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EthicsIn Paisley Livingston & Carl Plantinga (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy and Film, Routledge. 2008.
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83Hope for the Evolutionary Debunker: How Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and Arguments from Moral Disagreement Can Join ForcesEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1-17. 2022.Facts about moral disagreement and human evolution have both been said to exclude the possibility of moral knowledge, but the question of how these challenges interact has largely gone unaddressed. The paper aims to present and defend a novel version of the evolutionary “debunking” argument for moral skepticism that appeals to both types of considerations. This argument has several advantages compared to more familiar versions. The standard debunking strategy is to argue that evolutionary accoun…Read more
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62Moral Realism and the Argument from SkepticismInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4): 283-303. 2020.A long-standing family of worries about moral realism focuses on its implications for moral epistemology. The underlying concern is that if moral truths have the nature that realists believe, it is hard to see how we could know what they are. This objection may be called the “argument from skepticism” against moral realism. Realists have primarily responded to this argument by presenting accounts of how we could acquire knowledge of moral truths that are consistent with realist assumptions about…Read more
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1Democracy Unbound: Basic Explorations (edited book)Stockholm University. Filosofiska institutionen. 2005.
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49From Scepticism to Anti‐RealismDialectica 73 (3): 411-427. 2019.A common anti-realist strategy is to argue that moral realism (or at least the non-naturalist form of it) should be abandoned because it cannot adequately make room for moral knowledge and justified moral belief, for example in view of an evolutionary account of the origins of moral beliefs or of the existence of radical moral disagreement. Why is that (alleged) fact supposed to undermine realism? I examine and discuss three possible answers to this question. According to the answer that I think…Read more
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134A New Route from Moral Disagreement to Moral SkepticismJournal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2): 189-207. 2019.Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts the realists posit. In particular, it is "fundamental" moral disagreement—that is, disagreement that is not due to distorting factors such as ignorance of relevant nonmoral facts, bad reasoning skills, or the like—that is supposed to generate skeptical implications. In this paper, we show that this version of the disagreement challenge is flawed as it st…Read more
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39On What Matters, Volume III, by Derek Parfit. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, xiv + 468 pp. ISBN 9780198778608. hb. £25.00 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1): 668-672. 2018.
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132Recent work on reflective equilibrium and method in ethicsPhilosophy Compass 13 (6). 2018.The idea of reflective equilibrium remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent objections are related to general arguments against the pos…Read more
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15This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book "Ethics and Explanation", edited by Neil Sinclair and Uri Leibowitz due for publication in 2016.
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26The Benacerraf challenge is a well-known objection to Platonism in mathematics. Its proponent argues that, if mathematical entities are, as Platonists claim, mind-independent, causally inert, and existent beyond space and time, then we are led to a skeptical stance according to which it is not possible to explain how it is that we have cognitive access to the mathematical realm or how it is that our mathematical beliefs are reliable. It has been argued that a similar objection could be leveled a…Read more
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16Norman Daniels: Justice and Justification. Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice & Folke Tersman, Reflective Equilibrium. An Essay in Moral Epistemology (review)Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1): 129-132. 1998.
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61The Case for a Mixed Verdict on Ethics and EpistemologyPhilosophical Topics 38 (2): 181-204. 2010.An increasingly popular strategy among critics of ethical anti-realism is to stress that the traditional arguments for that position work just as well in the case of other areas. For example, on the basis of that claim, it has recently been claimed that ethical expressivists are committed to being expressivists also about epistemic judgments (including the judgment that it is rational to believe in ethical expressivism). This in turn is supposed to seriously undermine their position. The purpose…Read more
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107Quine on EthicsTheoria 64 (1): 84-98. 1998.W.V. Quine has expressed a fairly conventional form of non-cognitivism in those of his writings that concern the status of moral judgments. For instance, in Quine (1981), he argues that ethics, as compared with science, is ‘methodologically infirm’. The reason is that while science is responsive to observation, and therefore ‘retains some title to a correspondence theory of truth’ (p. 63), ethics lacks such responsiveness. This in turn leads Quine to contrast moral judgments with judgments that …Read more
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28Disagreement, MoralIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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41DAVIDSON, DONALD: Problems of Rationality Oxford: Clarendon, 2004, pp. xx + 280. ISBN 0-19-823754-Theoria 72 (3): 233-239. 2006.
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31A World without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory, edited by Richard Joyce and Simon KirchinInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4): 333-337. 2015._ Source: _Page Count 5
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376The reliability of moral intuitions: A challenge from neuroscienceAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3). 2008.A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in ce…Read more
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57Intuitional DisagreementSouthern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4): 639-659. 2012.Some think that recent empirical research has shown that peoples' moral intuitions vary in a way that is hard to reconcile with the supposition that they are even modestly reliable. This is in turn supposed to generate skeptical conclusions regarding the claims and theories advanced by ethicists because of the crucial role intuitions have in the arguments offered in support of those claims. I begin by trying to articulate the most compelling version of this challenge. On that version, the main p…Read more
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114Crispin Wright on moral disagreementPhilosophical Quarterly 48 (192): 359-365. 1998.Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, the appropr…Read more
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310Coherence and disagreementPhilosophical Studies 65 (3). 1992.A traditional objection to coherentism is that there may be incompatible though equally coherent sets of beliefs. The purpose of the paper is to assess this objection. It is argued that the better a belief "p" coheres with the system of a person, the less likely it is that the negation of the belief coheres equally well with someone else's system, or even that there is someone else who believes the negation of "p". The arguments are based on two plausible assumptions about coherence, and some mo…Read more