Federico L. G. Faroldi

Partial reasons are considerations in favor of something that, taken individually, are not sufficient to establish an obligation. I consider the extent to which partial reasons are reasons, and why they cannot be reduced to or identified with pro tanto reasons. I lay out two approaches to the content of reasons, the flat theory and the structured theory. I argue that parts of reasons are not partial reasons, by showing that natural ways to represent parts of reasons in the flat theory and the structured theory lead to overgeneration problems with regard to partial reasons. I then formulate two notions of partial reasons: one based on a notion of partial support, which is in turn captured by the notions of full support and partial content, and one based on the notion of in exact verification. I show under which conditions the two notions of partial reasons (based on partial content, and based on inexact verification) coincide.

This book explores some of Kit Fine's outstanding contributions to logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and metaphysics, among others. Contributing authors address in-depth issues about truthmaker semantics, counterfactual conditionals, grounding, vagueness, non-classical consequence relations, and arbitrary objects, offering critical reflections and novel research contributions. Each chapter is accompanied by an extensive commentary, in which Kit Fine offers detailed responses to the ideas and themes raised by the contributors. The book includes a brief autobiography and exhaustive list of his publications to this date. This book is of interest to logicians of all stripes and to analytic philosophers more generally.

Practical reasons can be aggregated to decide what one ought to do. This paper explores an operation that undoes aggregation: subtraction. I consider several distinctions concerning subtraction: subtracting content and subtracting strength; and subtracting one reason from one other reason or from a set of reasons. I put forward a precise understanding of subtracting the content of one reason from another, based on an operation of difference on a state-like, structured notion of content. Finally, I apply my approach to subtracting reasons to normative domains, and in particular to belief revision and norm change.

Le problème de Frege-Geach est un problème qui se pose pour les théories selon lesquelles les jugements normatifs n’ont pas de contenu cognitif, mais expriment plutôt des états mentaux non cognitifs. Dans cet article, je présente le problème de Frege-Geach ; j’examine certaines stratégies existantes pour l’aborder dans sa forme traditionnelle ; et je me demande enfin si un problème de Frege-Geach se pose pour les raisons, et si l’usage des raisons peut mener à une solution. J’esquisse une réponse positive à cette question.

This paper presents a justification counterpart for dyadic deontic logic, which is often argued to be better than Standard Deontic Logic at representing conditional and contrary-to-duty obligations, such as those exemplified by the notorious Chisholm’s puzzle. We consider the alethic-deontic system (E) and present the explicit version of this system (JE) by replacing the alethic Box-modality with proof terms and the dyadic deontic Circ-modality with justification terms. The explicit representation of strong factual detachment (SFD) is given and finally soundness and completeness of the system (JE) with respect to basic models and preference models is established.

I suggest an account of desuetudo in game-theoretic terms. I argue that there is an asymmetry with consuetudo, because consuetudo cannot be fully captured by a game-theoretic analysis, while desuetudo, properly understood as a dynamic, diachronic process, can. A norm (not necessarily a consuetudo) ceases to exist because there’s no need anymore, in an interactive situation, to foster certain equilibria, even though the same norm which is going in desuetudo might not have emerged as a consuetudo. While this kind of norm dynamics cannot explain all kinds of consuetudines, it can explain desuetudo, understood as a dynamic process ending with normative indifference, from a state which was normatively relevant. In this game-theoretic account the dynamicity is captured by the repeated occurence of the game, while desuetudo is the opposite process, in terms of normativity, with which a norm emerges (regardless of the fact whether the initial norm was a consuetudo or posited).

ABSTRACT In recent experimental work, the spectrum-like nature of the phenomenon of ordering subjectivity has been accounted for by recourse to the distinction, within the class of subjective adjectives, between multi-dimensional and judge-dependent ones. One way to cash out judge-dependency is in terms of some kind of experiencer-sensitivity. In this paper, we argue that this approach is insufficient. Applying Solt’s experimental paradigm to moral adjectives suggests that, within the class of judge-dependent adjectives, one must draw a further distinction between experiential and evaluative adjectives. This opens up the question of what, if anything, characterizes judge-dependency. We propose that judge-dependency is characterized by the notion of holistic multi-dimensionality: a predicate is holistically multidimensional just in case its denotation is composed by various dimensions whose contribution is inseparable.

Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related fields get up to speed on open research-level problems.

In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: an argument from the nature of reasons, an argument from substitutivity and an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a hyperintensional logic of reasons based on justification logics. Eventually we discuss the philosophical import of this proposal and highlight some limitations and possible developments.

In this paper I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, i.e. logically equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one deductive and the other abductive. First, I show that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I argue that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity and explanatory power. I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis and outline some consequences. In Section 1 I introduce and define deontic modality and hyperintensionality. In Section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are illfitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In Section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics.

We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for permissions and obligations: - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Pφ iff every exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of permissibility of the act, and - a singular act is an exact truthmaker of Oφ iff some exact truthmaker of φ is in the sphere of requirements of the act. We show that this semantics is hyperintensional, and that it can deal with some of the so-called paradoxes of deontic logic in a natural way. Finally, we give a sound and complete axiomatization of the semantics.

Co-hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. I argue that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality fail. I argue that there is no generalized notion of co-hyperintensionality that meets plausible desiderata, by showing that the opposite thesis leads to falsity. As a conclusion, I suggest to take co-hyperintensionality as a primitive and I provide a general criterion of co-hyperintensionality whose content depends on each hyperintensional notion we aim to formalize.

This paper deals with the relationship between legal responsibility and causation. I argue that legal responsibility is not necessarily rooted in causation. The general claim I aim to disprove is that responsibility is descriptive because it is fundamentally rooted in causality, and causality is metaphysically real and founded. My strategy is twofold. First, I show (in §1) that there are significant and independent non- causal form of responsibility that cannot be reduced to causal responsibility; second, in §2, I show that the very notion of causality is— lato sensu—not plainly descriptive. I will suggest that even causation is tied to evaluative elements, contrary to what is assumed by many theorists and practitioners working in normative domains.

In this paper I provide some linguistic evidence to the thesis that responsibility judgments are normative. I present an argument from negation, since the negation of descrip- tive judgments is structurally different from the negation of normative judgments. In particular, the negation of responsibility judgments seem to conform to the pattern of the negation of normative judgments, thus being a prima facie evidence for the normativity of responsibility judgments. I assume — for the argument’s sake — Austin’s distinction be- tween justification and excuse, and I sketch how to accommodate the distinction between internal (justification) and external (excuse) nega- tion of responsibility within a language with a second-order analogous of existential generalization and λ operator. In the end I confront with and refute some objections against this argument.

The Normative Structure of Responsibility deals with responsibility in legal, moral, and linguistic contexts. The book builds on conceptual analysis and data from everyday language, ethics, and the law in order to defend the thesis that responsibility is fundamentally normative, that is, it cannot be reduced to purely descriptive factors. The book is divided in three parts: the first part draws a conceptual map of various responsibility concepts, conceptions and conditions and their interaction with different kinds of rules; the second part engages with arguments in favour of a descriptive understanding of responsibility based on ethics, neuroscience, and metaphysics and argues against it; the third part investigates the language of responsibility and its use in formal and informal contexts.