Francisco Lara

The emergence of AI is posing serious challenges to standard conceptions of moral status. New non-biological entities are able to act and make decisions rationally. The question arises, in this regard, as to whether AI systems possess or can possess the necessary properties to be morally considerable. In this chapter, we have undertaken a systematic analysis of the various debates that are taking place about the moral status of AI. First, we have discussed the possibility that AI systems, by virtue of its new agential capabilities, can be understood as a moral agent. Discussions between those defending mentalist and anti-mentalist positions have revealed many nuances and particularly relevant theoretical aspects. Second, given that an AI system can hardly be an entity qualified to be responsible, we have delved into the responsibility gap and the different ways of understanding and addressing it. Third, we have provided an overview of the current and potential patientist capabilities that AI systems possess. This has led us to analyze the possibilities of AI possessing moral patiency. In addition, we have addressed the question of the moral and legal rights of AI. Finally, we have introduced the two most relevant authors of the relational turn on the moral status of AI, Mark Coeckelbergh and David Gunkel, who have been led to defend a relational approach to moral life as a result of the problems associated with the ontological understanding of moral status.

Many of our daily activities are now made more convenient and efficient by virtual assistants, and the day when they can be designed to instruct us in certain skills, such as those needed to make moral judgements, is not far off. In this paper we ask to what extent it would be ethically acceptable for these so-called virtual assistants for moral enhancement to use subtle strategies, known as “nudges”, to influence our decisions. To achieve our goal, we will first characterise nudges in their standard use and discuss the debate they have generated around their possible manipulative character, establishing three conditions of manipulation. Secondly, we ask whether nudges can occur in moral virtual assistants that are not manipulative. After critically analysing some proposed virtual assistants, we argue in favour of one of them, given that by pursuing an open and neutral moral enhancement, it promotes and respects the autonomy of the person as much as possible. Thirdly, we analyse how nudges could enhance the functioning of such an assistant, and evaluate them in terms of their degree of threat to the subject’s autonomy and their level of transparency. Finally, we consider the possibility of using motivational nudges, which not only help us in the formation of moral judgements but also in our moral behaviour.

A significant stimulus for co-editing a book on AI ethics comes from a collaboration between Francisco Lara and Jan Deckers that started when Francisco spent some time, in 2017, as a visiting researcher in the School of Medicine at Newcastle University (United Kingdom). Both of us had been interested for quite some time in the ethics of human enhancement by biotechnological means. Both saw significant problems with these ambitions and associated technologies, recognising at the same time the value of, and the need for a particular type of human enhancement, the improvement of our moral skills. This collaboration resulted in the idea that artificial intelligence (AI) might potentially fulfil a useful role in this respect, and led to the publication of an article that makes a case for designing and using ‘Artificial Intelligence as a Socratic Assistant for Moral Enhancement’ (Lara and Deckers 2020). Francisco subsequently developed this idea, arguing that such a virtual assistant might be even better than a human being in morally enhancing AI users (Lara 2021), whilst Jan spent some time thinking through the nature of the unnatural or artificial (Deckers 2021). Meanwhile, both of us developed a greater awareness of the moral problems and opportunities of AI in general, and of the urgent need to explore, resolve, and govern the ethical issues raised by AI.

This book presents the reader with a comprehensive and structured understanding of the ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI). It describes the main ethical questions that arise from the use of AI in different areas, as well as the contribution of various academic disciplines such as legal policy, environmental sciences, and philosophy of technology to the study of AI. AI has become ubiquitous and is significantly changing our lives, in many cases, for the better, but it comes with ethical challenges. These challenges include issues with the possibility and consequences of autonomous AI systems, privacy and data protection, the development of a surveillance society, problems with the design of these technologies and inequalities in access to AI technologies. This book offers specialists an instrument to develop a rigorous understanding of the main debates in emerging ethical questions around AI. The book will be of great relevance to experts in applied and technology ethics and to students pursuing degrees in applied ethics and, more specifically, in AI ethics.

Los trabajos que componen este libro se adentran en eso que ha llegado a verse como un campo de estudio asegurado, pero que más bien parece un arco en problemática tensión: el que se forma al pretender conjuntar la fenomenología “y” la hermenéutica. La particularidad de Heidegger consiste tanto en haber tensado ese arco como en haber abandonado después su propio intento, tan fructífero para otros. Por ello, Heidegger es −junto a Gadamer− el interlocutor principal de estos escritos. El libro tiene como objetivo homenajear a Franco Volpi por todo lo que nos dio como pensador y persona. Da a conocer uno de los últimos trabajos del propio Volpi, así como ensayos de Jean Grondin, Arturo Leyte, Ramón Rodríguez, Alejandro Vigo y Ángel Xolocotzi, entre otros

Recommender Systems (RecSys) have been around since the early days of the Internet, helping users navigate the vast ocean of information and the increasingly available options that have been available for us ever since. The range of tasks for which one could use a RecSys is expanding as the technical capabilities grow, with the disruption of Machine Learning representing a tipping point in this domain, as in many others. However, the increase of the technical capabilities of AI-powered RecSys did not come with a thorough consideration of their ethical implications and, despite being a well-established technical domain, the potential impacts of RecSys on their users are still under-assessed. This paper aims at filling this gap in regards to one of the main impacts of RecSys: personal autonomy. We first describe how technology can affect human values and a suitable methodology to identify these effects and mitigate potential harms: Value Sensitive Design (VSD). We use VSD to carry out a conceptual investigation of personal autonomy in the context of a generic RecSys and draw on a nuanced account of procedural autonomy to focus on two components: competence and authenticity. We provide the results of our inquiry as a value hierarchy and apply it to the design of a speculative RecSys as an example.

Resumen: El artículo analiza los escritos de Heidegger de 1911 sobre el “juramento modernista” exigido por Pío X. En la discusión de Heidegger con el liberalismo encontramos tensiones políticas que se mantienen hasta nuestros días. La separación efectiva entre Iglesia y Estado, la pretensión de una educación laica, el rol neutro de un Estado al que grupos ultraconservadores acusan de parcial e ideológico, son algunos de los problemas que aparecen en esta polémica.: The article analyzes Heidegger's 1911 writings on the "modernist oath" demanded by Pius X. Heidegger's quarrel with liberalism exposes some political tensions that continues nowadays. The effective separation between church and state, the aim of a secular education, the neutral role of a state that ultraconservative groups accuse of being biased and ideological, are some of the problems that appear in this controversy.

El presente trabajo pretende ser un aporte a la discusión actual sobre las implicaciones políticas de la filosofía de Heidegger. A tal efecto, se remonta a la filosofía del joven Heidegger y presenta los dos grandes modelos de análisis fenomenológico que éste pone en marcha en sus primeros cursos de Friburgo. Gracias a ello se vuelve posible hacer explícitas sus convicciones acerca del objeto y el sentido de la filosofía, así como sobre la relación de ésta con lo que el mismo Heidegger considera lo originariamente histórico. Por este camino se hacen visibles ciertos gestos políticos de signo jerárquico y elitista operando ya desde el inicio de su pensamiento.

El artículo pretende contribuir a la discusión actual en torno al «caso Heidegger». En concreto, se intentarán mostrar tres gestos políticos correspondientes a tres momentos distintos de la evolución de su pensamiento: el neokantismo, la fenomenología hermenéutica y la ontohistoria. Se planteará hasta qué punto son distintos estos gestos, qué tienen en común y, sobre todo, qué lugar político se le concede a la filosofía en ellos. This paper aims to contribute to the current discussion around the «case Heidegger». It shows three political gestures corresponding to three different moments in the evolution of his thought: neo-kantianism, hermeneutic phenomenology and history of Being. We will consider if this gestures are actually different, what do they have in common, and, especially, which political place is granted to philosophy in them

RESUMEN: El artículo expone el programa filosófico de Heidegger en su cursoProblemas fundamentales de la fenomenología de 1919/20 y destaca su concepto de concreción. Por esa vía se explicita cuál es para Heidegger el asunto y la tarea de la filosofía. Finalmente, se lleva a cabo una crítica de sus pretensiones tanto de concreción como de formalidad, mostrando que ambas están lastradas por varios prejuicios. Para finalizar, se ponen de relieve, también de forma crítica, algunas consecuencias fenomenológicas y políticas de esta particular idea de filosofía. ABSTRACT: In this paper I descibe Heidegger's philosophical program in his lecture course of 1919/20, Basic problems of Phenomenology, emphasizing his concept of concretion. I try to make explicit how Heidegger understood the subject and the task of philosophy in those years. Next, I critically review his claims about concretion and formality in his philosophy, showing that they are burdened by various prejudices. Finally, I underscore some phenomenological and political consequences of this idea of philosophy.

El texto rinde un homenaje a Ramón Rodríguez a partir de una revisión de dos aspectos. Por un lado, el modo como el autor llegó a conocer el trabajo de Ramón Rodríguez y el impacto que tuvo en sus propias investigaciones. Por otro lado, la importancia que su libro La transformación hermenéutica de la fenomenología posee en el marco de los estudios heideggerianos. En especial, se destaca su lectura de la intencionalidad, la intuición hermenéutica y la indicación formal. El objetivo final es mostrar la forma de leer de Ramón Rodríguez como un ejemplo de ejercicio fenomenológico-hermenéutico.

El presente artículo analiza los primeros escritos de Heidegger, en el contexto de sus orígenes católicos y antimodernos, a fin de mostrar en ellos una serie de aspectos característicos. La pretensión final consiste en poner de relieve los elementos valorativos y cosmovisionales que dirigen el pensamiento de Heidegger en sus inicios. De ese modo, se vuelve posible dejar planteada la pregunta de si dichos elementos no siguen jugando un papel decisivo, aunque menos visible ya, en toda la filosofía del primer Heidegger.

El presente trabajo pretende ser un aporte a la discusión actual sobre las implicaciones políticas de la filosofía de Heidegger. A tal efecto, se remonta a la filosofía del joven Heidegger y presenta los dos grandes modelos de análisis fenomenológico que éste pone en marcha en sus primeros cursos de Friburgo. Gracias a ello se vuelve posible hacer explícitas sus convicciones acerca del objeto y el sentido de la filosofía, así como sobre la relación de ésta con lo que el mismo Heidegger considera lo originariamente histórico. Por este camino se hacen visibles ciertos gestos políticos de signo jerárquico y elitista operando ya desde el inicio de su pensamiento.

The new biotechnology raises expectations for modifying human behaviour through its use. This article focuses on the ethical analysis of the not so remote possibility of rehabilitating criminals by means of neurotechnological techniques. The analysis is carried out from a synthetic position of, on the one hand, the consequentialist conception of what is right and, on the other hand, the emphasis on individual liberties. As a result, firstly, the ethical appropriateness of adopting a general predisposition for allowing the neurorehabilitation of prisoners only if it is safe and if they give their consent will be defended. But, at the same time, reasons will be given for requiring, in certain circumstances, the exceptional use of neurotechnology to rehabilitate severely psychopathic prisoners, even against their will, from the same ethical perspective.

Utilitarianism has been able to respond to many of the objections raised against it by undertaking a major revision of its theory. Basically, this consisted of recognising that its early normative propositions were only viable for agents very different from flesh-and-blood humans. They then deduced that, given human limitations, it was most useful for everyone if moral agents did not behave as utilitarians and habitually followed certain rules. Important recent advances in neurotechnology suggest that some of these human limitations can be overcome. In this article, after presenting some possible neuro-enhancements, we seek to answer the questions, first, of whether they should be accepted by a utilitarian ethic and, second, if accepted, to what extent they would invalidate the revision that allowed them to escape the objections.

Erick J. Ramirez, Miles Elliott and Per‑Erik Milam (2021) have recently claimed that using Virtual Reality (VR) as an educational nudge to promote empathy is unethical. These authors argue that the influence exerted on the participant through virtual simulation is based on the deception of making them believe that they are someone else when this is impossible. This makes the use of VR for empathy enhancement a manipulative strategy in itself. In this article, we show that Ramirez et al.’s ethical rejection of empathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception of empathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promote empathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions.

Can Artificial Intelligence be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.

Biomedical innovations are making possible the enhancement of human capabilities. There are two philosophical stances on the role that medicine should play in this respect. On the one hand, naturalism rejects every medical intervention that goes beyond preventing and treating disease. On the other hand, welfarism advocates enhancements that foster subjective well-being. We will show that both positions have considerable shortcomings. Consequently, we will introduce a third characterization in which therapies and enhancements can be reconciled with the legitimate objectives of medicine inasmuch as they improve the capabilities that enable the freedom to pursue personal well-being.

The history of humankind is full of examples that indicate a constant desire to make human beings more moral. Nowadays, technological breakthroughs might have a significant impact on our moral character and abilities. This is the case of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies. The aim of this paper is to consider the ethical aspects of the use of VR in enhancing empathy. First, we will offer an introduction to VR, explaining its fundamental features, devices and concepts. Then, we will approach the characterization of VR as an “empathy machine,” showing why this medium has aroused so much interest and why, nevertheless, we do not believe it is the ideal way to enhance empathy. As an alternative, we will consider fostering empathy-related abilities through virtual embodiment in avatars. In the conclusion, however, we will, we will examine some of the serious concerns related to the ethical relevance of empathy and will defend the philosophical case for a reason-guided empathy, also suggesting specific guidelines for possible future developments of empathy enhancement projects through VR embodied experiences.

En el artículo se critica la tesis de Javier Mosterín (defendida en su libro Vivan los Animales, Debate, 1998) de que los animales no humanos deben ser incluidos en la comunidad moral como resultado de un progreso moral en la sensibilidad de los humanos que llevará progresivamente a una mayor compasión por el sufrimiento ajeno. Tras señalar ciertas deficiencias metaéticas de esta propuesta y la no deseada implicación normativa de tener que incluir finalmente en la comunidad moral a cualquier ser vivo, se esbozan en el artículo algunas razones para permitir una mejor consideración de los animales sin acabar por ello en ese radicalismo ecológico.

This paper considers, firstly, to what extent the administration of oxytocin can augment the capacity of empathy in human beings; and secondly, whether or not such practice ought to be allowed. In relation to the latter, the author develops an argument in favour of this intervention by virtue of its consistency with the belief that, if a therapeutic treatment is to be considered acceptable, it is essential that it maximizes the well-being of those affected and that it does not compromise the autonomy of the patient. Having rejected several objections related to the nature of this intervention, the author finally questions its morality on the basis of a concern with its universalizability.