Purdue University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1998
West Lafayette, Indiana, United States of America
  •  480
    Aristotle as A-Theorist: Overcoming the Myth of Passage
    with Jacqueline Marina
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2): 169-192. 2001.
    Debate about the nature of time has been dominated by discussion of two issues: the reality of absolute time and the reality of A-series. We argue that Aristotle adopts a form of the A-theory entailing a denial of the reality of absolute time. Furthermore, Aristotle's denial of absolute time is linked to a denial of the reality of pure temporal becoming, namely, the idea that the now moves through a fixed continuum along which events are arranged in chronological order. We show that the puzzles …Read more
  •  346
    Aristotle as A-Theorist: Overcoming the Myth of Passage
    with Jacqueline Mariña
    Journal of History of Philosophy 39 169-192. 2001.
    Two things are often said about Aristotle's treatment of time in the Physics. First, that Aristotle's considered view of time is intrinsically tied to a language of temporal passage heavily dependent on the A-series. As such Aristotle's understanding of time is plagued with the perplexities that the A-series generates. Second, that the series of puzzles that Aristotle treats in IV.10, leading to the conclusion that time is non-existent, are left unanswered by Aristotle. Instead after presenting …Read more
  •  102
    In his ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?: An Argument for “Atomless Gunk’’, Dean Zimmerman defends the claim that no physical object has a complete decomposition into simples but instead has among its parts a piece of ‘atomless gunk’ His argument for this claim rests in part upon a theory of the impenetrability of physical objects. In that theory, Zimmerman distinguishes ‘[t]he sort of impenetrability that is a part of the concept of’ a physical object from ‘a power to resist …Read more
  •  59
    What is presentism?
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 44 (1): 107-128. 2006.
    Presentism has received much scrutiny of late, yet little has been said of its definition. Many assume that it means simply that all that exists, exists at present. However, this definition will not do. It is defective in a multiplicity of ways. I consider and reject each of a number of intuitive ways in which to amend it. Each carries us a bit closer to our goal, but not until the end do we reach a definition that is wholly satisfactory. The final definition has this remarkable feature: it has …Read more
  •  50
    The Presence of Experience and Two Theses About Time
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 35 (1): 75-89. 1997.
  •  47
    Parts and places: The structures of spatial representation
    Philosophical Review 110 (3): 479-481. 2001.
    The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then, is psychological, not metaphysical. Its object of study is not space. It is not the things that lie within it. Rather its object of study is us. In this regard, Parts and Places is at best a mixed success.
  •  45
    Presentism and the Special Theory
    Philo 11 (1): 19-49. 2008.
    Presentism—the thesis that only those things that are present exist—seems to face an insurmountable barrier in the Special Theory ofRelativity (STR). For the STR entails that simultaneity, and so the present, are relative to inertial frame. But if the present is the real and the present is relative, so too is in the real relative. But this cannot be. The real is absolute. But what is the Presentist to do? I suggest that she craft an alternative to the STR that is empirically equivalent to it but…Read more
  •  43
    The Grounds of Moral Considerability
    Philo 11 (2): 145-164. 2008.
    Not all beings matter from the moral point of view. But how are we to distinguish those that do from those that do not? Some argue that mere sentience alone makes a being matter morally. Others argue that an ability to set ends and thus to place value on those ends is necessary for moral value. I break from these views and argue for a radically more inclusive account of the source of moral value. What makes a being matter morally is that it has a good of its own.
  •  29
    Transient time and the persistence of the concrete
    Philosophia 28 (1-4): 491-501. 2001.
    I suggest that Carter and Hestevold's arguments for L1 and L2 can be given a chance to succeed if (i) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Transient Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism, and (ii) everywhere in them that we find an occurrence of the thesis Static Time we replace it with an occurrence of Presentism's denial. I'm fairly confident that their arguments for L1 would succeed if these changes were made. (If Presentism is true, nothing has temporal p…Read more
  •  23
    The purpose of Parts and Places, say Casati and Varzi in their introduction, is to construct “a theory of our spatial competence,” a theory that will lay bare how we conceive of space and the things that lie within it. Its purpose, then, is psychological, not metaphysical. Its object of study is not space. It is not the things that lie within it. Rather its object of study is us. In this regard, Parts and Places is at best a mixed success.
  •  16
    Aristotle as A-Theorist: Overcoming the Myth of Passage
    with Jacqueline Marina
    Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2): 169-192. 2001.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle as A-Theorist:Overcoming the Myth of PassageJacqueline Mariña and Franklin MasonTwo things are often said about Aristotle's treatment of time in the Physics. First, that Aristotle's considered view of time is intrinsically tied to a language of temporal passage heavily dependent on the A-series.1 As such Aristotle's understanding of time is plagued with the perplexities that the A-series generates.2 Second, that the series …Read more
  • The Reality of the Present
    Dissertation, Purdue University. 1998.
    The purpose of the present study is to explore and defend a particular thesis within the philosophy of time, viz., that the universe does not extend in the temporal dimension as it does in the three spatial dimensions but rather has the temporal breadth of one instant. All that exists exists at present, and thus, since the present is instantaneous, all that exists exists at one and the same moment of time, the moment that we call the present. I call this view of time Presentism. Presentism, I ar…Read more