•  7
    Concepts: neither Representations nor Abilities but Rules
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (2): 277-300. 2018.
    Philosophers have always tried to explain what concepts are. Currently, most neo- Fregean philosophers identify concepts with abilities peculiar to cognitive agents. Philosophers who defend a psychological view, in contrast, identify concepts with representations located in the mind. In this paper, I argue that concepts should be understood neither in terms of mental representations nor in terms of abilities. Concepts, I argue, are rules for sorting an inferring. To support this, I follow Ginsbo…Read more
  •  32
    Non-conceptualism, observational concepts, and the given
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 33 (3): 401-416. 2018.
    In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke…Read more
  •  46
    Intellectualism Against Empiricism
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 90 (1): 231-251. 2014.
    Intellectualism is the philosophical view that thinking involves the activity of reason-giving. In this paper I argue that the intellectualist point of view is incompatible with any form of empiricism. First, I show that Traditional Empiricism collapses because it brings together two conflicting theses: the intellectualist thesis according to which the normative properties of thoughts depend upon the activity of reason-giving, and the intuitive empiricist thesis according to which the normative …Read more