•  1
    Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures
    Bulletin of the Section of Logic. forthcoming.
    After putting forward a formal account of value disagreement via imprecise measures, I develop a logic of value attribution and of agreement based on truthmaker semantics.
  • Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Kit Fine (edited book)
    Springer. forthcoming.
  •  11
    Hyperintensionality and Normativity
    Springer Verlag. 2019.
    Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate studen…Read more
  •  19
    A hyperintensional logical framework for deontic reasons
    with Tudor Protopopescu
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4): 411-433. 2019.
    In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: an argument from the nature of reasons, an argument from substitutivity and an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a h…Read more
  •  25
    Deontic modals and hyperintensionality
    Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4): 387-410. 2019.
    In this paper I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, i.e. logically equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one deductive and the other abductive. First, I show that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I argue that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity and explanatory power. I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis and outline some consequence…Read more
  • An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Permission and Obligation
    with Albert J. J. Anglberger and Johannes Korbmacher
    In Olivier Roy, Allard Tamminga & Malte Willer (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, College Publications. pp. 16-31. 2016.
    We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and - a singular act is an exact trut…Read more
  •  369
    Verità d'imperativi in Kalle Sorainen
    Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia Del Diritto 90 (1). 2013.
    This brief note explores Sorainen's (1939) contribution to the birth of deontic logic. He maintained that imperatives can be true or, respectively, false.
  •  76
    Ratio 30 (3): 270-287. 2017.
    Co-hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. I argue that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality fail. I argue that there is no generalized notion of co-hyperintensionality that meets plausible desiderata, by showing that the opposite thesis leads to falsity. As a conclusion, I suggest to take co-hyperintensionality as a primitive and I …Read more
  •  422
    Responsibility Regardless of Causation
    In Bacchini, Dell'Utri & Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Press. 2014.
    This paper deals with the relationship between legal responsibility and causation. I argue that legal responsibility is not necessarily rooted in causation. The general claim I aim to disprove is that responsibility is descriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and causality is metaphysically real and founded. My strategy is twofold. First, I show (in §1) that there are significant and independent non- causal form of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal responsibilit…Read more
  •  254
    Prior’s arguments for and against seeing ‘ought’ as a copula and his considerations about normative negation are applied to the case of responsibility judgments. My thesis will be that responsibility judgments, even though often expressed by using the verb ‘to be’, are in fact normative judgments. This is shown by analyzing their negation, which parallels the behavior of ought negation.
  •  591
    In this paper I provide some linguistic evidence to the thesis that responsibility judgments are normative. I present an argument from negation, since the negation of descrip- tive judgments is structurally different from the negation of normative judgments. In particular, the negation of responsibility judgments seem to conform to the pattern of the negation of normative judgments, thus being a prima facie evidence for the normativity of responsibility judgments. I assume — for the argument’s s…Read more
  •  1853
    The Normative Structure of Responsibility
    College Publications. 2014.
    The Normative Structure of Responsibility deals with responsibility in legal, moral, and linguistic contexts. The book builds on conceptual analysis and data from everyday language, ethics, and the law in order to defend the thesis that responsibility is fundamentally normative, that is, it cannot be reduced to purely descriptive factors. The book is divided in three parts: the first part draws a conceptual map of various responsibility concepts, conceptions and conditions and their interaction …Read more