Fulvia De Luise

The subject I intend to discuss deals with a problem which is central in the debate of ancient greek philosophy: the quest for happiness as the final end, the highest good for a human being. Fixing in the achievement of a life worth living the strategic aim of actions, ancient philosophers tried to define as well what a man should desire for himself to fully develop all the capabilities which lie inside human nature. On the one side they proposed major normative models of wisdom, on the other side they gave an important practical indication: the “care of the self”, as a self-control discipline that aims to build a virtuous form of subjectivity, that is able to design and deserve the eudaimonia. In this context, my analysis will focus on the issue of pleasure. The hedone surely represents the critical point of all happiness models of Socratic origin, centred in different ways on the practice of the “care of the self”. While this practical proposal appears to be a complex and demanding alternative in the search for a life worth living, the hedonistic way seems to be much easier and simpler, as far as pleasure is intended as an unequivocal sign of goodness and wellness, immediately recognisable in the experience of happiness. The hedonism of the many appears to the philosophers as a serious menace to society and to the individual, because it conveys unlimited desires and interior disharmony, though, on the other hand, it not possible to deny the value of pleasure without making philosophical happiness unattractive. In the field of the important contemporary re-evaluation of bios models of ancient philosophers (Hadot, Foucault, Nussbaum, Annas) to test their strength and operative capabilities in human subject’s condition in the present days, I would like to outline a comparison between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on the dilemmas set by pleasure in the enterprise of self-construction: their positions appear, as usual, close and at the same time opposite in the well-known “gigantomachy”.

This essay is broadly conceived as a study of how the emotional experience of shame can play an important role in the construction of personal identity. It considers, on the one hand, the way in which Greek culture conceives the social meaning of this emotion and, on the other, the double representation that Plato provides in the Symposium of two very different forms of pedagogy of shame. Using the Platonic text as a phenomenological source, the author discusses the general validity and relevance to the Greek world of the anthropological scheme that opposes «shame cultures» to «guilt cultures», attributing evolutionary primacy to the latter in terms of the acquisition of individual moral autonomy.

We would be wrong to state that Plato’s approach to the Golden Age in the Statesman occurs through nostalgia, even if he stresses the immense distance between our world and that blessed time. After evoking the shepherd-god as a ruler, Plato shows that the completely abandoned disposition of the ruled is only justifiable in presence of an unbridgeable chasm between the two, such as that between gods and men, or men and beasts. The real question in the Statesman is how to single out the peculiar form of knowledge possessed by the few men that are truly capable to rule.

Il saggio si propone di mostrare la compresenza di aspetti collaborativi e competitivi all'interno della pratica del dialogo. Risalendo al di qua dell'esempio di Socrate, cui si riconosce in qualche modo l'invenzione di una ‘tecnica' del confronto tra interlocutori interessati alla ricerca della veritÀ, l'autrice intende mostrare le radici conflittuali della forma-dialogo e le implicazioni meno rassicuranti della dialettica discorsiva. Il tema del dialogo indica certo l'emergere di una possibilitÀ evolutiva nel cammino politico della civiltÀ: dalle passioni distruttive degli eroi omerici all'impegno a perfezionare se stessi esponendosi a un pacifico confronto. Senza dimenticare, perň, che la natura dell'uomo si rispecchia in molti animali diversi e che il dialogo con lupi e sparvieri resta difficile.

Vingt ans après le premier numéro de Philosophie Antique, consacré aux « Figures de Socrate », le panorama des études socratiques semble avoir été profondément modifié par certaines nouveautés en matière de contenu et de méthode, issues d’une meilleure compréhension du phénomène des logoi sokratikoi et de son importance dans l’histoire culturelle et politique athénienne des ve et ive siècles.L’usage de la méthode intertextuelle a non seulement contribué à briser le monopole platonicien dans la transmission du patrimoine socratique, mais également à dépasser une lecture doctrinale des textes platoniciens, au profit d’une lecture plus attentive à la forme dialogique de l’écriture et à la logique interne de la représentation proposée par l’auteur : une mise en scène du débat éthique et politique du passé récent d’Athènes, dans lequel Socrate joue le rôle de conscience critique de la cité alors que Platon est tout simplement absent. Compte tenu de l’importance de cette reconstruction de la mémoire commune, dans le cadre des conflits d’idées et de références politiques qui impliquent certainement les socratiques, cet essai se propose de relire des aspects particuliers de la représentation platonicienne de Socrate : 1) la solitude du philosophe, obtenue aussi en minimisant et en discréditant la présence des socratiques autour de lui ; 2) l’« atopie » de Socrate, en tant que pratique du paradoxe incluant le renversement des canons traditionnels du savoir et du pouvoir ; 3) la vertu comme enjeu d’un défi dont dépend le choix des meilleurs hommes d’Athènes pour le gouvernement politique ; un défi dans lequel le Socrate platonicien prend une position très différente de celle d’Antisthène et de Xénophon, qui soulignent en revanche l’importance morale des vertus les plus dures (enkrateia, karteria), en évoquant un monde de valeurs semblable au modèle lacédémonien. Le but de cette recherche est de montrer que Platon expose une perspective politique divergente (par rapport à la cité démocratique et par rapport aux autres socratiques) à travers les choix pratiqués par son Socrate en matière de vertu. Ce sont des choix qui développent de manière cohérente le paradoxe de l’« atopie » de Socrate, nous permettant de tracer les lignes d’un dessin unitaire à travers différents contextes, y compris entre des dialogues traditionnellement considérés comme distants les uns des autres : entre le Protagoras et la République, ou entre le Criton, le Gorgias et le Politique. Le renversement des canons traditionnels trouve également son expression esthétique dans le masque de Socrate en Silène.

Il saggio si propone di mostrare come dalla Repubblica di Platone emerga un progetto di felicità “relazionale”, basato cioè sulla buona qualità delle relazioni sociali e sulla consonanza armonica tra equilibrio interiore e valori civili. L’idea-guida è che la logica costruttiva della kallipolis rappresenti anche il superamento di una certa immagine socratica, legata all’autosufficienza della virtù e ad una prospettiva di felicità più eroica e solitaria.The essays wants to show how from Plato’s Republic emerges a project of a “relation-based” happiness, which is based on the good quality of social relationships and the harmonious consonance between inner balance and social values. The key idea is that the constructive logic of the kallipolis also represents the overcoming of a certain Socratic image, linked to the self-sufficiency of virtue and to a perspective of happiness more heroic and solitary

Se e in che modo il piacere abbia a che fare con il modello di vita preferibile è argomento centrale, sia nella cultura greca, sia nel dibattito filosofico antico. Questo articolo confronta le differenti soluzioni che Platone e Aristotele hanno dato alla questione del piacere, rispettivamente nel Filebo e nell’Etica Nicomachea, registrando una significativa divergenza nel metodo e nella concezione antropologica.Whether and in what way pleasure has to do with a desirable lifestyle is a main topic both in Greek culture and in ancient philosophical debate. This article compares the different solutions that Plato and Aristotle gave to the question of pleasure, in Philebus and in Nicomachean Ethics respectively, pointing out an important divergence in method and anthropological conception

L’articolo si propone di mostrare alcuni aspetti della strategia platonica nella Repubblica. L’analisi è condotta ricostruendo in primo luogo il modo in cui si presentava a Platone la questione della giustizia, con particolare riferimento alla tradizione relativa a Dike e alla crisi della cultura cittadina ateniese, tra V e IV secolo; in secondo luogo segnala il rapporto ambivalente che Platone intrat¬tiene con la cultura socratica della giustizia interiore; si indirizza infine a mostrare le modalità costruttive con cui Platone propone di risolvere il conflitto nell’anima e nella città, ricorrendo ad una poli¬tica delle emozioni che non necessariamente esclude la compas¬sione.This article intends to illustrate some aspects of the platonic strategy in the Republic. The analysis is carried out at first by revising the way in which Plato was faced with the question of justice, with particular emphasis on the Dike’s tradition and on the crisis of the Athenian urban culture, between the Vth and IVth centuries; secondly, it points out Plato’s ambivalent relationship with the Socratic culture of inner justice; it finally underlines the structural procedures according to which Plato intends to solve the conflict in the soul and in the city and to realize forms of social identity, resorting to a policy of emotions which does non necessarily exclude compassion