•  546
    Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth beneath Cognitive Command
    Dissertation, University of Aberdeen. 2014.
    This thesis engages with three topics and the relationships between them: (i) the phenomenon of disagreement (paradigmatically, where one person makes a claim and another denies it); (ii) the normative character of disagreements (the issue of whether, and in what sense, one of the parties is “at fault” for believing something that’s untrue); (iii) the issue of which theory of what truth is can best accommodate the norms relating belief and truth. People disagree about all sorts of things: about …Read more
  •  390
    Normative Alethic Pluralism
    In Nathan Kellen, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 145-168. 2018.
    Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I cal…Read more
  •  385
    Epistemic Peer Disagreement
    In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. forthcoming.
    We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality.
  •  345
    Ecumenical alethic pluralism
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3): 368-393. 2019.
    ABSTRACTEcumenical Alethic Pluralism is a novel kind of alethic pluralism. It is ecumenical in that it widens the scope of alethic pluralism by allowing for a normatively deflated truth property alongside a variety of normatively robust truth properties. We establish EAP by showing how Wright’s Inflationary Arguments fail in the domain of taste, once a relativist treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of that domain is endorsed. EAP is highly significant to current debates on the nature o…Read more
  •  255
    Deflating Truth about Taste
    American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (4). forthcoming.
    In Truth and Objectivity, Crispin Wright argues that because truth is a distinctively normative property, it cannot be as metaphysically insubstantive as deflationists claim.1 This argument has been taken, together with the scope problem,2 as one of the main motivations for alethic pluralism.3 We offer a reconstruction of Wright’s Inflationary Argument (henceforth IA) aimed at highlighting what are the steps required to establish its inflationary conclusion. We argue that if a certain metaphysic…Read more
  •  250
    Some philosophers, like Mark Richard and Paul Boghossian, have argued against relativism that it cannot account for the possibility of faultless disagreement. However, I will contend that the objections they moved against relativism do not target its ability to account for the possibility of faultless disagreement per se. Ra- ther, they should be taken to challenge its capacity to account for another element of our folk conception of disagreement in certain areas of discourse—what Cris- pin Wrig…Read more
  •  182
    Assessment Relativism
    In Martin Kusch (ed.), Routledge Handbook to Relativism. forthcoming.
    Assessment relativism, as developed by John MacFarlane, is the view that the truth of our claims involving a variety of English expressions—‘tasty’, ‘knows’, ‘tomorrow’, ‘might’, and ‘ought’—is relative not only to aspects of the context of their production but also to aspects of the context in which they are assessed. Assessment relativism is thus a form of truth relativism which is offered as a new way of understanding perspectival thought and talk. In this article, I present the main theses o…Read more
  •  176
    Disagreement about Taste and Alethic Suberogation
    Philosophical Quarterly 66 (264): 516-535. 2016.
    I present a novel strategy to account for two thoughts concerning disagreements about taste: (i) that they need not involve any substantive fault (faultlessness); (ii) that the faultlessness of a contrary opinion can be coherently appreciated from within a committed perspective (parity). Under the assumption that judgments of taste are truth-apt and governed by the truth-norm, I argue that understanding how exactly truth is normative offers a strategy for accounting for both thoughts. I distingu…Read more
  •  140
    Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-24. 2017.
    According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to res...
  •  121
    Assessment–Sensitivity
    Analysis 76 (4): 516-527. 2016.
    In this paper I offer some critical comments to MacFarlane's recent book "Assessment Sensitivity". I focus primarily on MacFarlane's understanding of the normative aspects of enquiry—in particular I take issue with the phenomena of retraction and disagreement as preclusion of joint accuracy. I argue that both notions are problematic and that—at least in the case of basic taste—they are not needed in order to account for our intuitions.
  •  89
    Truth and Naturalism
    with Michael P. Lynch and Douglas Edwards
    In Kelly J. Clark (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Naturalism, Wiley-blackwell. 2015.
    Is truth itself natural? This is an important question for both those working on truth and those working on naturalism. For theorists of truth, answering the question of whether truth is natural will tell us more about the nature of truth (or lack of it), and the relations between truth and other properties of interest. For those working on naturalism, answering this question is of paramount importance to those who wish to have truth as part of the natural order. In this paper, we focus primari…Read more
  •  62
    The value of minimalist truth
    Synthese 195 (3): 1103-1125. 2018.
    Since the publication of Truth, Paul Horwich’s ‘Minimalism’ has become the paradigm of what goes under the label ‘the deflationary conception of truth’. Despite the many theoretical virtues of Horwich’s minimalism, it is usually contended that it cannot fully account for the normative role that truth plays in enquiry. As I see it, this concern amounts to several challenges. One such challenge—call it the axiological challenge—is about whether deflationists have the theoretical resources to expla…Read more
  •  49
    Verità e Post-Verità: dall'Indagine alla Post-Indagine
    1088 Press & Bononia University Press. 2020.
    In this book, we interpret post-truth as a multifaceted phenomenon which involves fake news, emotion-driven rhetoric (vs fact-driven discussion), credulism in the social-media, conspiracy theories and scientific denialism. We develop three models intended to represent the multifaceted nature of post-truth in terms of deviated forms of enquiry – which we label “post-enquiries”. The first form of post-enquiry posits the existence of alternative facts; the second prioritizes emotions over facts; th…Read more
  •  34
    Proof-theoretic pluralism
    with Eugenio Orlandelli
    Synthese 1-25. forthcoming.
    Starting from a proof-theoretic perspective, where meaning is determined by the inference rules governing logical operators, in this paper we primarily aim at developing a proof-theoretic alternative to the model-theoretic meaning-invariant logical pluralism discussed in Beall and Restall. We will also outline how this framework can be easily extended to include a form of meaning-variant logical pluralism. In this respect, the framework developed in this paper—which we label two-level proof-theo…Read more
  •  27
    I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of discourse. I shall call this the axio…Read more
  •  6
    Logical pluralism, indeterminacy and the normativity of logic
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4): 323-346. 2020.
    According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken…Read more
  •  6
    Preface to Special Issue Logical Pluralism and Normativity
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4): 231-235. 2020.
  •  6
    Relative Truth (review)
    Disputatio 3 (28): 334-343. 2010.
  • Review of Relative Truth (review)
    Disputatio 3 (28): 334-343. 2010.
  • Enquiry and Normative Deviance The Role of Fake News in Science Denialism
    In Sven Bernecker, A. K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    The main thesis of this paper is that science denialism brings about an aberrant form of enquiry in which the epistemic norms governing scientific enquiry are deviated in significant ways. Science denialism doesn’t involve just a rejection of a scientific theory; it also deeply challenges the practice, common within scientific enquiry, of continuously and, to a certain extent, impartially testing research methods, theories, and evidential sources with the aim of improving the accuracy of our the…Read more