•  26
    Benton, RA, 527 Blackburn, P., 281 Braüner, T., 359 Brink, C., 543
    with S. Chopra, B. J. Copeland, S. Donaho, F. Ferreira, H. Field, D. M. Gabbay, L. Goldstein, J. Heidema, and M. J. Hill
    Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (615). 2002.
  •  45
    Sense, Reference, and Philosophy (review)
    Disputatio 1 (20): 359-361. 2006.
    020-6
  •  65
    Same‐Saying, Pluri‐Propositionalism, and Implicatures
    Mind and Language 27 (5): 546-569. 2012.
    In combining a pluri‐propositionalist framework concerning alleged conventional implicatures, and a pluri‐propositionalist framework distinguishing various levels of content associated with a single utterance, I defend a Grice‐inspired model of communication. In so doing, I rely on the distinction between what is said, i.e. what is semantically encoded, and what is pragmatically implicated. I show how the notion of same‐saying plays a central role in dealing with problems pertaining to communica…Read more
  •  67
    Unenriched Subsentential Illocutions
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3): 560-582. 2011.
    In this paper I challenge the common wisdom (see Dummett and Davidson) that sentences are the minimal units with which one can perform a speech act or make a move in the language game. I thus sit with Perry and Stainton in arguing that subsentences can be used to perform full-fledged speech acts. In my discussion I assume the traditional framework which distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the thought or mental state (possibly a sentence in Mentalese) one comes to grasp when using…Read more
  •  228
    Who Is I?
    with William Fish and Jonathan Gorvett
    Philosophical Studies 107 (1): 1-21. 2002.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may be thought…Read more
  •  137
    Situated minimalism versus free enrichment
    with Jérôme Dokic
    Synthese 184 (2): 179-198. 2012.
    In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thoug…Read more
  •  135
    'She' and 'he': Politically correct pronouns
    Philosophical Studies 111 (2). 2002.
    It is argued that the pronouns `she' and `he' are disguised complexdemonstratives of the form `that female/male'. Three theories ofcomplex demonstratives are examined and shown to be committed to theview that `s/he' turns out to be an empty term when used to refer toa hermaphrodite. A fourth theory of complex demonstratives, one thatis hermaphrodite friendly, is proposed. It maintains that complexdemonstratives such as `that female/male' and the pronoun `s/he' can succeed in referring to someone…Read more
  •  6
    Washing Away Original Sinn
    Dialogue 38 (4): 743-764. 1999.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'objectif de cet article est essentiellement négatif. Suivant en cela Dummett, j'introduis deux manières attrayantes d'interpréter le Sinn original de Frege, que j'appelle respectivement la doctrine du sens privé et la doctrine du sens public. Je montre que ces conceptions ne peuvent être utilisées dans le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua. Il faut donc abandonner soit l'interprétation du Sinn par Dummett, soit le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua.
  • 1. the essence of minimalism
    with Jirdme Dokic
    In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 169. 2007.
  •  93
    Review: Reference and reflexivity (review)
    Mind 112 (445): 171-175. 2003.
  •  19
    Washing Away Original Sinn
    Dialogue 38 (4): 743-764. 1999.
    RÉSUMÉ: L'objectif de cet article est essentiellement négatif. Suivant en cela Dummett, j'introduis deux manières attrayantes d'interpréter le Sinn original de Frege, que j'appelle respectivement la doctrine du sens privé et la doctrine du sens public. Je montre que ces conceptions ne peuvent être utilisées dans le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua. Il faut donc abandonner soit l'interprétation du Sinn par Dummett, soit le traitement frégéen de l'oratio obliqua.
  •  189
    Temporal Indexicals And Temporal Terms
    Synthese 130 (3): 441-460. 2002.
    Indexical reference is personal, ephemeral, confrontational, and executive. Hence it is not reducible to nonindexical reference to what is not confronted. Conversely, nonindexical reference is not reducible to indexical reference. (Castañeda 1989, p. 70).
  •  60
    Eros Corazza presents a fascinating investigation of the role that indexicals play in our thought. Indexicality is crucial to the understanding of such puzzling issues as the nature of the self, the nature of perception, social interaction, psychological pathologies, and psychological development. Corazza draws on work from philosophy, linguistics, and psychology to illuminate this key aspect of the relation between mind and world. By highlighting how indexical thoughts are irreducible and intri…Read more
  •  27
    Why is Frege's Puzzle Still Puzzling?
    with Jerome Dokič
    In Petr Kotatko & John Biro (eds.), Frege: Sense and Reference One Hundred Years Later, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 151--168. 1995.
  •  139
    Sense and insensibility: Or where minimalism meets contextualism
    with Jérôme Dokic
    In G. Preyer (ed.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism, Oxford University Press. pp. 169--193. 2007.
    In this paper we present some benefits of semantic minimalism. In particular, we stress how minimalism allows us to avoid cognitive overloading, in that it does not posit hidden indexicals or variables at the LF or representational level and it does not posit the operation of free enrichment processes when we produce or hear a sentence. We nonetheless argue that a fully adequate semantic minimalism should embrace a form of relativism—that is, the view that semantic content must be evaluated, pac…Read more
  •  17
    Descartes, one of the central figure of the rationalist school, brought to the philosophical forum questions such as “What am I?”, “Does one’s mind differ from one’s body?” and if so, “How does the mind interact with the body?”. The Cartesians observed that some phenomena of nature (e.g. the mastery of language) do not fall within the mechanical philosophy of their time: they thus posited a new entity, the res cogitans (the mind) to account for these phenomena. In rejecting the mechanical philos…Read more
  •  14
    Référence directe et psychologisme
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (2). 1997.
  •  7
    Fiction, Counterfactuals and Truth
    with Jérôme Dokic
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 45 (1): 117-123. 1993.
    An account of the evaluation of fictional discourse in terms of counterfactuals is sketched which accommodates the insights of D. Lewis and G. Evans but is not committed to the existence of possibilia on the one hand and to taking counterfactuals as barely true on the other hand. By adopting a two-step theory of evaluation which does not evaluate expressions across possible worlds modal realism is avoided. And the use of a modified incorporation principle saying that every singular reference mad…Read more
  •  7
    Reports and Imagination
    ProtoSociology 17 78-100. 2002.
    The following thesis will be discussed and defended: An attitude ascription is an empathetic exercise resting on our, more general, imaginative faculty. Sentences of natural language are the best medium we have to classify someone’s mental life.The sentence used to classify one’s mental state is the one the reporter would use to express the attributee’s mental state if the reporter were in the attributee’s situation. A report of the form “A believes/desires/wishes/… that p” captures the attribut…Read more
  •  136
    It is argued that, in order to account for examples where the indexicals `now' and `here' do not refer to the time and location of the utterance, we do not have to assume (pace Quentin Smith) that they have different characters (reference-fixing rules), governed by a single metarule or metacharacter. The traditional, the fixed character view is defended: `now' and `here' always refer to the time and location of the utterance. It is shown that when their referent does not correspond to the time a…Read more
  •  14
    Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations
    Dialectica 48 (3-4): 307-336. 1994.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalization…Read more
  •  35
    Lndexicals and demonstratives
    In Marina Sbisà, Jan-Ola Östman & Jef Verschueren (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics, John Benjamins. pp. 10--131. 2011.
  • Penser En Contexte le Phénomène de L'Indexicalité
    with Jérôme Dokic, John Perry, and Gareth Evans
    . 1993.