Evandro Barbosa

The article presents an analysis centered on the emotional lapses of artificial intelligence (AI) and the influence of these lapses on two critical aspects. Firstly, the article explores the ontological impact of emotional lapses, elucidating how they hinder AI’s capacity to develop a moral sense. The absence of a moral emotion, such as sympathy, creates a barrier for machines to grasp and ethically respond to specific situations. This raises fundamental questions about machines’ ability to act as moral agents in the same manner as human beings. Additionally, the article sheds light on the practical implications within human-machine relations and their effect on human friendships. The lack of friendliness or its equivalent in interactions with machines directly impacts the quality and depth of human relations. This concerningly suggests the potential replacement or compromise of genuine interpersonal connections due to limitations in human-machine interactions.

: In today’s political philosophy framework, it is commonplace to associate Adam Smith with akind of theory that ignores human dispositions and considers only the self-interested perspective ofindividuals. Although this view has been widely supported in different fields – viz Philosophy andEconomy, we consider this a biased interpretation. Using the Cambridge School orientation, we explainthe importance of historical background in reading Smith’s work to argue that Smith’s writings should beinterpreted within the Scottish Enlightenment context. From this contextual approach, it is possible tosustain an integrated reading of Smith’s books The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and An Inquiryinto the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations (WN). This reading leads to a more faithfulinterpretation of Smith’s idea that the agent in society is morally engaged in socio-economic relations.Once this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend a systematic analysis of Smith’s philosophy arguingthat Smith’s philosophy is a holistic system, in what we call a tripartite theory.

The COVID-19 pandemic, whose consequences will be felt in the long term, can be interpreted as a signal that we have been living in a pandemic age. A pandemic is humanity's common ground, so the moral problems inherent in it are of interest to everyone from now on. It brought a set of moral challenges that cannot be ignored. This book – which emerged amid the novel coronavirus crisis – is designed to fill the gap in the current literature on the topic, offering an original approach to its moral implications. It can be taken as a guide in the face of these pandemic-age challenges for human relations. The pandemic is a multifaceted phenomenon, and its debate involves a wide variety of practical philosophical concerns. All the chapters of this book, divided into four sections, aim to clarify its central aspects, while each chapter provides an original approach to the debate’s leading issues and relies on each most significant collaborator’s expertise. Also, they reflect their unique pandemic experiences under the scrutiny of philosophical unrest. Since the pandemic is an ongoing event, Moral Challenges in a Pandemic Age will be of interest to professors, students, and researchers engaged in understanding the ethical dimension of the age we are experiencing. The problems addressed in this collection transcend the boundaries of the philosophical field, offering an innovative approach to individuals keen on discussing the pandemic from a moral point of view. Such a discussion encompasses the philosophical inquiry but is not restricted to it. Those interested in related areas such as psychology, sociology, biology, public health, education, anthropology, and cultural studies – to name a few – will find connections with parallel themes in this book. In addition, the collection brings a theoretically supported approach to several related debates in a language accessible to anyone who wants to know more about the topic.

The shortage conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic have been changing our ordinary way of life around the world since the beginning of 2020. Such conditions pose a challenge for shaping a cohesive theory of justice—one that takes non-ideal circumstances as necessary for the model. These conditions also interfere with agents’ moral capacity in ways that make it difficult for them to tell what is morally relevant, which impairs their ability to identify what actions are just. To shed light on these problems, I turn to David Hume’s theory of justice as a test case to portray how outer conditions shape an agent’s inner conditions and affect the foundation of our moral perception of what is just.

The shortage conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic have been changing our ordinary way of life around the world since the beginning of 2020. Such conditions pose a challenge for shaping a cohesive theory of justice—one that takes non-ideal circumstances as necessary for the model. These conditions also interfere with agents’ moral capacity in ways that make it difficult for them to tell what is morally relevant, which impairs their ability to identify what actions are just. To shed light on these problems, I turn to David Hume’s theory of justice as a test case to portray how outer conditions shape an agent’s inner conditions and affect the foundation of our moral perception of what is just.

The shortage conditions created by the COVID-19 pandemic have been changing our ordinary way of life around the world since the beginning of 2020. Such conditions pose a challenge for shaping a cohesive theory of justice—one that takes non-ideal circumstances as necessary for the model. These conditions also interfere with agents’ moral capacity in ways that make it difficult for them to tell what is morally relevant, which impairs their ability to identify what actions are just. To shed light on these problems, I turn to David Hume’s theory of justice as a test case to portray how outer conditions shape an agent’s inner conditions and affect the foundation of our moral perception of what is just.

This chapter argues that the Covid-19 pandemic has exposed the limits of the mainstream individualistic notion of resilience and, in light of these limits, it advances a new, relational notion of the concept of resilience that contributes to the individuals’ well-being and takes into consideration the role of systemic inequality. The first half of the paper argues that the individualistic notion is flawed in two ways: i) it can foster ill-being because it is cognitively taxing, and ii) it discounts systemic inequality because it transfers the responsibility of any achievement and failure onto the single individual without regard for conditions of oppression. The second half of the paper reconceptualizes the concept of resilience as a relational notion that takes into account structural support as well as conditions of oppression and marginalization. According to this latter notion of resilience, the chapter argues that oppression, lack of material conditions, or lack of structural support are elements that can impact the appropriateness of calls to be resilient. A relational notion of resilience fosters well-being because it puts the collective community at the center (instead of the individual) and it takes into consideration material conditions and structural injustices

Revisitando as obras seminais de John Rawls, propõe-se analisar em que medida os termos equitativos de cooperação nas sociedades democráticas marcadas pelo pluralismo de valores, aliada à ideia de razão pública, permite estabelecer uma concepção pública e compartilhada de justiça.: By revising the seminal John Rawls’s works, we claim to analyze how the equitative terms of cooperation in Democratic societies, which are characterized by values pluralism, allied to the idea of public reason, may provide us a public and shared conception of justice. Keywords: cooperation, public reason, contract, justice.

The mainstream view of the twentieth century suggests that the Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith made a tout court defense of individualism and the pure rational calculation of economics. However, we consider this to be a biased interpretation that ignores an integrated reading of his books, The Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, which hinder a global view of his thinking. In opposition to this dominant view, we propose, as the central objective of this article, the conciliation between Smith’s classical liberalism and his sentimental ethics, based on the notion of human dignity, present in the recognition of the other as an equal. If this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend the thesis of sympathetic liberalism in Adam Smith’s philosophical system. For this, we will analyze the feeling of Smithian sympathy and its interference in interpersonal relationships, then, the device of moral justification of impartiality as a promoter of fairness behavior. Finally, we will argue that the intertwining of these two elements of Smithian sentimental ethics in public space engenders a notion of human dignity compatible with his liberalism, insofar as it respects individual freedoms while fostering the progress of commercial societies. For such, we will make use of the work Theory of Moral Sentimentalism by Adam Smith and the article Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith by Stephen Darwall.

O objetivo desse artigo é discutir a possibilidade de uma morte feliz, e consequentemente, uma vida feliz a partir da interpretação dos pilares filosóficos de Albert Camus, a saber: o absurdo e a revolta. Enquanto o absurdo diz respeito ao confronto da irracionalidade do mundo com o desejo de clareza e racionalidade que se encontra no homem, a revolta está vinculada ao desejo inconsciente de uma moral que denominamos de moral antiteísta ou moral de atitude por mover-se consciente no âmbito das ações concretas, nascidas do sentimento da absurdidade do mundo frente à morte e o sofrimento. Testaremos, ao final, a viabilidade dessa moral antiteísta promover uma morte feliz para quem sofre e uma vida feliz, apesar de todo sofrimento, para aquele que se depara com a morte do outro. Para isso, utilizaremos como fios condutores as obras de Albert Camus: O Mito de Sísifo e A peste.

Segundo David Copp, o cenário moral requer a compreensão de três aspectos inter-relacionados básicos: identificar a natureza dos juízos morais, especificar a justificação dessas decisões e determinar o papel da sociedade moral neste esquema. Para isso, o autor discute a necessidade de uma teoria cognitivista da linguagem normativa, assim como uma teoria da justificação dos códigos morais. O propósito deste artigo é analisar em que medida a teoria moral de Copp consegue acomodar a metodologia construtivista sobre as bases realistas de seu naturalismo moral sem desmantelar seu propósito naturalista de relacionar propriedades morais à propriedades naturais.

Trata-se de pensar a relação entre direito e moral para Habermas, em suas Tanner Lectures, a partir de uma imbricação entre os modelos de racionalidade procedimental jurídico e moral. Contra toda forma de positivismo jurídico, Habermas restabelece a relação entre direito e moral partindo do que se consagrou chamar moralização do direito. Nesse sentido, a legalidade possui um fundamento racional que o torna válido enquanto ordenamento jurídico, haja vista a relação complementar estabelecida entre o direito positivo e o procedimentalismo moral.

John Rawls se apresenta como um contratualista para questões de ética normativa, ao mesmo tempo em que desenvolve um apelo construtivista em sua teoria. Não obstante, não é clara qual a relação que ele estabelece entre o seu modelo procedimental de justiça e a metáfora da construção normativa. O objetivo central deste artigo é demonstrar em que medida seu o modelo contratualista pode ser interpretado como uma forma de construtivismo procedimental. Para isso, analisaremos contrato e construtivismo separadamente para, posteriormente, identificar os conectivos entre ambos. Com isso, esperamos esclarecer esta relação e responder algumas objeções levantadas a este modelo.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo avaliar em que medida a releitura que Amartya Sen faz acerca da obra de Adam Smith permitiria vislumbra a economia internacional como promotora do desenvolvimento humano. Para tal, inicialmente, apresentaremos a releitura seniana da obra de Smith, focando em suas preocupações éticas, para em seguida, apresentar o modelo de justiça de Amartya Sen que visa à promoção do desenvolvimento humano através das liberdades. Para isso, utilizaremos como fio condutor dessa pesquisa as obras On ethics and economics de Amartya Sen e An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of the Nation de Adam Smith. Palavras-chave: Desenvolvimento humano. Economia. Liberdades. Mercado.

Revisitando as obras seminais de John Rawls, propõe-se analisar em que medida os termos equitativos de cooperação nas sociedades democráticas marcadas pelo pluralismo de valores, aliada à ideia de razão pública, permite estabelecer uma concepção pública e compartilhada de justiça. By revising the seminal John Rawls’s works, we claim to analyze how the equitative terms of cooperation in Democratic societies, which are characterized by values pluralism, allied to the idea of public reason, may provide us a public and shared conception of justice