Felicitas Holzer

Mexico's pandemic management and the absence of measures have been harshly criticized as being disproportionate. This paper examines whether the proportionality principle was properly applied to Mexico's COVID-19 response and outlines three reasons against such an endeavor, namely (i) the content of “proportionate measures” remained insufficiently well defined, (ii) there were yet fundamental rights conflicts to resolve, and (iii) the situation was moreover characterized by epistemic uncertainty.

La violencia en México, específicamente en algunos estados de la República mexicana en donde la población se enfrenta a situaciones de peligro, tiene como una de tantas consecuencias la ausencia de personal médico que se desempeñe como profesional y proporcione servicios de salud en estas zonas rurales. En este sentido, es de considerar que la asignación de recursos humanos en salud es fundamental para el funcionamiento de un sistema eficiente y observar las causas por las que médicos que desde el servicio social hasta el desempeño de su especialidad no consideran trabajar en lugares en donde se sienten vulnerables. En este proceso, es importante visibilizar los cuestionamientos éticos que pueden surgir por lo que este trabajo pretende dar importancia al tema de la exposición de circunstancias, hechos y cifras dentro de esta problemática y plantear las cuestiones normativas pertinentes dentro de este contexto.

Equal access to vaccines has been one of the key ethical challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic. Most scholars consider the massive purchase and hoarding of vaccines by high-income countries, especially at the beginning of the pandemic, to be unjust towards the vulnerable living in low-income countries. A recent proposal by Andreas Albertsen of a vaccine tax has been put forward to remedy this problem. Under such a scheme, high-income countries would pay a contribution, conceptualised as a vaccine tax, dedicated to buying vaccines and distributing them to low and middle-income countries. Proceeding from this proposal, we critically assess the feasibility of a vaccine tax and suggest how to conceptualise and implement a vaccine tax in practice. We present our ‘VaxTax model’ and explore its comparative advantages and disadvantages while considering other possible measures to address the global vaccine access problem, also in view of future pandemics and disease outbreaks.

What has the past reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic taught us? We have seen that many low and middle-income countries (LMICs) still lack access to vaccines, and it seems little progress has been made in the last few months and year. This article discusses whether the current strategies, most notably, vaccine donations by the international community and the COVID-19 global access facility COVAX, offer meaningful solutions to tackle the problem. At the centre of our analysis, we compare the concepts of “donations” and “charity” with “vaccine equity” and the “empowerment” of poorer countries. We suggest that the achievement of fair global vaccine production requires that our global approach is supportive of the idea of empowerment. We, therefore, need structural reforms, which would most importantly include capacity building, to positively impact this goal and to take the interests of the global poor seriously.

What has the past reaction to the COVID-19 pandemic taught us? We have seen that many low and middle-income countries (LMICs) still lack access to vaccines, and it seems little progress has been made in the last few months and year. This article discusses whether the current strategies, most notably, vaccine donations by the international community and the COVID-19 global access facility COVAX, offer meaningful solutions to tackle the problem. At the centre of our analysis, we compare the concepts of “donations” and “charity” with “vaccine equity” and the “empowerment” of poorer countries. We suggest that the achievement of fair global vaccine production requires that our global approach is supportive of the idea of empowerment. We, therefore, need structural reforms, which would most importantly include capacity building, to positively impact this goal and to take the interests of the global poor seriously.

The term “innovation” or “innovative care” has recently gained attention in the context of the use of novel and not yet fully validated medical interventions and technologies. Most notably, there have been various incidences of medical activities insufficiently validated for its regular use in healthcare that fall into this category, such as stem cell treatments, genome sequencing for diagnostic purposes, or novel reproductive technologies. Latin American countries are among the places where new and non-validated medical activities take place, notably due to a lack of clear regulations and the poor support of authorities of existent legal and ethical guidelines, which is driven by “hidden battles” on the moral status of certain interventions. The increasing importance of innovative care underlines the importance of developing a general framework for these practices. Therefore, the present chapter scrutinizes this nascent field of inquiry in Latin America and offers a conceptual framework for innovation as well as its ethical justification. As we will argue, an important use of the term “innovation” or “innovative care” is best interpreted as “new non-validated practice” and not as a research activity. Then, we will defend that responsible innovation understood as responsible new non-validated practice is ethically permissible and poses an acceptable medical option if done in exceptional circumstances—where no reasonable alternatives can be provided to an individual patient—and following special ethical principles. Finally, we focus on the peculiarities and specific difficulties the concept of new non-validated practice poses to the Latin American context. We will conclude the chapter by some remarks and recommendations we draw from our analysis for individual patients, doctors, and societies in Latin America.

The ‘socially valuable knowledge’ principle has been widely acknowledged as one of the most important guiding principles for biomedical research involving human subjects. The principle states that the potential of producing socially valuable knowledge is a necessary requirement, although not sufficient, for the ethical conduct of research projects. This is due to the assumption that the social value of knowledge avoids exploitation of research subjects and justifies the use of health resources. However, more recently, several authors have started interrogating the validity of SVK in research and offered various lines of argument against the SVK principle as a necessary constraint to research. In this article, I will reconstruct the main arguments of this discussion between defenders and debunkers of the SVK principle and offer a third way to consider the social value of knowledge in research studies. I will argue that the social value of knowledge can be supported by an independent justification. This justification of the SVK principle addresses the rationality and common interest of researchers. Thus, I will introduce the SVK principle as a safeguarding principle for public trust based on a conceptual framework by Alex John London. My approach justifies keeping the principle as a precautionary and rational requirement for human health research that all rational stakeholders can agree upon.