Francisco Vergara

Transdisciplinary research knits together knowledge from diverse epistemic communities in addressing social-environmental challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate crises, food insecurity, and public health. This paper reflects on the roles of philosophy of science in transdisciplinary research while focusing on Indigenous and other subaltern forms of knowledge. We offer a critical assessment of demarcationist approaches in philosophy of science and outline a constructive alternative of transdisciplinary philosophy of science. While a demarcationist focus obscures the complex relations between epistemic communities, transdisciplinary philosophy of science provides resources for meeting epistemic and political challenges of collaborative knowledge production.

Everyone has heard of "the invisible hand," the famous metaphor used by Adam Smith (1723-1790) in The Wealth of Nations. Although he uses the expression only once in the book, it has given rise to controversy that has lasted for over two centuries. The famous expression has been understood, in (at least) two very different ways. In one way by most of academia, and in a very different way by Keynes, Noah Chomsky and more lately by Mark Blaug (in the second edition of The New Palgrave, 2008). In the standard textbook interpretation, it is considered a poetical name for "the price mechanism" and presented as an argument in favor of laisser-faire and free trade. In this paper we recall the less well-known interpretation (of Keynes, Blaug and Chomsky), showing that Smith was more reserved towards laisser-faire than is commonly believed and that by "invisible hand" he did not mean the price mechanism.

One of the most disputed questions among economists is that of "the role" and "size" that the public sector should have in a rich and developed country like France. The importance of this question is understandable, because the history of nations is filled with examples of a sector (or a branch) of the economy becoming too large, or remaining too small, hampering growth or making the economy more vulnerable. A recent case is that of the "Financial Corporations Sector", which doubled in size in several countries during the two decades leading up to the 2008 economic collapse [1]. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether this is not also the case, in France, with "General Government" or "the Public Sector". We explain why the argument most often used by those who hold this opinion (that the ratio "public expenditure/GDP" is a good measure of the size of the public sector and that in France it is too high) is not a serious one.

This book describes the philosophical principles underlying the doctrine (the political project) often called “classical liberalism”. By this expression we mean, in this book, the project for society proposed, during the second half of the eighteenth century, by David Hume and Adam Smith in Great Britain, Turgot and Condorcet in France, Thomas Jefferson in the United States and Kant and Humboldt in Germany. The differences between the principles of “classical liberalism” and those of the extreme doctrines of Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek (often confused with 'classical liberalism') are clearly explained. This book has been translated into Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Vietnamese, Rumanian and Turkish. Several scholars have done me the honor of posting a .pdf version of this work (which is no longer available in paper form). Here are three excellent versions that are easily found : "Les fondements philosophiques du libéralisme jugurtha noblogs" (224 pages), "Les fondements philosophiques du libéralisme" (224 pages), in ZLibrary. "Les fondements philosophiques du libéralisme abdelmagidzarrouki" (224 pages),

John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham are often said to have held opposed views concerning the way “the value” of different pleasures should be estimated. Mill is accused of being an inconsistent utilitarian because he thought that, when comparing the value of two pleasures, we should not forget to take their “quality” into account. Bentham, on the other hand, is said to have believed that we should take “only quantity” into consideration. By verifying what they actually wrote, and reflecting on what they meant by words like “value”, “quantity”, and “quality”, we find that these allegations are largely imaginary and that the difference between Mill and Bentham on this question has (at least) been exaggerated. Bentham, for example, did not write that "quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry", as is so often reported. In his Principles of Morals and Legislation he clearly tells us why he rejects the inaccurate word “quantity”, when speaking of “the value of (a lot of) pain or pleasure”, and he explicitly introduces “quality” – both the word and the concept – in his analysis of rewards and punishments. These clarifications allow us to sort-out a few other confusions concerning utilitarianism. We explain, for example, why authors like Amartya Sen and Michael Sandel are mistaken in believing that rights and freedoms have “no intrinsic value” (only instrumental value) in utilitarian ethics.

The prestigious French publisher Presses Universitaires de France has recently brought out (November 1995) a new French edition of Elie Halévy's well known book "The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism", first published in France in three volumes as "La formation du radicalisme philosophique" (1901-1904) and translated into English in 1926. The prevailing opinion on this book is that it gives an excellent account of English utilitarianism. Thus, in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Talcott Parsons speaks of it as the ‘virtually definitive analysis of utilitarianism’. More recently Donald Winch, in his introduction to the Penguin edition of John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political Economy, describes Halévy's book as: ‘Still the best study of the ideas and activities of the school taken as a whole’. In this short essay I express a very different opinion. I show that Halévy, who qualifies utilitarianism (with obvious disgust) as ‘a plebeian or rather bourgeois morality’, as ‘much too simple’, completely misunderstood the writings of the English and Scottish utilitarian philosophers.

Historians of ideas have, frequently, misunderstood the founders of liberalism. Often, they say that authors like Adam Smith or Turgot are inconsistent in their adherence to a supposed .principle of state non-intervention., since they find that those classic authors defend many examples of public intervention in the economy. But the truth is that none of the great economists, whether French or British, have ever professed such an absurd principle as that of non-intervention. They have, however, defended vigorously other rival principles, such as the state.s defence of natural rights, public utility or laisser-faire, which should not be confused with non-intervention

En este trabajo se cuestiona la opinión dada a menudo de acuerdo con la que la economía política se separa de la moralidad en los escritos de Adam Smith y su escuela. Según esta vieja idea, fuertemente defendida en el libro de Louis Dumont, From MandeVille to Marx los grandes economistas clásicos ingleses pensaron que en el espacio económico los hombres podían seguir exclusivamente su propio interés sin ninguna referencia a las reglas morales. Se muestra que esto es estrictamente lo contrario de lo que en realidad dijeron. Así, en La riqueza de las naciones, Smith escribe que en el sistema de la libertad natural que propugna: "Todo hombre, mientras que no viole las leyes de justicia, es totalmente libre de perseguir su propio interés"- Aparentemente Dumont no conoce esta doctrina o no sabe que para Smith la "justicia" es una de las cuatro virtudes cardinales y que las reglas que prescribe son las más precisas y la parte más importante de la moralidad, sin las que una sociedad pacífica y próspera no puede existir. De ahí que se critiquen algunas otras opiniones populares que Dumont recoge también de acuerdo con las que se supone que los economistas clásicos ingleses han creído que el interés del individuo nunca se contradice con el interés público y que el Estado nunca debería intervenir. 5e concluye con Lionel Robbins "Identificar tales doctrinas con las ideas declaradas y fácilmente accesibles de los economistas clásicos constituye un signo cierto de ignorancia o maldad"