G. Gérard

This article inquires into that which articulates the two texts brought together by Heidegger in Identity and Difference. It sets out from the indications provided in the Preface of the work concerning the “harmony” that reigns between what is at stake at the heart of the two texts, namely what Heidegger respectively calls the Ereignis (event of appropriation) and the Austrag (reconciling difference). The understanding of this harmony makes it possible to approach that which unveils itself as the articulation of Being, but in so doing also raises the difficult problem of the very possibility of thinking Being setting out from its essential withdrawal.

Le propos de cet article est de chercher à dégager les raisons de l'exceptionnelle admiration vouée par Hegel à Aristote. La thèse avancée est que ce que Hegel découvre chez le Stagirite, en particulier dans sa Métaphysique, c'est, dans le contexte du commencement grec de la philosophie, l'anticipation géniale de sa propre compréhension de la substance en tant que sujet. Cette thèse est développée en deux temps. Il s'agit tout d'abord de montrer qu'aux yeux de Hegel la philosophie ancienne n'a de façon générale nullement ignoré la notion de subjectivité au sens qu'elle prendra au sein de la modernité, même si elle n'a pu lui conférer son plein déploiement. Ensuite, il s'agit d'établir, en s'attachant plus spécifiquement aux pages que Hegel consacre à Aristote dans ses Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie, que c'est chez lui, dans la conception dynamique de la substance comme energeia active et effectuante qu'il développe dans sa Métaphysique, que cette modernité affleure de la façon la plus claire et la plus complète. The purpose of this article is to attempt to elucidate the reasons for Hegel's exceptional admiration for Aristotle. The thesis put forward is that what Hegel discovers in the Stagirite, particularly in his Metaphysics, is, in the context of the Greek origins of philosophy, the brilliant anticipation of his own understanding of substance as subject. This thesis is developed in two stages. In the first place the aim is to show that in Hegel's eyes ancient philosophy in general in no way ignored the notion of subjectivity in the sense it will take on in modern times, even if it was unable to develop it fully. The goal is then, based more specifically on the pages devoted by Hegel to Aristotle in his Lectures on the history of philosophy, to establish that it is in him, in the dynamic conception of substance as active and realising energeia that he develops in his Metaphysics, that modern philosophy emerges in the clearest and most complete way

Recent developments in agriculture have stirred up interest in the concept of “sustainable” farming systems. Still it is difficult to determine the extent to which certain agricultural practices can be considered sustainable or not. Aiming at identifying the necessary attributes with respect to sustainability in Dutch dairy farming in the beginning of the third millennium, we first compiled a list of attributes referring to all farming activities with their related side effects with respect to economic, internal social, external social, and ecological sustainability. A wide range of people (i.e., experts and stakeholders) were consulted to contribute to our list of attributes. Our consultation showed that only one attribute was selected for economic and internal social sustainability: profitability and working conditions, respectively. The list for external social sustainability contained 19 attributes and the list for ecological sustainability contained 15 attributes. To assess their relative importance, the same experts and stakeholders ranked the attributes for external social and ecological sustainability by using a questionnaire. The most important attributes for external social sustainability were food safety, animal health, animal welfare, landscape quality, and cattle grazing. For ecological sustainability they were eutrophication, groundwater pollution, dehydration of the soil, acidification, and biodiversity. The present method for identifying and ranking attributes is universal and, therefore, can be used for other agricultural sectors, for other countries, and for other time periods.

This article investigates how late nineteenth century Japanese philosophers responded to large categories of ideas imported from the West and for which there were no Japanese equivalents; mainly "science," "religion," and "philosophy." Discussions on whether Buddhism or Confucianism would fall under "philosophy" or "religion" accompanied a re-categorization of ideas. Some philosophers made elaborate reconstructions of Buddhism and Confucianism as modern philosophies. However, over time, Japanese categorizations of Buddhism and Confucianism shifted from "philosophy" (tetsugaku) to "thought" (shisō). Investigating Meiji philosophy from the perspective of this problem of categories makes it is possible to reevaluate it on its own terms.

Cet article se propose d’interroger la compréhension par Hegel de sa propre pensée comme « fin » de l’histoire de la philosophie. Il montre tout d’abord de quelle manière cette compréhension est bien incontestable chez Hegel. Il entreprend ensuite d’analyser la signification essentielle, mais éminemment complexe que revêt la notion de fin ici en question. Il cherche enfin à établir que loin d’être le gage d’un dogmatisme intempérant, la position de fin de la philosophie que Hegel impute à sa pensée est au contraire l’expression de son antidogmatisme résolu qui entend restituer la vérité à son essence dynamique et inquiète, et, de là, à son historicité foncière.This article sets out to inquire into Hegel’s understanding of his own thought as the “end” of the history of philosophy. It shows firstly how Hegel unquestionably understood his philosophy this way. It then sets out to analyse the essential, but highly complex meaning taken on by the concept of “end” in question here. It seeks finally to establish that, far from being a token of immoderate dogmatism, the view of being the end of philosophy which Hegel attributes to his thought is, on the contrary, the expression of his resolute opposition to dogmatism which seeks to restore truth to its dynamic and restless essence, and hence to its fundamental historicity