•  54
    What Makes a Reasoning Sound? C. S. Peirce's Normative Foundation of Logic
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (1): 31. 2012.
    The immediate purpose of this paper is to expound C. S. Peirce's conception of reasoning as he refined it in his mature reflection on the normative sciences and their hierarchical relations (the dependence of logic on ethics and, in turn, that of ethics on esthetics). In order to clarify adequately Peirce's position, however, it is helpful to consider his rejection of Christoph Sigwart's attempt to ground logical soundness in subjective feeling. What is at stake in this debate is nothing less th…Read more
  •  19
    Ambivalence and Self-Deception: Reframing the Debate
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2): 387-407. 2019.
    A multitude of scholars have recently argued that inherently ambivalent reactions ought to be accepted, and our drive toward overcoming them resisted, in order to preserve a reflectively accurate account of oneself. By contrast, I argue that a genuine commitment to overcome ambivalence aims less at avoiding than acknowledging and understanding, as well as possibly resolving, whatever conflicts led us to become ambivalent in the first place. On the other hand, certain forms of ‘reflective ambival…Read more
  •  12
    Critical Reflection and Common-Sense Beliefs
    European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2). 2017.
    I explore the connection between pragmatism and common sense by reflecting upon two seemingly contrasting Peircean remarks about the pragmatic method: (a) its “basis on the doctrine of common sense” and (b) the recommendation that a proposition p be explicated in light of critical, deliberate, or “self-controlled” conduct ensuing from a belief that p. I show that Peirce’s focus on phenomena of self-control is situated within his broader interest in the nature of reasoning. The “secret of rationa…Read more
  •  11
    Nitrogen and heavy metals in soil and eucalyptus trees due to biosolid application
    with M. Velasco-Molina, M. E. Mattiazzo, and C. A. De Andrade
    Scientia 71. 2006.
  •  9
    Entrando direttamente nel cuore del realismo di Peirce, il presente articolo vuole rispondere alla domanda: come si può affermare l’essenziale conoscibilità dell’essere senza minarne l’irriducibile alterità? La risposta a questa domanda esigerà un radicale ripensamento del concetto stesso di realtà. L’ipotesi di Peirce è che l’indipendenza del reale, invece che determinarne la costitutiva inaccessibilità, è al contrario condizione per l’emergenza, lo sviluppo e il compimento finale della ricerca…Read more