•  293
    Seeing What is not There
    Philosophical Review 98 (2): 189. 1989.
  •  164
    Keep Making Sense
    Synthese 170 (2): 275-287. 2009.
    In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.
  •  140
    Cognitive content and propositional attitude attributions
    In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2006.
    Tyler Burge (Burge (1979)) has developed a very influential line of anti-individualistic thought. He argued that the cognitive content of a person
  •  131
    The causal inefficacy of content
    Mind and Language 24 (1): 80-102. 2009.
    The paper begins with the assumption that psychological event tokens are identical to or constituted from physical events. It then articulates a familiar apparent problem concerning the causal role of psychological properties. If they do not reduce to physical properties, then either they must be epiphenomenal or any effects they cause must also be caused by physical properties, and hence be overdetermined. It then argues that both epiphenomenalism and over-determinationism are prima facie perfe…Read more
  •  125
    The causal efficacy of content
    Philosophical Studies 63 (July): 1-30. 1991.
    Several philosophers have argued recently that semantic properties do play a causal role. 1 It is our view that none of these arguments are satisfactory. Our aim is to reveal some of the deficiencies of these arguments, and to reassess the question in our own way. In section 1, we shall explain in more detail what is involved in the pretheoretical idea of a causally efficacious property and so provide a fuller sense of the issue. In section 2 we shall discuss Fodor's and Kim's arguments that the…Read more
  •  112
    In this chapter, I will compare and contrast singular concepts with what I call
  •  98
    Two theories of names
    Mind and Language 16 (5). 2001.
    Two semantic theories of proper names are explained and assessed. The theories are Burge’s treatment of proper names as complex demonstratives and Larson and Segal’s quasi-descriptivist account of names. The two theories are evaluated for empirical plausibility. Data from deficits, processing models, developmental studies and syntax are all discussed. It is concluded that neither theory is fully confirmed or refuted by the data, but that Larson and Segal’s theory has more empirical plausibility
  •  97
    The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.
  •  85
    A preference for sense and reference
    Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 73-89. 1989.
    The topic of this paper is the semantic structure of belief reports of the form 'a believes that p'. it is argued that no existing theory of these sentences satisfactorily accounts for anaphoric relations linking expressions within the embedded complement sentence to expressions outside. a new account of belief reports is proposed which assigns to embedded expressions their normal semantic values but which also exploits frege's idea of using senses to explain the apparent failures of extensional…Read more
  •  68
    Two Theories of Names
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51 75-93. 2002.
    The aim of this paper is to assess the relative merits of two accounts of the semantics of proper names. The enterprise is of particular interest because the theories are very similar in fundamental respects. In particular, they can agree on three major features of names: names are rigid designators; different co-extensive names can have different cognitive significance; empty proper names can be meaningful. Neither theory by itself offers complete explanations of all three features. But each th…Read more
  •  66
    of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online).
  •  63
    Intentionality
    In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Article
  •  55
    Alcoholism, Disease, and Insanity
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (4): 297-315. 2013.
    It is argued that alcoholism, and substance addiction generally, is a disease. It is not of its nature chronic or progressive, although it is in serious cases. It is better viewed as a psychological disease than a neurological one. It is argued that each time an alcoholic takes a drink, this is the result of choice; however, in cases of serious affliction, such choices are compulsive and may be called 'involuntary' in that they are made against the subject's will, motivated by an overwhelmingly …Read more
  •  54
    Truth and Meaning
    In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    This article says something about previous work related to truth and meaning, goes on to discuss Davidson and related papers of his, and then discusses some issues arising. It begins with the work of Gottlob Frege. Much work in the twentieth century developed Frege's ideas. A great deal of that work continued with the assumption that semantics is fundamentally concerned with the assignments of entities to expressions. So, for example, those who tried to develop a formal account of sense did so b…Read more
  •  48
    This paper is principally devoted to comparing and contrasting poverty of stimulus arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in relation to language and in relation to folk psychology. These days one is no longer allowed to use the term ‘innate’ without saying what one means by it. So I will begin by saying what I mean by ‘innate’. Sections 2 and 3 will discuss language and theory of mind, respectively. Along the way, I will also briefly discuss other arguments for innate cognitive apparatus in t…Read more
  •  45
  •  40
    On Saying �??
    with Margaret Speas
    Mind and Language 1 (2): 124-132. 1986.
  •  35
    VI—In the Mood for a Semantic Theory
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91 (1): 103-118. 1991.
  •  27
  •  26
    Consciousness, by W. G. Lycan
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1): 240-243. 1991.
  •  22
    Priorities in the Philosophy of Thought
    with James Higginbotham
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1). 1994.
  •  20
    Ignorance of meaning
    In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language, Oxford University Press. 2003.
    Article