Farhang Erfani

The pace of globalization has disenfranchised many, alienating them from participation in local modes of self-governance and placing their political agency in an exceedingly fragile position. This alienation cannot be simply overcome, because institutional mediation, as Ricoeur argues, is constitutive of politics: political representation operates by its own rules, partially disconnected from the represented world. Using Ricoeur's work on narrative and alienation alongside Mouffe’s radical democratic theory, we re-envision what political participation could look like outside the traditional nation-state: an agonistic citizenship of discursive struggle, embodied in overlapping communities of interest that work in transparent, democratic ways. We argue that we must begin reorienting ourselves (thinking and acting) as “citizens” of these supra-local communities, rather than merely of our state (which nevertheless remains important). By re-plotting our narratives of political engagement, we can respond positively to the alienation created by globalization, while avoiding the extremes of hyperglobalism and protectionist nationalism.

Their paper begins with the observation that, even though many philosophers, especially in the twentieth century, have had personal experience of exile, they rarely treat the topic of exile directly in their philosophical works. Existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger, it is true, have employed exile as a metaphor for the human condition, yet the concrete experience of political exile has been treated as somehow lacking the universality that canonical philosophy needs. This paper warns against the temptation to conflate the real situation of exile with a general condition of existential unbelongingness. It goes on to trace two major threads in the history of the philosophical treatment of citizenship, the one deriving from Plato and the other from Kant and to explore their relevance to contemporary debate around the moral and legal status of those who seek refuge abroad from war, oppression, or other kinds of threat in their homeland. The Platonic tradition treats citizenship as deriving primarily from association with a land; it views foreigners as having the potential to contaminate the polis and any citizen who spends time away from the polis as likely to betray it. While many features of the Platonic position have not survived to the present, it is noteworthy that, for indigenous peoples in many parts of the world, attachment to the land remains of fundamental importance. At the same time, though migration of many kinds has become extremely common, some individuals and governments in the first world still demonstrate a visceral belief that refugees and immigrants to their country will somehow corrupt or contaminate it. The Kantian position, by contrast, treats citizenship as, ideally at least, cosmopolitan and global. It envisages nation states as moving towards “an enduring and gradually expanding federation likely to prevent war”. Consequently, the stranger seeking refuge abroad from life-threatening persecution in his or her own country has what Kant refers to as a “right of resort” in another country. While Kant argues that we must therefore not show hostility to such people, our obligations to them do not extend to philanthropic hospitality. This assertion of a limited obligation to displaced persons forms the basis for much contemporary discussion around the rights of refugees and migrants. Globalization, of course, has not taken quite the form that Kant envisaged. While the United Nations asserts the universality of human rights, and certain clusters of countries, such as those in Western Europe, have moved towards federation and free internal movement of their citizens, so-called globalization has taken place primarily on the economic, rather than the political, level. The extreme international mobility of investment capital from first-world countries in search of cheap labour is not currently matched by an acceptance within such countries of the rights of third-world citizens to migrate to their shores in search of higher wages and improved living conditions. Finally, this paper offers a critique of both the Platonic and the Kantian positions and argues the need in the modern world for institutional arrangements which represent a variety of interests and struggles across national boundaries.

:In this essay, I argue that what I consider a generally valid critique of the traditional model of representation remains too closely focused on its limitations and not its liminality. To make this distinction, I couch my analysis in terms of sacrifice. The canonical model of mimesis was concerned by the sacrificed thickness of “presence” in the thin re-presentation; today's anti-essentialist model is instead concerned that presence or sameness comes at the sacrificial cost of the other. Although the latter is accordingly more sensitive to racial representation, it still fails to come to terms with liminality, which is the structural inability to represent the margins. The Lacanian analysis of an Iranian film that cannot rely on traditional visual cues opens the door to appreciating liminality. But unless a “narcissistic” tendency of the Lacanian scholarship is addressed, liminality becomes a fetish for the other as a “stain.”

We argue that Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and alienation provides a largely untapped, though potentially fruitful way of re-thinking the question of political agency within the context of globalization. We argue that the political agency of many around the world has been placed in an exceedingly fragile position due to the rapid pace of globalization, the movement of multi-national corporations from their previous national headquarters, etc. We use Ricoeur’s work to argue that the alienation of globalization is not something that can be simply overcome either in a unified world-state or a retreat to protectionist nationalism, because institutional mediation—and consequently alienation—is in some sense constitutive of all politics: the world of political representation operates by its own set of rules, which are at least partially disconnected from the represented world. Using the work of Mouffe, a radical democratic theorist, we then flesh out an ideal of agonistic citizenship (which recognizes both the need for and the inevitability of discursive struggle in politics) in a number of overlapping communities of interest, rather than tying political participation solely to the sovereign government of my state. The state will remain important, but because globalization has disenfranchised so many from their participation in “local” modes of self-governance (tied to the state in which they live), we have a responsibility to re-envision what political participation means outside the traditional context of the state. Rather than merely citizens of a particular state, we need to begin thinking of ourselves politically—and then acting—as “citizens” of Green Peace, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, or whatever other supra-local concrete universals or communities of interest to which we belong, investing the time and energy there that we might previously have invested solely in our state’s government. (By implication, we must also ensure that these organizations work in transparent democratic ways themselves.) We believe that by re-plotting our narratives of political engagement in this way, we can positively respond to the alienation created by globalization, while avoiding both the extremes of “McWorld” (hyperglobalism) and “Jihad” (complete skepticism towards, or war against globalization) that Benjamin Barber and David Held have recently described.

There is a very fine line separating democracy from terror. Through analysis of the work of the French political philosopher Claude Lefort, I hope to show that there is an uncanny proximity between terror and democracy. In Lefort’s view, political power rests on the contingency and groundlessness that politics has experienced since the French Revolution. Since that time, political power has been separated from the divine and has become a human affair. For Lefort, totalitarianism can come only after the democratic turn because democracy and totalitarianism have the same political foundation in the French Revolution. The openness of democracy is what allows for a totalitarian regime to take power and to terrorize people. But democracy is also able to combat terrorism because, by giving more voice to the excluded and the oppressed, democracy may be able to assimilate them; for if the claim of such people is a lack of autonomy, democracy is the system that should be able to allow them to exercise power. A true war on terror, therefore, would empower people through democracy and not disenfranchise them further

Introduction -- How orphans believe: Deleuze, national cinema and Majidi's The color of paradise. Deleuze: on realism and movement-Image -- Deleuze: neorealism (and a brief analysis of Kiarostami's life and nothing more) -- Majidi: The color of paradise -- Deleuze and Majidi: the faith of Mohammad -- "What are filmmakers for in needy times?" On Heidegger and Kiarostami's Taste of cherry -- An overview of Kiarostami's Taste of cherry and the question of the medium -- Heidegger on art and truth -- Heidegger and Kiarostami -- Committed perception: Merleau-Ponty and Children of heaven -- Carroll on emotions -- Merleau-Ponty and embodied Imagination -- Censorship and Children of heaven -- Perception and ideology. Regarding you: Lacanian gaze and ethics in Kiarostami's Close-up -- A brief overview of Close-up -- Misreading Lacan's gaze -- The three orders: real, symbolic and imaginary -- The Lacanian gaze -- Gaze in Close-up -- The ethical function of the gaze in Close-up -- Stolen Jouissance: Lacan, feminism and Meshkini's The day I became a woman. A brief overview of The day I became a woman -- Hava: the birth of desire -- From Hava to Ahoo: from demand to desire and jouissance -- Traversing the fantasy: from Hoora to Meshkini -- Meshkini: the fourth woman of the story -- Deafening silence: Bahman Ghobadi's Turtles can fly and marginal politics -- Bahman Ghobadi and Turtles can fly -- The abject -- Can Ghobadi speak? National cinema and national mission, once again -- Hegemonic movement: on the way to the Green Movement -- The future of Iranian cinema is the future of the Green Movement.

In this essay, I closely read one of the last major works of the late Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, along with Samuel Beckett’s Waiting forGodot. Ricoeur argues that recognition has not received sufficient attention in the philosophical tradition. Those who have approached the question come mainlyfrom a Hegelian perspective, which posits recognition in terms of struggle. Against this model, Ricoeur argues that we ought to make room for mutual recognition, not grounded in violence and reciprocity but in mutuality. While Beckett illustrates Ricoeur’s point, especially at the affective level—one of Ricoeur’s possible “states of peace”—I argue that Beckett pays greater attention to friendship in comparison to Ricoeur.

In this dissertation, I address the role of the social imaginary in the age of democracy. I first show that we live in the "age of democracy" by looking at the works of modern thinkers such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau and de Tocqueville. They see democracy as an overcoming of what I called "epistemocracy." Then I turn my attention to the debate that occurred in the early and the mid-twentieth century on "the End of Ideology." This debate that still influences us today shaped the way we think of democracy; we oppose it to all that is ideological and utopian. But this position is paradoxical because on the one hand it rejects the "atemporality" of ideology and utopia, but on the other it places itself outside of time in order to make its claim. This is referred to as "Mannheim's paradox." Thanks to the work of Paul Ricoeur, I show that narratives are unsurpassable and that we ought to see them as constitutive of reality. I show that this is dominant theme throughout Ricoeur's life and work where he insists that the modern and autonomous subject of modernity must be rejected and a new form of subjectivity, one that understands finitude and one that is linguistically mediated, must be retrieved. I then apply this general philosophy to Ricoeur's reading of ideology and utopia, whereby each plays a necessary role of sedimentation---in the case of ideology---and of innovation---in the case of utopia. Once the social imaginary is retrieved, I move to the work of radical democrats---Claude Lefort, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe---to show that radical democracy is the most compatible form of democracy with Ricoeur's thought. Lefort will show that Ricoeur is right in believing that power is symbolically mediated and that is ultimately groundless. Laclau and Mouffe will also complement Ricoeur's philosophy by showing that dissent is also linguistically and symbolically mediated

Despite Emmanuel Levinas’ own ambivalent relationship to utopianism, Levinasian ethics and utopianism have much in common. First, I look at Levinas’ own remarks on utopianism, to underline the said ambivalence. It is clear that Levinas is concerned with utopia’s “totalitarian” potential. Then I turn to the utopian tradition and scholarship to argue that utopia ought to be properly understood precisely as a resistance to a given order, or totality. Utopia is a form of political imagination that positions itself against the dominant forces of its time, giving a voice to those who have “no place” in society. But there is an inherent danger to utopia as well. What if it lends itself to a dangerous “other”? I conclude by looking at Levinas’ politics and the importance of the Third, which politically keeps our singular ethical obligation in check by forcing us to think about our obligation to all other others

There are at least two different ways of coping with struggles: one is to eliminate them—this is the way that Plato, Hegel, Marx and many others chose—and the other is to institutionalize them—this is Tocqueville's democratic way. I first outline the main elements of Hegel's approach, with a specific focus on the Phenomenology of Spirit. My aim is to emphasize that, for Hegel, the goal of political philosophy must be a reconciled polis, which can happen only if and when the history-long struggle between masters and slaves has ended. I then turn to Tocqueville's Of Democracy in America, which was published about thirty years after Hegel's Phenomenology. Tocqueville is also aware of struggles between masters and slaves, but he prefers embracing democracy as a means of domesticating, rather than eliminating once and for all, political strife