Gabriel Gottlieb

According to J. G. Fichte, for a science to possess systematic form the science must begin with a first principle known with certainty and each proposition within the science must be validly connected to the first principle. The content of the Wissenschaftslehre consists of essentially one kind of content, what he calls “the acts of the human mind” He also holds that the Wissenschaftslehre provides each science its own first principle, thus making up part of its content. Following his first publications, F. W. J. Schelling began to simultaneously develop a philosophy of nature, or Naturphilosophie, and to systematize his view of transcendental philosophy. His Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature and First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature were followed by the System of Transcendental Idealism. Where Spinoza attempted to provide a model of the unconditional as a self‐causing substance, Schelling conceives of the unconditional as the absolute or self‐positing.

Fichte’s Foundations of Natural Right develops an intersubjective view of individual self-consciousness. The central concept of this view is his notion of the summons, which he characterizes as upbringing. I argue that Fichte has a developmental view of self-consciousness in which a subject is brought up, through relations of recognition, to be first an individual human being that is capable of responding to reasons and second a political individual that respects other political individuals’ rights. My argument shows that Fichte has two conceptions of recognition, elementary recognition and political recognition, as well as two conceptions of the individual, the individual human being and the political individual. I examine Fichte’s conception of Erziehung, or upbringing, and particularly, Fichte’s remarks about child rearing in order to disambiguate the two types of recognition and individuality.

The essay provides a new interpretation of Fichte’s deduction of the external world that considers the argument to be motivated not by epistemic concerns but by concerns about the possibility of freedom. In defending this view, I critically examine Frederick Beiser’s reconstruction of Fichte’s deduction, which characterizes the argument as refuting external world skepticism, exactly the threat by which Fichte is not troubled. I claim that Fichte is troubled by ethical skepticism, the view that the freedom required for self-consciousness is not possible. Establishing the possibility of the freedom involved in self-consciousness requires an external world suitable for such a form of freedom. An implication of this claim is that the world that Fichte deduces is an intersubjective or social world.

Hubert Dreyfus has defended a novel view of agency, most notably in his debate with John McDowell. Dreyfus argues that expert actions are primarily unreflective and do not involve conceptual activity. In unreflective action, embodied know-how plays the role reflection and conceptuality play in the actions of novices. Dreyfus employs two arguments to support his conclusion: the argument from speed and the phenomenological argument. I argue that Dreyfus's argumentative strategies are not successful, since he relies on a dubious assumption about concepts and reflection. I suggest that Dreyfus is committed to a minimal view of conceptuality in action

Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right was one of the most influential books in nineteenth-century philosophy. It was read carefully by Schelling, Hegel, and Marx, and initiated a tradition in German philosophy that considers human subjectivity to be relational and intersubjective, thus requiring relations of recognition between subjects. The essays in this volume highlight this little-understood book's most important ideas and innovations. They offer discussions of Fichte's conception of freedom, self-consciousness, coercion, the summons, the body, and human rights, together with new analyses of his deduction of right, his views on the social contract, and his arguments for the separation of right from morality. The essays expand and deepen ongoing debates in the scholarship and chart new avenues of thought about Fichte's most enduring work of political philosophy. They will be essential reading for students and scholars of German Idealism, nineteenth-century philosophy, and the history of political thought.

I examine two explanatory models of choking: the representationalist model and the anti-representationalist model. The representationalist model is based largely on Anderson's ACT model of procedural knowledge and is developed by Masters, Beilock and Carr. The antirepresentationalist model is based on dynamical models of cognition and embodied action and is developed by Dreyfus who employs an antirepresentational view of know-how. I identify the models' similarities and differences. I then suggest that Dreyfus is wrong to believe representational activity requires reflection and attention. I also argue that the representationalist model of choking is preferable, since some embodied actions require appeals to representations, something not available to Dreyfus's anti-representational model