some associated description or not. However, description-names name and describe. Some arguments supporting this peculiarity and a logic to handle description-names are proposed. It will be shown that the best f…Read more
  •  100
    Complex demonstratives qua singular terms
    Erkenntnis 59 (2). 2003.
    In a recent book, Jeffrey King (King 2001) argues that complexdemonstratives, i.e., noun phrases of the form `this/that F, are not singular terms. As such,they are not devices of direct reference contributing the referent to the proposition expressed.In this essay I challenge King's position and show how a direct reference view can handle the datahe proposes in favor of the quantificational account. I argue that when a complex demonstrativecannot be interpreted as a singular term, it is best und…Read more
  •  95
    Review: Reference and reflexivity (review)
    Mind 112 (445): 171-175. 2003.
  •  93
  •  80
    Same‐Saying, Pluri‐Propositionalism, and Implicatures
    Mind and Language 27 (5): 546-569. 2012.
    In combining a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Bach‐style) concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri‐propositionalist framework (Perry‐style) distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice‐inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same‐saying plays a central role in dealing with probl…Read more
  •  73
    Unenriched Subsentential Illocutions
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3): 560-582. 2011.
    In this paper I challenge the common wisdom (see Dummett and Davidson) that sentences are the minimal units with which one can perform a speech act or make a move in the language game. I thus sit with Perry and Stainton in arguing that subsentences can be used to perform full-fledged speech acts. In my discussion I assume the traditional framework which distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the thought or mental state (possibly a sentence in Mentalese) one comes to grasp when using…Read more
  •  73
    Fictions without ficta
    Dialectica 63 (1): 67-74. 2009.
    No Abstract
  •  70
    Eros Corazza presents a fascinating investigation of the role that indexicals play in our thought. Indexicality is crucial to the understanding of such puzzling issues as the nature of the self, the nature of perception, social interaction, psychological pathologies, and psychological development. Corazza draws on work from philosophy, linguistics, and psychology to illuminate this key aspect of the relation between mind and world. By highlighting how indexical thoughts are irreducible and intri…Read more
  •  61
    Perspectival thoughts and psychological generalizations
    Dialectica 48 (3-4): 307-36. 1994.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalization…Read more
  •  54
    Sense, Reference, and Philosophy (review)
    Disputatio 1 (20): 359-361. 2006.
    020-6
  •  43
    Indexicals and demonstratives
    In Marina Sbisà, Jan-Ola Östman & Jef Verschueren (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics, John Benjamins. pp. 10--131. 2011.
  •  40
    Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling?
    with Jerome Dokič
    In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 151--168. 1995.
  •  37
    Fiction, Counterfactuals and Truth
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1): 117-123. 1993.
    An account of the evaluation of fictional discourse in terms of counterfactuals is sketched which accommodates the insights of D. Lewis and G. Evans but is not committed to the existence of possibilia on the one hand and to taking counterfactuals as barely true on the other hand. By adopting a two-step theory of evaluation which does not evaluate expressions (sentences) across possible worlds modal realism is avoided. And the use of a modified incorporation principle saying that every singular r…Read more
  •  35
    Demonstratives qua singular terms
    Erkenntnis 59 (2): 263-283. 2003.
    In a recent book, Jeffrey King argues that complex demonstratives, i.e., noun phrases of the form 'this/that _F<D>', are not singular terms. As such, they are not devices of direct reference contributing the referent to the proposition expressed. In this essay I challenge King's position and show how a direct reference view can handle the data he proposes in favor of the quantificational account. I argue that when a complex demonstrative cannot be interpreted as a singular term, it is best under…Read more
  •  30
    Dire «je»
    Dialogue 30 (1-2): 51-. 1991.
    Dans ce texte j'aborderai presque exclusivement la question de savoir si le pronom personnel «je» est un terme référentiel ou non. Il s'agit en définitive de savoir si le pronom en question est une expression qui désigne quelque chose et, si oui, de spécifier la nature du référent en question. En un mot, je me propose ici d'analyser le comportement sémantique du pronom «je».
  •  27
    Contexts, non-specificity, and minimalism
    Manuscrito 37 (1): 5-47. 2014.
    Atlas argues that semantic minimalism fails because it cannot deal with semantic non-specificity. I argue that thereis a plausible version of minimalism-viz., situated minimalism-which doesn't succumb to the non-specificity charge insofar as non-specificity can be dealt with at a postsemantic level. Thus, pragmatics plays no rolewhen it comes to determining the proposition expressed. Instead, pragmatic and other extra-semantic considerations enter the scene in characterizing the situation vis-à-…Read more
  •  27
    Washing Away Original Sinn
    Dialogue 38 (4): 743-764. 1999.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'objectif de cet article est essentiellement négatif. Suivant en cela Dummett, j'introduis deux manières attrayantes d'interpréter le Sinn original de Frege, que j'appelle respectivement la doctrine du sens privé et la doctrine du sens public. Je montre que ces conceptions ne peuvent être utilisées dans le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua. Il faut donc abandonner soit l'interprétation du Sinn par Dummett, soit le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua.
  •  26
    Benton, RA, 527 Blackburn, P., 281 Braüner, T., 359 Brink, C., 543
    with S. Chopra, B. J. Copeland, S. Donaho, F. Ferreira, H. Field, D. M. Gabbay, L. Goldstein, J. Heidema, and M. J. Hill
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (615). 2002.