Francisco González Frich L. González Frich LC

361DIALECTIC AS ?PHILOSOPHICAL EMBARRASSMENT? * Francisco Gonzalez is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Skidmore College. Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 40, no. 3 361?89 [361] Dialectic as ?Philosophical Embarrassment?: Heidegger?s Critique of Plato?s Method FRANCISCO GONZALEZ* Philosophie ist ein Ringen um die Methode. Hans-Georg Gadamer has expressed the following debt to the thought of Martin Heidegger: ?The philosophical stimuli I received from Heidegger led me more and more into the realm of dialectic, Plato?s as well as Hegel?s.?1 It is therefore surprising to discover that Heidegger himself did not see his thought as leading him into the realm of dialectic. On the contrary, in Being and Time we find a curt and unexplained dismissal of dialectic, specifically Plato?s, as a ?genuine philosophical embarrassment? .2 This dismissal is repeated in the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics course of WS 1929/30 where Heidegger asserts that ?all dialectic in philosophy,? and thus that of Hegel as well as Plato, ?is only the expression of an embarrassment.?3 Only with the publication of Heidegger?s earlier lecture courses from the 1920s, are we in a position to understand and evaluate this surprising dismissal. We are also in a better position to understand why even the later Heidegger failed to reassess his rejection of dialectic, despite the existence of strong incentives for doing so: incentives recognized not only by..

Faced with the impossibility of saying Being directly given that all language is language of beings, Heidegger proposes an overcoming of logic in favor of what he calls Sigetik: a way of addressing Being in and through silence, i.e., without asserting anything of Being. After considering what such a Sigetik actually involves and how it is possible, this paper asks why Heidegger rejects the alternative of that indirect saying of Being that he identifies with dialectic. It is then argued both that Heidegger's arguments against dialectic are not compelling and that the Beiträge itself, in mostly failing to achieve and sustain the Sigetik it prescribes, cannot fully escape some form of dialectic. Sigetik may prove a lure more threatening to philosophical questioning than the dialectic it seeks, unsuccessfully, to overcome.

Problem: Starting with his personal experience the author pursues the question: How can we alter our way of living, sensoriality and reflective skills so that we can handle today’s information flows, which nowadays are so large that they create confusion and ineffective educational actions? Method: The approach to follow is called “parenthesism,” a practice based on Maturana’s theoretical frameworks of the “biology of cognition” and the “biology of love.” Results: One of the findings when a person lives in parenthesism is the ability to see their own dogmatism and stubbornness when that person would otherwise be blind to his/her own convictions. Implications: Many aspects of this essay, and this manner of thinking, are circular and tautological, and hence may appear illogical to the reader. However, the author claims that existence is not solely logical, and that in a complex matrix circular and recursive relationships are common, and that these can best be understood through circular and recursive logics. Furthermore the relevance of parenthesism for UNESCO’s view on learning paradigms is reviewed in this light

A partir de la recabación de testimonios profesionales y de pregrado, se describe la elaboración de un proyecto de divulgación de la filosofía en la Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, se exponen diferentes enfoques que parten de las necesidades académicas, escolares y se extiende a la oralidad vivencial, virtual y de interconexión en diferentes plataformas tecnológicas que cubren diversos segmentos de población con el propósito de divulgar a la filosofía a partir de nuevas estrategias de comunicación filosófica, así como descubrir nuevos enfoques didácticos de transmisión del conocimiento y la cultura filosófica en el centro de México.

En este texto discutiremos la tensión entre los nuevos medios y la narratología ocupándonos especialmente del caso del cine. Nuestra tesis será que los nuevos medios tienen que ver básicamente con la ilusión y solo derivadamente con la imaginación; por el contrario, el campo de la literatura tiene que ver solo con la imaginación y no con la ilusión. Si esto es así, algo debe estar mal con la pretensión de la narratología de ser el esquema teórico adecuado para entender cualquier fenómeno cultural, especialmente el de losnuevos medios. Insistiremos, por ello, en la distinción entre ilusión e imaginación. De hecho, los teóricos literarios no lo consideran. Se suele decir que el cine es ficción, y de hecho la literatura es ficción, pero el cine es mucho más que la ficción, es una ilusión.Here we will discuss the tension between the new mass media and narratology and the case in study will be cinema. Our thesis would be that new mass media have to do basically with illusion and only derivatively with imagination; on the contrary, the field of literature has to do only with imagination, not with illusion at all. If it is so, something must be wrong with the pretence of narratology to be the adequate theoretical schema in order to understand every cultural phenomenon, especially in the case of new mass media. We have to insist on the distinction between illusion and imagination. In fact, literary theoreticians do mostly not consider it. It is usually said of cinema that it is fiction, and indeed literature is fiction, but cinema is much more than fiction, it is illusion