Frank Dietrich

Zusammenfassung Die im Dezember 2022 in Kraft getretene Erweiterung des Infektionsschutzgesetzes sieht vor, im Fall einer Pandemie knappe intensivmedizinische Ressourcen nach dem Kriterium der Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit zu priorisieren. Der Aufsatz geht der Frage nach, ob der Vorwurf, diese Regelung setze Menschen mit Behinderung einer erheblichen Diskriminierungsgefahr aus, berechtigt ist. Nach einer kurzen Darstellung des im Infektionsschutzgesetz festgelegten Zuteilungsverfahrens wird zunächst das vielschichtige Konzept der Diskriminierung erörtert. Im Kontext der Allokation knapper intensivmedizinischer Ressourcen besteht vornehmlich das Risiko einer nichtintendierten Diskriminierung, die in direkter wie auch indirekter Form erfolgen kann. Die Regelungen, die das Infektionsschutzgesetz trifft, bieten Menschen mit Behinderung einen vergleichsweise hohen Schutz vor direkter Diskriminierung. Dennoch müssen Menschen mit bestimmten Behinderungen gravierende Nachteile hinnehmen, weil sie im Fall einer COVID-19-Infektion absehbar eine geringere Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit als gesunde Menschen haben. Eine indirekte Diskriminierung liegt aber nur dann vor, wenn für die Auferlegung disproportionaler Nachteile keine hinreichende Rechtfertigung angeführt werden kann. In modernen pluralistischen Gesellschaften, die durch tiefgreifende Wertkonflikte gekennzeichnet sind, sollten unterschiedliche ethische Theorien – darunter auch konsequentialistische Positionen – als mögliche Grundlage einer Rechtfertigung anerkannt werden. Im Ergebnis erweist sich der Vorwurf, eine am Kriterium der Überlebenswahrscheinlichkeit orientierte Zuteilung knapper intensivmedizinischer Ressourcen bewirke eine Diskriminierung von Menschen mit Behinderung, als nicht stichhaltig.

Zusammenfassung: Das Internet bietet die Möglichkeit, eine beliebig große Anzahl von Personen durch unterschiedliche Formen der Deliberation und Beschlussfassung politisch einzubinden. Insbesondere im kommunalen Kontext wird die Online-Partizipation – etwa im Rahmen städtischer Bürgerhaushalte – bereits vielfach als Mittel erprobt, um die soziale Akzeptanz und Legitimität politischer Entscheidungen zu erhöhen. Die Legitimität demokratischer Verfahren hängt neben anderen Faktoren maßgeblich von der Konstitution des Demos und der damit festgelegten Allokation der Teilnahmerechte ab. In historischer Perspektive hat vor allem die Exklusion bestimmter Gruppen, insbesondere von Frauen, Besitzlosen oder nichtweißen Personen, die Legitimität klassischer Offline-Verfahren, wie z. B. Parlamentswahlen, in Frage gestellt. Die neuen Formen der Online-Partizipation bergen hingegen – so die zentrale These des Aufsatzes – die Gefahr der Über-Inklusivität, weil sie häufig auf jegliche Zugangsbeschränkung verzichten. Selbst wenn die Verfahren, wie in der Praxis üblich, einen konsultativen Charakter haben und die politischen Entscheidungsträger formal nicht binden, führt ihre Offenheit zu Legitimationsproblemen. Daraus entsteht die Notwendigkeit, normative Kriterien für die Vergabe von Partizipationsrechten zu entwickeln, die den Besonderheiten der Online-Deliberation angemessen Rechnung tragen.

Die Möglichkeit, aus einer Gemeinschaft auszutreten und sich einer anderen Gemeinschaft anzuschließen oder außerhalb jeglicher Gemeinschaft zu bleiben, stellt ein zentrales Freiheitsrecht dar. Moderne Staaten begegnen bei der Gewährung individueller Austrittsoptionen jedoch gravierenden Problemen, die sich im Wesentlichen auf ihre territoriale Verfasstheit zurückführen lassen. Im Blickpunkt des Aufsatzes steht das Konzept der Panarchie, das der belgische Ökonom Paul-Emile de Puydt Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts entwickelt hat. Seine Überlegungen zu einer nichtterritorialen Form der Staatlichkeit zeigen einen interessanten Weg auf, die Austrittsoptionen der Individuen zu erweitern. Die von de Puydt vorgeschlagene Etablierung einer panarchistischen Herrschaft sieht sich aber mit erheblichen Schwierigkeiten konfrontiert, die es ratsam erscheinen lassen, seine Konzeption nur in abgeschwächter Form zu verwirklichen. Im Ergebnis wird für die Anerkennung partieller Austrittsrechte plädiert, die es den Individuen erlauben, sich der staatlichen Zuständigkeit in allen Bereichen zu entziehen, in denen ein territoriales Monopol des Staates nicht plausibel begründbar ist.

The child’s right to an open future aims at protecting the autonomy of the mature person into which a child will normally develop. The justification of state interventions into parental decisions which unduly restrict the options of the prospective adult has to address the problem that the value of autonomy is highly contested in modern pluralist societies. The article argues that the modern majority culture provides young adults with many more options than traditionalist religious communities. However, the options that can be chosen in faith groups, such as the Amish, do not constitute a subset of the options available in the wider society. Therefore, state policies which pursue the goal of providing every child with the greatest possible set of options cannot be based on a neutralist version of political liberalism. The advocates of a child’s right to an open future must rely on a perfectionist version of liberalism which draws on the ideal of leading an autonomous life. Since liberal perfectionism has problematic implications, the article defends a neutralist position that largely refrains from state interference with the educational authority of fundamentalist religious communities.

In modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their influence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decision making. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at first a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which does without the assumption of a privileged access to 'moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not influence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect.

Inhabitants of low-lying islands flooded due to anthropogenic climate change will lose their territory and thereby their ability to exercise their right to political self-determination. This paper addresses the normative questions which arise when climate change threatens territorial rights. It explores whether the loss of statehood supports a claim to territorial compensation, and if so, how it can be satisfied. The paper concludes that such claims are well founded and that they should be met by providing compensatory territories. After introducing a differentiation between land rights and territorial rights, previous theoretical responses to the problem of sinking islands are criticized. It is argued that states may be required to give up parts of their territory as compensation. The paper develops criteria of sufficiency for compensatory territories and proposes to base their selection process on a negative auction. Since it is unlikely that unsettled compensatory territories that meet the specified requirements are available, the rights of their original inhabitants are discussed.

By the example of deafness the article examines the ethical problems that arise when preimplantation genetic diagnosis is used for the intentional heredity of genetic defects. In the first two sections the relevant rules of the German Embryo Protection Law and the motives of deaf couples to desire a handicapped child are explained. Subsequently, it is asked whether the positive selection of genetic defects can harm or otherwise wrong the future child. Moreover, a possible duty of prospective parents to prefer an embryo which will most probably experience a higher quality of life is discussed. Finally, the question is raised whether parents have a right to refuse medical treatment that may alleviate their child's handicap. As a result, it is argued that neither a legal ban on the positive selection of handicapped embryos nor compulsory treatment of deaf children are ethically justified.

Theorists who support the legalisation of active euthanasia usually base their arguments on the principle of autonomy. In their view the wish of a severely ill person not to continue his or her life must be respected. However, some opponents of the legalisation of active euthanasia refer to the principle of autonomy as well. They are concerned that patients may be held responsible for burdening others with the provision of care. Thus family members, physicians or nurses may exert pressure on patients to opt for active euthanasia. In this article it is argued that these worries are justified; the occurrence of social coercion poses a real danger. However, neither the prohibition nor the permission of active euthanasia enables each individual to make an autonomous choice. Comparing the risks involved in both options, legalisation seems to be preferable to maintaining the status quo.

The secession of prosperous regions may negatively affect the redistributive scheme of an established state. As a consequence, the capacity of its welfare system to support the inhabitants of poorer regions may be significantly reduced. Some authors assert that affluent groups who opt for full political independence violate duties of solidarity. This objection to the secession of prosperous regions can be based on different views of distributive justice. Here, following a distinction that has been introduced by Allen Buchanan, ‘subject centred’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories are explored. It is argued that both theories fail to support the case against the secession of wealthy groups. ‘Subject centred’ theories cannot explain special duties toward compatriots, whereas ‘justice as reciprocity’ theories cannot justify restrictions on exit rights. However, this does not mean that separatists have no moral duties vis-à-vis their fellow citizens. They are obliged to dissolve the political union in a fair way, e.g., by accepting responsibility for some share of the public debts

The article addresses the issue of rationing health care services, a topic currently being hotly debated in many countries. The author argues that the aspect of causal responsibility ought to play a decisive role in the allocation of limited medical resources. Starting out from Ronald Dworkin's distinction between option luck and brute luck, the appropriate and meaningful uses of the term causal responsibility are clarified first. A discussion of the conditions which might justify giving lower priority to patients whose illnesses are the result of unhealthy behavior, like e.g. alcohol abuse, follows. Causal responsibility is then viewed in the context of private health insurance and the club model of organ donation. It is argued that individuals themselves are basically responsible for their decisions regarding insurance coverage and membership in organ donors' clubs. Causal responsibility is shown to be a more suitable criterion for rationing scarce medical resources than other criteria which might alternatively be considered, such as patients' age.

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, auf welcher Grundlage sich territoriale Ansprüche, die von Staaten erhoben werden, rechtfertigen lassen. Zunächst werden vier Legitimationstheorien, die in der aktuellen Diskussion häufig vertreten werden, untersucht und aus verschiedenen Gründen zurückgewiesen. Als Basis der Rechtfertigung scheiden damit individuelle Eigentumsrechte, der Verlauf der Geschichte, die Gerechtigkeit der staatlichen Herrschaft sowie die Selbstbestimmung nationaler Gemeinschaften aus. Abschließend wird die Auffassung vertreten, die Legitimität der staatlichen Gebietshoheit gründe in dem – gegebenenfalls in einem Referendum zu klärenden – Mehrheitswillen der ortsansässigen Bevölkerung.

Eingangs wird die Pflicht zum Rechtsgehorsam näher bestimmt und die Anforde-rungen, denen ihre theoretische Begründung zu entsprechen hat, dargelegt. Anschließend wird das Fairnessprinzip ausgehend von den Formulierungen, die sich in den Arbeiten von Hart und Rawls finden, erläutert. Im nächsten Schritt wird dann seine Anwendung auf die staatliche Gemeinschaft als Grundlage einer individuellen Pflicht zum Gesetzesgehorsam betrachtet. Darauf aufbauend wird die einflussreiche Kritik, die Robert Nozick an der Fairnesstheorie geübt hat, vorgestellt und erörtert. Danach gilt es den Versuch verschiedener zeitgenössischer Vertreter der Fairnesstheorie, die Einwände Nozicks zu entkräften, einer eingehenden Prüfung zu unterziehen. Im letzten Abschnitt wird die Argumentation resümiert und die Begründung individueller Fairnesspflichten im Rahmen der staatlichen Gemeinschaft abschließend bewertet.

Traditionally, state recognition in international law has been based on descriptive criteria stipulated by the Montevideo Convention. However, in the last decades the international community’s response to newly created political units has increasingly been oriented at legitimacy standards. As a consequence, several entities showing the basic characteristics of a state, such as North-Cyprus or Transnistria, failed to gain recognition. In the philosophical debate, most prominently Allen Buchanan has welcomed this development in international law. He argued that the recognition of illegitimate states creates perverse incentives and turns the recognizing parties into accomplices in injustice. However, judging applicants for statehood by normative principles creates, at least, three problems that require detailed examination. First, as long as established states which do not meet the relevant legitimacy standards cannot lose recognition, it seems unfair to withhold recognition from newly created political entities. Second, since the international legal order cannot exclude too many or too powerful states, there may be a need to compromise the principles of justice underlying the recognition account. Third, disagreement among the international community on the interpretation of normative principles may lead to a conflict-laden practice of partial recognition. In view of these objections it seems doubtful whether a “moralization” of state recognition in international law can be recommended on moral grounds

In his recent book One World one of Peter Singer’s main concerns is the preferential treatment of compatriots. Two aspects of Singer’s theoretical reflections on this issue are critically discussed: the use of an impartiality test as basis for the justification of special duties and the resulting condemnation of partial preferences for compatriots. Subsequently, an alternative way to justify special duties is outlined and applied to the case of fellow citizens. It is argued, that partiality to compatriots can be defended, if special duties are regarded as a constitutive part of valuable relationships.

On 17 February 2008, the province of Kosovo formally declared its independence from Serbia. The most important normative theories of secession*choice theories and just cause theories* appear to justify the creation of a second Albanian state on the Balkans. Kosovo’s independence reflects the will of the vast majority of its inhabitants and can be seen as a remedy for grave human rights violations in the era of Slobodan Milos?evic´. Two problems, however, need to be thoroughly discussed. Firstly, the secession of Kosovo may establish a precedent for other separatist conflicts and contribute to the destabilization of south-east Europe and other world regions. Secondly, the new political authorities in Pristina may not be capable to protect the Serb minority against discrimination and repression. It is argued that both problems give no conclusive reasons to reject Kosovo’s claim for independence. However, some aspects of the secession, for instance the maintenance of the provincial borders, are considered to be illegitimate. Keywords: drawing of borders; independence; majority decision; minority protection; primary right theories; remedial right theories; self-determination; sovereignty; territorial integrity Citation: Ethics & Global Politics, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 123-142. DOI: 10.3402/egp.v3i2.1983

In recent years theorists, such as Yael Tamir and David Miller, have proposed a liberal form of nationalism thereby combining two seemingly incompatible traditions of thought. Perhaps the most controversial element of their theories is the claim that national communities should be accorded with a right to political self-determination. In the article it is explained, firstly, why membership in a nation is seen as important for the individual’s well-being and, secondly, why statehood is deemed necessary for the thriving of the nation. Subsequently, two problems of the liberal nationalists’ argument for political self-determination are discussed. It is argued, firstly, that national communities only need some form of regional autonomy to achieve their most important goals and, secondly, that non-national communities, e.g. religious groups, can base their demand for political sovereignity on the very same argument.

In this chapter I will survey the philosophical discussion on the justification of territorial rights which has developed during the last two decades. By a territorial right I will understand a moral entitlement to exert jurisdictional power, i.e. to enact and to enforce laws, within a certain area. The theories of territorial rights which are currently debated in political philosophy can be broadly classified into four groups. In the following I will examine various forms of property theories, justice-based arguments, national accounts and choice theories. Ultimately, I will defend a plebiscitary version of choice theory which considers the will of the residents to be decisive for the assessment of territorial claims.

While the number of people is increasing rapidly on a global scale, the popula-tions of some countries, e.g. Germany or Japan, are predicted to shrink significantly. The article raises the question whether these demographic developments have any bearing on the justification of territorial rights. More specifically, it is asked whether drastically growing populations may demand declining populations to cede parts of their territo-ries. It is argued that a prima facie claim to the reallocation of territory can be grounded on end state theories as well as on historic accounts of distributive justice. However, several objections to the cession of land, such as the creation of perverse incentives, need to be taken into account. As an alternative to a complete transfer of territorial rights it is proposed to restrict single competences of the right holders concerned. It is maintained that states which control an overproportional share of the world’s territory ought to allow immigration from extremely densely populated countries.

This article examines the neoaristotelian theories of Martha Nussbaum and Douglas Rasmussen/douglas Den Uyl. Both sides give a similar account of good human living, which emphasizes the significance of individual autonomy. But they disagree sharply on the political institutions necessary to promote human flourishing; Nussbaum formulates a,social democratic' position; Rasmussen/den Uyl hold a,liberal‘ standpoint. The article explores both lines of reasoning. It is shown that neither Nussbaum nor Rasmussen/den Uyl present conclusive arguments for their political position.