•  1
    What Is A Family? A Constitutive-Affirmative Account
    with J. Y. Lee and R. Bentzon
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 1-11. forthcoming.
    Bio-heteronormative conceptions of the family have long reinforced a nuclear ideal of the family as a heterosexual marriage, with children who are the genetic progeny of that union. This ideal, however, has also long been resisted in light of recent social developments, exhibited through the increased incidence and acceptance of step-families, donor-conceived families, and so forth. Although to this end some might claim that the bio-heteronormative ideal is not necessary for a social unit to cou…Read more
  •  2
    The Control Paradox: From Technology to Populism
    Rowman & Littlefield International. 2020.
    New technologies are often introduced with the purpose of improving our control over a certain task: however, software, AI and robots often cause understandable fears of machines taking control away from us. This is what Ezio Di Nucci calls the ‘control paradox’.
  •  7
    The Control Paradox: From Ai to Populism
    Rowman & Littlefield International. 2020.
    New technologies are often introduced with the purpose of improving our control over a certain task: however, software, AI and robots often cause understandable fears of machines taking control away from us. This is what Ezio Di Nucci calls the ‘control paradox’.
  •  21
    Sex, demoralized
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 45 (1): 57-58. 2024.
  • Moral Status
    In Ezio Di Nucci, Ji-Young Lee & Isaac A. Wagner (eds.), The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Bioethics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2022.
  •  7
    Equal Access to Parenthood and the Imperfect Duty to Benefit
    with J. Y. Lee
    Philosophy of Medicine 4 (1). 2023.
    Should involuntarily childless people have the same opportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, we critically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. In…Read more
  •  201
    Does ectogestation have oppressive potential?
    Journal of Social Philosophy. forthcoming.
    In the future, full ectogestation – in which artificial placenta technology would be used to carry out the entirety of gestation – could be an alternative to human pregnancy. This article analyzes some underexplored objections to ectogestation which relate to the possibility for new and continuing forms of social oppression. In particular, we examine whether ectogestation could be linked to an unwarranted de-valuing of certain aspects of female reproductive embodiment, or exacerbate objectionabl…Read more
  •  117
    Should involuntarily childless people have the sameopportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, wecritically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away…Read more
  •  1
    COVID-19 and Intergenerational Justice: The Case of Denmark
    In The Global and Social Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic, Studies in Global Justice 22. Springer Nature, Switzerland, Studies in Global Justice 22. Springer Nature, Switzerland. 2022.
    We analyze Denmark’s COVID-19 containment policies. We argue that, despite the precautionary principle being explicitly appealed to by decision-makers at the highest political level, it is neither clear whether Danish COVID-19 policies did in fact constitute a genuine application of the precautionary principle, nor is it clear that the particular restrictions implemented ought indeed to count as precautionary when seen from a perspective that transcends the short-term emergency. Finally, we poin…Read more
  •  7
    The public health theory of populism
    Bioethics 37 (8): 748-755. 2023.
    Successful public health interventions have, in recent decades, improved the health of the working classes in significant ways across much of the western world. Nevertheless, here, I argue that populist electoral breakthroughs over the last decade may be considered side-effects of ‘successful’ public health policies: crucially, the claim is that those political side-effects resulted because of—rather than despite—the health-measured success of those public health interventions.
  •  17
    Simply, false
    Analysis 69 (1): 69-78. 2009.
    According to the Simple View of intentional action famously refuted by Bratman, φ-ing is intentional only if the agent intended to φ. In this paper I show that none of five different objections to Bratman's counter-example – McCann's, Garcia's, Sverdlik's, Stout's, and Adams's – works. Therefore Bratman's contention that SV is false still stands.
  •  10
    Frankfurt counterexample defended
    Analysis 71 (1): 102-104. 2011.
    Frankfurt sets out to refute the principle according to which ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise’. Frankfurt devises a counterexample in which an agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not have done otherwise: Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until J…Read more
  •  28
    Vicious Times
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5): 847-849. 2020.
  •  40
    Limits of Responsibility? (review)
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1): 317-319. 2021.
  •  9
    Frankfurt counterexample defended
    Analysis 71 (1): 102-104. 2011.
  •  34
    Anti-racism and inclusive racism
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (3): 637-640. 2021.
  •  4
    Sex: we can’t have it both ways
    Monash Bioethics Review 37 (1-2): 38-45. 2019.
    I analyse the tension between a plausible liberal view of sex work and the similarly plausible idea that rape and other forms of sexual violence are made morally worse by their sexual nature. I find no conclusive reason to drop the liberal view of sex work, at least as long as the concept of voluntary and informed consent at the core of it is robust enough to account for the realities of prostitution around the world; nor should we abandon the idea that rape is no ordinary immoral act: reducing …Read more
  •  19
    Simply, false
    Analysis 69 (1): 69-78. 2009.
  •  20
    Rational constraints and the Simple View
    Analysis 70 (3): 481-486. 2010.
  •  6
    Public sexual health: replying to Firth and Neiders on sex doula programs
    Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 44 (4): 401-403. 2023.
  •  24
    Concordance as evidence in the Watson for Oncology decision-support system
    with Aaro Tupasela
    AI and Society 35 (4): 811-818. 2020.
    Machine learning platforms have emerged as a new promissory technology that some argue will revolutionize work practices across a broad range of professions, including medical care. During the past few years, IBM has been testing its Watson for Oncology platform at several oncology departments around the world. Published reports, news stories, as well as our own empirical research show that in some cases, the levels of concordance over recommended treatment protocols between the platform and hum…Read more
  • Praktische Rationalität
    In Ralf Stoecker, Christian Neuhäuser & Marie-Luise Raters (eds.), Handbuch Angewandte Ethik, Verlag J.b. Metzler. pp. 187-192. 2011.
    Was ist praktische RationalitätRationalitätpraktische? Ein griffiger Slogan lautet: Praktische Rationalität handelt davon, wie man bekommt, was man will. Dies zeigt ein Beispiel aus Aristoteles’ Nikomachischer Ethik:EinePatientArzt-Patienten-BeziehungArztÄrztinArzt ist dazu da, Patienten zu heilen. Sie stellt keine praktischen Überlegungen an, um zu entscheiden, ob sie ihre Patienten heilen soll.
  •  12
    Beyond Pregnancy: A Public Health Case for a Technological Alternative
    International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 16 (1): 103-130. 2023.
    This paper aims to problematize pregnancy and support the development of a safe alternative method of gestation. Our arguments engage with the health risks of gestation and childbirth, the value assigned to pregnancy, as well as social and medical attitudes toward women’s pain, especially in labor. We claim that the harm caused by pregnancy and childbirth provides a prima facie case in favor of prioritizing research on a method of extra corporeal gestation.
  •  3
    Genetische Modifikation und Reproduktionstechnologien
    In Johannes Drerup & Gottfried Schweiger (eds.), Handbuch Philosophie der Kindheit, J.b. Metzler. pp. 290-294. 2019.
    Die neuen Reproduktionstechnologien in der heutigen Zeit sind dabei Familien zu verändern – sowohl in der Theorie als auch in der Praxis.
  •  5
    Does ectogestation have oppressive potential?
    Journal of Social Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.
  • Physical jerks ungood
    In Ezio Di Nucci & Stefan Storrie (eds.), 1984 and philosophy, is resistance futile?, Open Court. 2018.
  •  21
    The Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Bioethics (edited book)
    with Ji-Young Lee and Isaac A. Wagner
    Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2022.
    A wide-ranging, comprehensive overview of pressing issues in bioethics today, this handbook takes into account current affairs and historical precedents. Interdisciplinary authorship and global examples make the handbook applicable to a variety of scholar, student, and practitioner types.
  •  18
    Delegating gestation or ‘assisted’ reproduction?
    Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (7): 454-455. 2022.
    This paper argues that we ought to distinguish between ‘assisted’ gestation and ‘delegating’ gestation—and that the relevant difference does not depend on whether it is another human or technological system doing the work.1 In the philosophy of action, there is an important theoretical gap between S ‘helping A to φ’ and S ‘φ-ing on behalf of A’: the former is an instance of joint agency while the latter is an individual’s action. This matters because if the latter counts as an intentional action…Read more
  •  31
    Sexual rights puzzle: re-solved?
    Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (5): 337-338. 2020.
    My sexual rights puzzle according to which positive sexual rights are not compatible with negative sexual rights has been recently criticised in the Journal of Medical Ethics by Steven J Firth, who has put forward three objections to the puzzle. In this brief response, I analyse and reject each of these three objections.
  •  307
    Should we be afraid of medical AI?
    Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (8): 556-558. 2019.
    I analyse an argument according to which medical artificial intelligence represents a threat to patient autonomy—recently put forward by Rosalind McDougall in the Journal of Medical Ethics. The argument takes the case of IBM Watson for Oncology to argue that such technologies risk disregarding the individual values and wishes of patients. I find three problems with this argument: it confuses AI with machine learning; it misses machine learning’s potential for personalised medicine through big da…Read more