•  957
    XV—Cross‐Modal Experiences
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3): 429-468. 2011.
    This paper provides a categorization of cross-modal experiences. There are myriad forms. Doing so allows us to think clearly about the nature of different cross-modal experiences and allows us to clearly formulate competing hypotheses about the kind of experiences involved in different cross-modal phenomena
  •  906
    Impossible Figures
    In E. B. Goldstein (ed.), SAGE Encyclopedia of Perception, Sage Publications. 2010.
    Provides an overview and examples of what impossible figures are, and explains their interest to many different disciplines including philosophy, psychology, art and mathematics.
  •  679
    Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1): 24-62. 2011.
    Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away …Read more
  •  667
    Perception, Philosophical Perspectives
    In Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    This paper provides an introduction to, and overview of, the Philosophy of Perception.
  •  642
    Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4): 571-584. 2015.
    The main aim of Lupyan’s paper is to claim that perception is cognitively penetrated and that this is consistent with the idea of perception as predictive coding. In these remarks I will focus on what Lupyan says about whether perception is cognitively penetrated, and set aside his remarks about epistemology. I have argued (2012) that perception can be cognitively penetrated and so I am sympathetic to Lupyan’s overall aim of showing that perception is cognitively penetrable. However, I will be …Read more
  •  630
    Recently, the term ‘aphantasia’ has become current in scientific and public discourse to denote the absence of mental imagery. However, new terms for aphantasia or its subgroups have recently been proposed, e.g. ‘dysikonesia’ or ‘anauralia’, which complicates the literature, research communication and understanding for the general public. Before further terms emerge, we advocate the consistent use of the term ‘aphantasia’ as it can be used flexibly and precisely, and is already widely known in t…Read more
  •  427
    Synaesthesia
    In Mario de Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Kleuwer. 2007.
    Synaesthesia is most often characterised as a union or mixing of the senses. i Richard Cytowic describes it thus: “It denotes the rare capacity to hear colours, taste shapes or experience other equally startling sensory blendings whose quality seems difficult for most of us to imagine” ([1995] 1997, 7). One famous example is of a man who “tasted shapes”. When he experienced flavours he also experienced shapes rubbing against his face or hands. ii Such popular characterisations are rough and read…Read more
  •  407
    Sensing Art and Artifacts: Explorations in Sensory Museology
    with David Howes, Eric Clarke, Beverly Best, and Rupert Cox
    The Senses and Society, 13 (3): 317-334. 2018.
    This article proposes a sensory studies methodology for the interpretation of museum objects. The proposed method unfolds in two phases: virtual encounter via an on-line catalog and actual exposure in the context of a handling workshop. In addition to exploring the écart between image and object, the “Sensing Art and Artifacts” exercise articulates a framework for arriving at a multisensory, cross-cultural, interactive understanding of aesthetic value. The case studies presented here involve fou…Read more
  •  406
    It is hoped that modern sensory substitution and augmentation devices will be able to replace or expand our senses. But to what extent has this been achieved to date? To what extent are the experiences created by sensory substitution devices like the sensory experiences that we are trying to replace? To what extent can we augment people’s senses providing them with new information and new experiences? The first aim of this introduction is to delve deeply into this question to discover the useful…Read more
  •  384
    Introduction: Varieties of disjunctivism
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?
  •  362
    The 
senses,
 or
 sensory 
modalities,
 constitute 
the
different 
ways
 we
 have
 of
 perceiving 
the 
world,
such
 as 
seeing,
 hearing ,
touching, 
tasting, 
and
smelling.
 But
 what 
makes 
the 
senses 
different?
How 
many
 senses
 are 
there? 
How 
many 
could
 there
 be?
 Wha t
interaction
 takes
 place 
between
the
 senses?
 This 
introduction 
is
 a 
guide 
to
thinking 
about 
these 
questions.

  •  350
    Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience
    Noûs 40 (1): 82-117. 2006.
    Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or…Read more
  •  350
    Taxonomising the Senses
    Philosophical Studies 153 (1): 123-142. 2011.
    I argue that we should reject the sparse view that there are or could be only a small number of rather distinct senses. When one appreciates this then one can see that there is no need to choose between the standard criteria that have been proposed as ways of individuating the senses—representation, phenomenal character, proximal stimulus and sense organ—or any other criteria that one may deem important. Rather, one can use these criteria in conjunction to form a fine-grained taxonomy of the sen…Read more
  •  335
    This essay is an introduction to the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour. Why has the examination of many different aspects of colour been a prominent feature in philosophy, to such an extent that the topic is worthy of a handbook? Here are two related answers. First, colours are exceedingly familiar, seemingly simple features that become enigmatic under scrutiny, and they are difficult to capture in any familiar-sounding, unsophisticated theory. Second, through colour one can confront va…Read more
  •  322
    The Admissible Contents of Experience (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2011.
    Which objects and properties are represented in perceptual experience, and how are we able to determine this? The papers in this collection address these questions together with other fundamental questions about the nature of perceptual content. The book draws together papers by leading international philosophers of mind, including Alex Byrne (MIT), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Tim Bayne (St Catherine’s College, Oxford), Michael Tye (University of Texas, Austin), Richard …Read more
  •  289
    What Is It Like to Have Visual Imagery?
    In Susan Aldworth & Matthew MacKisack (eds.), Extreme Imagination: Inside the Eye's Mind. pp. 21-29. 2018.
    How does visual imagination differ from visual perceptual experience? And how should we describe experiences of visual imagery? Moreover how can people who have visual imagery convey what it is like to have it to those who have never had it – congenital aphantisics? This paper addresses these questions using examples of illusions and other perceptual phenomena to hone in on the answers.
  •  272
    Novel colours and the content of experience
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1): 43-66. 2003.
    I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore t…Read more
  •  254
    The neural correlates of visual imagery: a co-ordinate-based meta-analysis
    with C. Winlove, F. Milton, J. Ranson, J. Fulford, M. MacKisack, and A. Zeman
    Cortex 105 (August 2018): 4-25. 2018.
    Visual imagery is a form of sensory imagination, involving subjective experiences typically described as similar to perception, but which occur in the absence of corresponding external stimuli. We used the Activation Likelihood Estimation algorithm (ALE) to identify regions consistently activated by visual imagery across 40 neuroimaging studies, the first such meta-analysis. We also employed a recently developed multi-modal parcellation of the human brain to attribute stereotactic co-ordinates t…Read more
  •  244
    Property dualism and the merits of solutions to the mind-body problem: A reply to Strawson
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 72-89. 2006.
    This paper is divided into two main sections. The first articulates what I believe Strawson's position to be. I contrast Strawson's usage of 'physicalism' with the mainstream use. I then explain why I think that Strawson's position is one of property dualism and substance monism. In doing this, I outline his view and Locke's view on the nature of substance. I argue that they are similar in many respects and thus it is no surprise that Strawson actually holds a view on the mind much like one plau…Read more
  •  233
    Is perception cognitively penetrable? A philosophically satisfying and empirically testable reframing
    with Gary Lupyan, Dustin Stokes, Rasha Abdel Rahman, and Robert Goldstone
    Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 1 91-2. 2013.
    The question of whether perception can be penetrated by cognition is in the limelight again. The reason this question keeps coming up is that there is so much at stake: Is it possible to have theory-neutral observation? Is it possible to study perception without recourse to expectations, context, and beliefs? What are the boundaries between perception, memory, and inference (and do they even exist)? Are findings from neuroscience that paint a picture of perception as an inherently bidirectional …Read more
  •  227
    Perfect Pitch and the Content of Experience
    Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (2): 89-101. 1999.
    This paper examines the representationalist view of experiences in the light of the phenomena of perfect and relative pitch. Two main kinds of representationalism are identified - environment-based and cognitive role-based. It is argued that to explain the relationship between the two theories a distinction should be drawn between various types of implicit and explicit content. When investigated, this distinction sheds some light on the difference between the phenomenology of perfect and relativ…Read more
  •  218
    Colour inversion problems for representationalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1): 127-152. 2005.
    In this paper I examine whether representationalism can account for various thought experiments about colour inversions. Representationalism is, at minimum, the view that, necessarily, if two experiences have the same representational content then they have the same phenomenal character. I argue that representationalism ought to be rejected if one holds externalist views about experiential content and one holds traditional exter- nalist views about the nature of the content of propositional atti…Read more
  •  200
    Representational Theories of Phenomenal Character
    Dissertation, University of Stirling. 2000.
    This thesis is an examination and critique of naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. Phenomenal character refers to the distinctive quality that perceptual and sensational experiences seem to have; it is identified with 'what it is like' to undergo experiences. The central claims of representationalism are that phenomenal character is identical with the content of experience and that all representational states, bearing appropriate relations to the cognitive system, are …Read more
  •  199
    This volume presents ten new essays on the nature of perceptual imagination and perceptual memory, framed by an introductory overview of these topics. How do perceptual imagination and memory resemble and differ from each other and from other kinds of sensory experience? And what role does each play in perception and in the acquisition of knowledge? These are the two central questions that the contributors seek to address.
  •  195
    Nonconceptual content and the nature of perceptual experience
    Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6. 1998.
    [1] Recent philosophy of mind and epistemology has seen an important and influential trend towards accounting for at least some features of experiences in content-involving terms. It is a contested point whether ascribing content to experiences can account for all the intrinsic properties of experiences, but on many theories of experiences there are close links between the ascription of content and the ways in which experiences are ascribed and typed. The issues here have both epistemological an…Read more
  •  182
    Reflection on skeptical scenarios in the philosophy of perception, made vivid in the arguments from illusion and hallucination, have led to the formulation of theories of the metaphysical and epistemological nature of perceptual experience. In recent times, the locus of the debate concerning the nature of perceptual experience has been the dispute between disjunctivists and common-kind theorists. Disjunctivists have held that there are substantial dissimilarities (either metaphysical or epistemo…Read more
  •  173
    The Space of Sensory Modalities
    In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    Is there a space of the sensory modalities? Such a space would be one in which we can represent all the actual, and at least some of the possible, sensory modalities. The relative position of the senses in this space would indicate how similar and how different the senses were from each other. The construction of such a space might reveal unconsidered features of the actual and possible senses, help us to define what a sense is, and provide grounds that we might use to decide what is one token s…Read more
  •  171
    The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives (edited book)
    Oxford University Press USA. 2011.
    The senses, or sensory modalities, constitute the different ways we have of perceiving the world, such as seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. But how many senses are there? How many could there be? What makes the senses different? What interaction takes place between the senses? This book is a guide to thinking about these questions. Together with an extensive introduction to the topic, the book contains the key classic papers on this subject together with nine newly commissioned es…Read more