La Trobe University
Department of Politics, Media and Philosophy
PhD, 1975
Acton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
  •  2749
    Epiphenomenal qualia
    Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April): 127-136. 1982.
  •  2006
    What Mary Didn’t Know
    Journal of Philosophy 83 (5): 291-295. 1986.
  •  1702
    Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
    Philosophical Review 110 (3): 315-61. 2001.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes . Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no
  •  752
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, m…Read more
  •  617
    David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson’s popular introduction to philosophy of mind and cognition is now available in a fully revised and updated edition. Ensures that the most recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science are brought together into a coherent, accessible whole. Revisions respond to feedback from students and teachers and make the volume even more useful for courses. New material includes: a section on Descartes’ famous objection to materialism; extended t…Read more
  •  527
    Oughts, options, and actualism
    with Robert Pargetter
    Philosophical Review 95 (2): 233-255. 1986.
  •  486
    Structural explanation in social theory
    with Philip Pettit
    In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism, Oxford University Press. pp. 97--131. 1992.
  •  451
    Program explanation: A general perspective
    Analysis 50 (2): 107-17. 1990.
    Some properties are causally relevant for a certain effect, others are not. In this paper we describe a problem for our understanding of this notion and then offer a solution in terms of the notion of a program explanation
  •  410
    Thought experiments and possibilities
    Analysis 69 (1): 100-109. 2009.
    1. Reflecting on possible cases can be very valuable in differing ways. Sometimes it makes clear a consequence of a theory, a consequence that then plays an important role in debates about the theory. Utilitarians who favour maximising average happiness confront utilitarians who favour maximising total happiness with possible cases where there are enormously many sentient beings whose lives are barely worth living. Sometimes reflecting on possible cases serves to clarify a doctrine. Classical ve…Read more
  •  386
    Conditionals (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 1991.
    This collection introduces the reader to some of the most interesting current work on conditionals. Particular attention is paid to possible world semantics for conditionals, the role of conditional probability in helping us to understand conditionals, implicature and the material conditional, and subjunctive versus indicative conditionals. Contributors include V.H. Dudman, Dorothy Edgington, Nelson Goodman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, and Robert Stalnaker.
  •  382
    Reference and description revisited
    Philosophical Perspectives 12 201-218. 1998.
  •  366
    Grue
    Journal of Philosophy 72 (5): 113-131. 1975.
  •  358
    Philosophy of Mind and Cognition
    with David Braddon-Mitchell
    Blackwell. 1996.
    The philosophy of mind and cognition has been transformed by recent advances in what is loosely called cognitive science. This book is a thoroughly up-to-date introduction to and account of that transformation, in which the many strands in contemporary cognitive science are brought together into a coherent philosophical picture of the mind. The book begins with discussions of the pre-history of contemporary philosophy of mind - dualism, behaviourism, and early versions of the identity theory of …Read more
  •  279
    In defense of folk psychology
    with Philip Pettit
    Philosophical Studies 59 (1): 31-54. 1990.
    It turned out that there was no phlogiston, no caloric fluid, and no luminiferous ether. Might it turn out that there are no beliefs and desires? Patricia and Paul Churchland say yes} We say no. In part one we give our positive argument for the existence of beliefs and desires.
  •  265
    Why We Need A - Intensions
    Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2): 257-277. 2004.
    I think recent discussions of content and reference have not paid enough attention to the role of language as a convention-governed system of communication. With this as a background theme, I explain the role of A-intensions in elucidating one important notion of content and correlative notions of reference.
  •  252
    Moral functionalism and moral motivation
    with Philip Pettit
    Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178): 20-40. 1995.
  •  248
    Three theses about dispositions
    with Elizabeth W. Prior and Robert Pargetter
    American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3): 251-257. 1982.
    I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
  •  236
    The teleological theory of content
    with David Braddon-Mitchell
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4): 474-89. 1997.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  228
    On assertion and indicative conditionals
    Philosophical Review 88 (4): 565-589. 1979.
    I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature
  •  220
    Perception: A Representative Theory
    Cambridge University Press. 1977.
    What is the nature of, and what is the relationship between, external objects and our visual perceptual experience of them? In this book, Frank Jackson defends the answers provided by the traditional Representative theory of perception. He argues, among other things that we are never immediately aware of external objects, that they are the causes of our perceptual experiences and that they have only the primary qualities. In the course of the argument, sense data and the distinction between medi…Read more
  •  213
    Colour for representationalists
    Erkenntnis 66 (1-2): 169--85. 2007.
    Redness is the property that makes things look red in normal circumstances. That seems obvious enough. But then colour is whatever property does that job: a certain reflectance profile as it might be. Redness is the property something is represented to have when it looks red. That seems obvious enough. But looking red does not represent that which looks red as having a certain reflectance profile. What should we say about this antinomy and how does our answer impact on the contest between realis…Read more
  •  209
    A problem for expressivism
    with Philip Pettit
    Analysis 58 (4). 1998.
    Expressivists hold that ethical sentences express attitudes. We argue that it is very hard for expressivists to give an account of the relevant sense of 'express' which has some plausibility and also delivers the kind of noncognitivist account of ethical sentences they affirm. Our argument draws on Locke's point that words are voluntary signs
  •  206
    Moral functionalism, supervenience and reductionism
    with Philip Pettit
    Philosophical Quarterly 46 (182): 82-86. 1996.
    We respond to Mark van Roojen's discussion of our 'Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation', "Philosophical Quarterly", 45 (January, 1995): 20-40. There we assumed that ethical language makes claims about how things are and sought to make plausible under this assumption a view of moral language modelled on David Lewis's treatment of theoretical terms. Van Roojen finds the idea of treating ethical terms as theoretical terms attractive but doubts that we 'have succeeded in offering a reduction of…Read more
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  •  197
    A causal theory of counterfactuals
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1). 1977.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  193
    Reflections on Mirror Man
    Philosophical Studies. forthcoming.
    Juhani Yli-Vakkuri and John Hawthorne have recently presented a thought experiment—Mirror Man—designed to refute internalist theories of belief and content. We distinguish five ways in which the case can be interpreted and argue that on none does it refute internalism.
  •  192
    Galen Strawson on panpsychism
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11): 62-64. 2006.
    We make powerful motor cars by suitably assembling items that are not themselves powerful, but we do not do this by 'adding in the power' at the very end of the assembly line; nor, if it comes to that, do we add portions of power along the way. Powerful motor cars are nothing over and above complex arrangements or aggregations of items that are not themselves powerful. The example illustrates the way aggregations can have interesting properties that the items aggregated lack. What can we say of …Read more